101 nights on the discourse of self-legitimization: the case of Duško Tadić by Da Silva, Miguel Jesus Neves Ferreira & Vidal Bouzon, A.J.
Da Silva, Miguel Jesus Neves Ferreira and Vidal 
Bouzon, A.J. (2011) 101 nights on the discourse of self-
legitimization: the case of Duško Tadić. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28096/1/555499.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
101 NIGHTS 
ON THE DISCOURSE OF SELF-LEGITIMIZATION: 
THE CASE OF 
DUSKO T ADIC. 
MIGUEL JESUS NEVES FERREIRA DA SILVA 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
March 2011 
Abstract 
This thesis addresses the legitimacy discourse of the ad-hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, by focusing on a particular case study: the 
Interlocutory Motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the Dusko Tadi6 
case. This, the first ever International Criminal Tribunal established by the United 
Nations Security Council, faced in the initial proceedings with the first indictee to be 
present in the Chambers a challenge as to the lawfulness of its own establishment, 
and therefore as to its legitimacy. 
The lack of historical precedents for this novel jurisdiction, and the context of the 
more multicultural-driven international relations of the 1990s, that is, because of 
the collapse of the superpowers and the temporary suspension of the logic of a 
bipolar world, were all expected to validate a complex discourse of legitimacy, 
namely, through recourse to extra-legal references. In fact, the acceptance, and 
therefore the legitimacy, of the new jurisdiction depended on the recognition of a 
shared historical, cultural and political context, or, at least, of recognizable politico-
cultural references beyond the legalistic self-contained judicial speech. 
After extensively reviewing the initial materials of the challenge presented before 
the court, the thesis focuses its research on the Tribunal's Decisions, both at Trial 
and Appeal levels, identifying the attempts to break a self-referential legal 
discourse. The uncertainty of the historical moment, together with the hesitation on 
the use of politico-cultural references on the part of the Tribunal, sustains the 
conclusion of this thesis that no coherent legitimacy discourse is here attained. 
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Preface 
The thesis which follows, born of a concern to examine general issues of 
references of legitimacy in International Criminal Law came to rest, and confidently, 
on close examination of a particular case-study. 
The decision to focus on the case of Dusko Tadic, the very first indictee to be 
present before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at 
The Hague, and also the first to challenge the legitimacy of the Tribunal, will stand, 
but not in isolation, as a lesson and a warning to those, even and especially 
professional lawyers, who would pretend that the Law, national or international, 
can transcend the political constraints which drive, motivate and, yes, distort the 
implementation of its own discourses. 
The reader, whilst encountering a body of thought and argumentation drawn 
primarily from the Motion, Response, and Decisions, will rapidly learn that 
interfering, often contradictory, elements intrude. As the thesis develops and as the 
reader becomes accustomed to the nature of the legalistic discourses under 
analysis, the emphasis will be ever more on the interferences, whilst never 
neglecting the legal discursive base. 
7 
Introduction 
The subject of research is the basis of the judicial discourse of ad-hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals, insofar as they address the legitimacy of their own 
establishment. Although reference is made to other Courts and Tribunals, it is 
made so as to mark, within the same timeframe, the uniqueness of ad-hoc 
Tribunals in the period prior to the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), an option explained by the fact that only ad-hoc Tribunals were established 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions (Res.) acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
When considering the historical process of establishing ad-hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals (Yugoslavia and Rwanda), their respective initial cases and first 
legitimacy challenges, a clear seminal reference surfaces regarding the Dusko 
Tadic case, or better still its proceedings following the Defence Motion on the 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic (Tadic 
case), challenging the legitimacy of the Tribunal. Subsequent references 
reinforcing the precedent nature of that first judicial review lead to the hypothesis 
that the Decisions on this legitimacy-challenging Motion, both at Trial and Appeal 
level, can constitute the first basis of a legitimacy discourse by these Tribunals. 
The full analysis of the discursive contents of the proceedings of the Tadic case is 
incompatible with the formal limitations of a Thesis, thus imposing difficult choices. 
So as to allow for a full focused review of the central arguments regarding the 
legitimacy of the ICTY, only the first part of the Decisions will be fully reviewed, i.e., 
the Trial and Appeal's Decisions discourse facing the question on the legitimacy of 
the establishment of the ICTY (and not the second challenge, on the primacy over 
national courts, nor the third, on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal). 
These imposed limits, in the review of the Decisions, have the advantage of the 
non-contamination of arguments given that, at times, the argumentative path, 
although keeping the traditional legal discourse (of containment of arguments, and 
final col/age in the Decision) seems to use some circumlocutory speeches for 
reasoning in more than one challenge. 
However, the challenges posed by the Tadic case could not be coherently grasped 
without the framing of legal questions faced by the ICTY. To this end, and given 
that first limitation, an option was made to review extensively all the initial 
documents submitted to the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in order to present a 
complete picture of those initial references, or misconceptions, inherent in 
questioning the legitimacy (and not, as formally dubbed, the legality) of a novel, 
international criminal jurisdiction, established by a political organ of the United 
Nations (UN). 
The objective of the research is to present that framing of the legitimacy questions 
posed before the ICTY, and then, parting from the legal proceedings, to discuss 
the legitimacy arguments in those Decisions' discourses vis-a-vis (i) the Tribunal's 
power to review UNSC Resolutions, and (ii) if and when the Tribunal decides on its 
lack of competence to do so, if the arguments summoned to these Decisions end 
up addressing the issue; (iii) finally, in this last case, even in a non-binding 
Decision, to ascertain if the justifying arguments constitute, in fact, a global 
doctrine (i.e. discourse) on the legitimacy of these judicial organs. 
Hopefully, the result will allow us to answer seven questions: 
1. In the proceedings of the ad-hoc Tribunal, do the elements in its official 
positions, the Decisions, address the legitimacy of the Tribunals? 
2. ConSidering these Decisions, do they present a discourse of legitimacy? 
3. Do these Decisions, in fact, and not only or necessarily de jure, review the 
UNSC Resolutions' legitimacy or legality? 
According to such a possible discourse, is the UNSC: 
4. A constitutional body? 
5. Empowered to create judicial organs? 
6. Empowered to impose Tribunals upon States? 
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After answering these questions and focusing on the Tadic case, we might draw 
one or more of two sets of possible conclusions: 
1. Regarding the Tribunal's discourse on legitimacy: 
1.1. There is no judicial discourse on the legitimacy of the ICTY; or 
1.2. There is a judicial discourse on the legitimacy of this Tribunal. In which 
case: 
And 
1.2.1.lt is fully recognised by the Tribunal as the exercise of its own judicial 
powers; or 
1.2.2 It is adopted even though the Tribunal refers to it partially or only in 
an explanatory, non-binding way. 
1.2.3.Such discourse does not review UNSC Resolutions; or 
1.2.4.Such discourse reviews UNSC Resolutions, even if not in a binding 
manner. 
2. Regarding the judicial (re)view of the UNSC powers: 
2.1. The UNSC is not a constitutional organ; or 
2.2. The UNSC is a constitutional organ empowered to establish judicial 
organs, but respecting State sovereignty (in whatever way); or 
2.3. The UNSC is a constitutional organ empowered to establish judicial 
organs, which can be imposed upon States. 
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CHAPTER I - The Issue 
Section I - The Issue in perspective 
The thesis will follow an empirical approach, by extensively reviewing the case 
study. However, in this particular case, the empirical research reaches into the 
theoretical research, not so much to limit the subject of the thesis, but rather 
because the theoretical avant-garde of the matter is set precisely where the subject 
finds its data: the Tribunal's legal discourse. Other approaches tend to focus on 
one of two aspects: (i) reviewing the Tribunals' Decisions in the light of established 
legal Doctrine; or (ii) bringing out the precedent nature of the uniqueness of some 
aspects of the Decisions, as the creation of new recognisable Rules of 
International Law. The hypothesis that the Tadic case 1 constitutes the first basis of 
this discourse, further highlighted by its possible precedent nature, presents the 
double advantage (i) of parting with global theoretical approaches (on jurisdiction 
as on international rules) and focusing on a specific judicial discourse; and (il) 
reinforcing the possibilities that the research can obtain two goals (conclusions on 
the legitimacy discourse, and on the importance of the Tadic case in this same 
discourse ). 
The intended difference of the current research from the strictly legalistic is its 
primarily socio-cultural resonance: to start with the Decisions, and only those, 
parting from legal preconceptions on their analysis, and aiming not to identify new 
Rules, but rather recognising the judicial view of the legislative power of judicial 
creation. It might be said that such an approach touches, or nonetheless concerns, 
International Relations or Political Theory. The aimed novelty is to gather and 
process data, originated in the judicial discourse, from a cultural discourse analysis 
perspective, aware of our conclusions, possible interest for those fields of study. 
1 As it is now clear, the Importance of Tadic case to the current research results solely from 
the proceedings directly connected with the Motion challenging the ICTY legitimacy. 
Therefore, hereinafter, every reference to the "Tadic case", should be understood as 
referring only to that part of the case, i.e. the proceedings from the Motion to the Appeals' 
Chamber Decision. 
II 
Unlike any others, the International Criminal Tribunal for (the Former) Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are political 
creations2 to obtain a political goal, through judicial imposition of legal means yet to 
be ascertained. It was up to the Tribunals to establish their discourse, as always, 
but uniquely also to establish the legal interpretation of the political acts that 
created them, as well as to create (and not only discover) new rules in International 
Criminal Law, e.g. Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Empirical research is also involved because the subject is a novelty, and a novelty 
set in a record time: the 92 calendar days between UNSC Res. 808, deciding to 
establish the ICTY and UNSC Res. 827, establishing the Tribunal and adopting the 
SICTY, but also, regarding the Tadic case - i.e. the legitimacy challenge 
proceedings - the 101 calendar days between the filing of the Motion on 23 June 
1995 and the Appeal Decision on 2 October 1995. The solutions, object of 
academic scrutiny, though incorporating many of the theoretical debates of the 
day, are in themselves empirically born as the result of judicial Decisions, yet 
theoretical advancements, for the novelty of the never before explored solutions 
adopted. In this sense this is empirical research both because the reality of the 
Tribunal surpassed theoretical fiction, and the empirical work of the ad-hoc courts 
became the edge of the research theory. 
Suffice it to say that after the first two stones were thrown - ICTY and ICTR - the 
international community made a very real theoretical U-turn, by going back to the 
well established traditional instruments, such as the Treaty of Rome establishing 
the ICC. The fact remains that the jurisprudence of those Tribunals is considered to 
be the first codification of much International Humanitarian Law (IHL). On the other 
hand, the Tribunals, themselves, are not only still operational, as they are 
operating: a statement on the relevance of the empirical advancement of the 
science, or of the fusion between International Law and International Relations. 
2 See generally, Kerr (2004: 175-207), where in particular the ICTY is said to be "inherently 
political ( ... ) by virtue of their method of establishment", and the quotation therein of Justice 
Richard Goldstone (4nl, both p.175 
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The legalization of International Relations politicized International Law. Either way 
it is the experience of the experiments that brings, and in fact brought the 
acceptance of the novelties in enforcing International Criminal Law (ICL) by ad-hoc 
Tribunals. And the fact that an ICC was long longed for, and the ICTY took fewer 
than 100 days from intention to establishment, suggests the relevance of an 
empirical approach. 
The subject matter for the research, the origins of an International Criminal 
Tribunal's Discourse prior to the ICC, is set mainly considering the interest in 
recording and researching the self-legitimizing discourse of a new type of 
international jurisdiction. An interest renewed by later contradictory developments: 
moving away of the new solution, as the ICL enforcement by UNSC subsidiary 
organs, but still keeping operational both ICTY and ICTR. 
Thus our field of research, when looking for legitimacy discourse, focuses (i) on the 
International Criminal Tribunals prior to the ICC, and among these (ii) only the ones 
established up until the establishment of the ICC, on 1 July 2002, and even among 
these, rendering particular relevance to (iii) those which follow new forms of 
establishment, i.e. the ICTY and ICTR. 
Between all International Criminal Courts and Tribunals within the period, an 
unmanageable enterprise beyond the scope of this thesis, only that representing a 
theoretical novelty will be subject to deeper research on its discourse. That 
discourse means the official documents that either (i) establish the case or (ii) are 
the results of the Tribunals' review of legitimacy, usually as a result of challenges 
to its jurisdiction, i.e. the first proceedings which can include a legitimacy 
discourse. 
The main difficulty anticipated, in delimiting the subject of research, results from 
separate approaches, from theory, attaining themselves to the legal perspective on 
legality or, more relevantly, the political perspective of legitimacy in international 
relations and its consequent cultural impact. Such a difficulty may be overcome by 
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reviewing the full set of legal arguments, as included in official documents by the 
Tribunals, and only then discussing those in the light of their legitimacy 
discourse(s). This methodology is intended to avoid a Gordian knot of International 
Relations theories, Political Theory and Legal Theory through an empirical 
approach to the subject. 
A theoretical International Law critique would mainly focus on the Decisions, as 
self-contained speech, while a legal procedural approach would review the full 
extent of the proceedings. Neither would at the same time distance from the strictly 
judicial process and adopted Decisions, and still be able to find a possible, and 
somewhat more political, discourse of legitimacy attributable only to the Tribunal, 
regardless of the judicial enforcement or creation of International (Criminal) Law 
rules. 
This conditioning led us to a preliminary review of all the material for the 
proceedings of the "Motion on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" in the Tadic case. As 
later mentioned, the Motion formally challenging the jurisdiction starts by 
challenging the legitimacy of the Tribunal, the only matter truly relevant for this 
research. However, from an early stage of the research, it became evident that by 
exploring these materials from a procedural approach, one might find later 
difficulties in ascertaining the authorship of arguments. In view of such possibility 
for error, the selection of material follows the certainty of authorship by the 
Tribunal, i.e. Decisions at Trial and Appeal level, thus not considering, at least as 
empirical research rnaterial, documents not issued by the Tribunal itself, kee;)ing 
as secondary sources, in the Tadic case, otherwise relevant documents such as 
the Defence initial Motion, the Prosecutor Response and the submission by the 
amicus curiae - EUA Government. These specific secondary sources will be 
reviewed, as exceptions, but for the ulterior motive of setting the frame of the 
challenges faced by the court, in their own initial context. The extensive review of 
these case materials, as initially presented before the court, is also expected to 
allow us gradually to set aside the arguments less relevant to the review of the 
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legitimacy discourse. This method will permit a review of the reasoning in the 
Decisions focused only in those arguments directly connected with that legitimacy 
discourse. Additionally, the full review of those initial materials will laterally, but 
usefully, determine the concepts underlying each set of arguments as well as their 
scope and intended legal use in the case, a result that enables the review of the 
Decisions not to be entangled, even deeper, with the legalistic discourse. 
As core subjects of research, then, we can anticipate reference to: 
1. UNSC Resolutions, as decisions leading to the establishment of the ad-hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, insofar as they 
are referred by the ICTY itself; 
2. Materials filed before the court, regarding the challenge on the ICTY's 
Jurisdiction, in the Tadic case; 
3. Decisions of the ICTY (Trial and Appeal); 
4. Possible additional information officially published by the ICTY, regarding, 
or pertinent to, its legitimacy. 
Section II - International Criminal Tribunals 
After the establishment of the UN (1945) the then recent Nuremberg (and Tokyo) 
trials had imprinted upon the new international, would-be global, organization, 
(which as we know endured and became operational, contrary to its predecessor 
League of Nations) the will to debate at its General Assembly (UNGA) the creation 
of a permanent International Criminal Court as early as 1948, with the subsequent 
work on two projects of statutes by the International Law Commission (ILC), which 
never came into being. 3 
Only after the detente of the Cold War - until then conditioning international 
relations by the balance of force between the blocks, but also because of the 
assumption by each superpower of a policing action imposed upon their allies or 
3 See UN website http://www.un.org/News/factsliccfact.htm. 
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spheres of influence - the conditions were met for a free incursion of sovereign 
politics and international public opinion into the agenda of the UN 4 The World 
Organization was under a new order. The idea of a permanent international court, 
immediately renewed, officially from 1993 onwards, later made way for the Treaty 
of Rome on July 1998. But the political atmosphere of the early 1990s - faced with 
the reigniting of old nationalisms and the lack of a super-national / proto-global 
reference of alignment, i.e. the need to solve regional conflicts without the pre-
justified intervention of super-powers on maintenance of political balance - was a 
stage directly disputed by Nation States, but also by the public opinion, more prone 
to embark on radical and idealistic defence of values as a means to solve 
problems. 
Such was the politico-cultural frame5 in which the both ad-hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals were established in 1993 and 1994: the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), respectively. The permanent, and intended as global, 
International Criminal Tribunal ended up succeeding, with the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted by the Rome Treaty (1998), and fully 
established with the entering into force of the treaty, on 1 July 2002. 6 
However, the subject of the current research is precisely the case-studies of ad-
hoc International Criminal Tribunals prior to the ICC. Accordingly, the International 
Criminal Tribunals to be considered as source of research materials would be 
those established between: 
1. The establishment of the ICTY (on 25 May 1993), inclusive; and 
4 See Kerr (2004: 12). 
5 See O'Brien (1993 639). 
6 The debate on the establishment of the ICC formally started in 1995, up until the 1998 
conference, when the Statute was adopted. Following the provisions of the Treaty, the ICC 
was to be established with the coming into force of the Treaty after the ratification of at least 
60 States, which happened on 1 July 2002. For the process leading to the Treaty of Rome 
and the establishment of the ICC see: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html. 
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2. The establishment of the ICC (on 1 July 2002), exclusive. 
In the last decade of the second millennium and the first decade of the third, the 
jurisdictional bodies one may consider as international in nature and criminal in 
scope, are a limited yet unique group of seven: 
(A) Ad-hoc tribunals: 
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTy);7 
(25 May 1993) 
2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR);8 
(8 November 1994) 
(8) Hybrid courts (& Special Panels): 
3. The Special Panels, East Timor (SPET);9 
(6 June 2000)10 
4. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); 11 
(16 January 2002) 
5. The Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia (ECC); 12 
(29 April 2005/18 January 2006) 
6. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).13 
(1 March 2009) 
(C) Permanent Court: 
7. The International Criminal Court (ICC).14 
(1 July 2002) 
7 http://www.icty.org/ 
8 http://www.unictrorg/ 
9 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pastletimor/etimor.htm 
10 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/pastletimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf 
11 http://www.sc-slorg/ 
12 http://www.eccc.govkh/english/ 
13 http://www.stl-tslorg/action/home 
14 http://www. icc-cpi. intiMenus/1 CC?lan=en-G B 
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Section III - Relevant Tribunals for the subject 
(A) The chronological perspective - before and after the ICC. 
With the Treaty of Rome (1998/2002),15 any other such Tribunal would only either 
fall short of, or discredit, the ICC. So, post-Rome ICT's are likely to translate a 
wilful statement on the legitimacy of the ICC, rather than their own, on their own, 
i.e. if a set of jurisdiction ratione materiae, personae, loci and temporis is not 
submitted to the ICC, whatever the solution may be, it represents an intention to 
avoid such jurisdiction. 16 Concurrently well-established bases of legitimacy would 
be summoned in the political manoeuvring towards the establishment of such 
jurisdictions, e.g SCSL, ECC and STL - SPET are a particular case of 
establishment by an Administering power. Therefore the research on International 
Criminal Tribunals created before the Treaty of Rome allows a different, and more 
objective, analysis, becoming more likely to produce relevant conclusions 
regarding the other options, tested, followed or abandoned, prior to the adoption of 
the classical legitimacy of treaties between sovereign States. 
For the current research it is purposeless to enter the discussion on the global 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Although a primary subject for any conclusions that may 
arise from this research, the lively debate on the legitimacy of the global jurisdiction 
of the ICC would most certainly interfere with the approach followed here about the 
more explicit establishment of ad-hoc International Criminal Tribunals, where the 
legitimacy of the establishing treaty is not a question - as there are none. 
Consequently, our research must focus on the cases within the dates specified 
above, from 25 May 1993 until 1 July 2002, limiting the relevant cases to four: 
1. The ICTY -- 25 May 1993; 
15 Adopted by a diplomatic conference on 17 July 1998; entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
16 This conclusion carries neither preconceptions nor prejudice In fact the objective might be 
to strengthen a national Judicial body, or show how national legal norms are sufficient and 
fair, yet recognizing some sort of incapability to carry out the full proceedings (e.g. the cost 
of specialized chambers within the Cambodian jurisdiction, leading to a request for 
assistance, although still applying national rules). 
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2. The ICTR - 8 November 1994; 
3. The SPET - 6 June 2000; and 
4. The SCSL - 16 January 2002. 
(8) The novelty perspective of the act of establishment. 
Another set of more relevant arguments, as far as this research is concerned, 
brings the ICTY and the ICTR to the up-front question of legitimacy, otherwise 
solved by previous experiences. In fact the SCSL, the ECC and the STL find their 
legal basis on separate and different agreements between the countries involved 
and the UN.17 Although these Courts differ in several aspects of their 
proceedings,18 the old legitimacy of sovereignty, and its power to celebrate treaties, 
is, first and foremost, the legal basis for the establishment of all these courts. 
The questions on the circumstances that led to the signing of each treaty, from 
need to pressure, case studies for International Relations or Political Theory as 
they may be, layout of the subject of the present one. In fact, the option taken to 
make reference, and use, a well established source of legitimacy for international 
action (treaties I agreements) presents an immediate answer to any questions that 
may arise on the source of such legitimacy. 
These courts' discourses of legitimacy are therefore based on references to well-
known landmarks of International Law. A world apart from the loose international 
legal norms and theory regarding ad-hoc Tribunals created before there were any 
legal landmarks for International jurisdictions other than those created by Treaty 
17 In March 2002 (Sierra Leone), March 2003 (Cambodia), and February 2007 (Lebanon). 
18 E.g. the SCSL rules of criminal procedure are based on ICTR rules, Prosecutor and 
Registrars are international (as 2 of the 3 judges); the ECC follows Cambodian law with 
reference to international law (only) if necessary, having 2 local prosecutors and 1 
international, and a Cambodian Registrar with an international deputy; the STL follows 
national law (with exceptions) in the proceedings, although held by international judges. 
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CHAPTER 11- THE FRAMING OF THE ISSUE 
Section I - The founding discourse, ICTY and the Dusko Tadic case. 
(A) The need for the ICTY 
"The International Tribunal For The Prosecution Of Persons Responsible For 
Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed In The Territory 
Of Former Yugoslavia since 1991", usually know as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the ad-hoc Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
was formally established by Res. 827 of the UNSC, adopted in 25 May 1993. 
Shraga & Zacklin, 19 in a very brief, but meaningful, picture of the circumstances in 
which The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was 
established, emphasise an evolving path: 
1. The minor and lateral role of the UN direct involvement (through 
UNPROFOR) up to then (February 1993); 
2. Its inability to playa peace keeping function; 
3. The growing signs of the perpetration of "international crimes,,;2o 
4. The disregard of the parties in conflict of the UNSC Resolutions and 
appeals, particularly regarding the respect for IHL. 
The listing of facts, by these authors becomes increasingly relevant to the current 
research, for the possible self-awareness of the political organ (UNSC), of its 
legitimate role in the possible enforcement of International Law: 
5 The acknowledgment, by the UNSC, of its own inability to control the 
violation of "international norms", directly leading the UNSC to ask the SG 
19 Sh raga (1994 360-361) 
20 . The option to keep the term used by the authors is justified so as to maintain the broadest 
meaning of the crimes, which, In these authors' words, referring to Bosnia, included "mass 
executions, mass sexual assaults and rapes, the existence of concentration camps and the 
implementation of a policy of so-called 'ethnic cleansing'." (Ibid.: 360). 
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to "establish a Commission of Experts,,21 entrusted with reporting on those 
alleged violations of IHL. The intention was to show the seriousness of the 
UNSC, thus creating a "dissuasive effect"; 
6. However the idea of an International Criminal Court was already at play, 
not only in previous references by various western politicians, but also (still 
according to the above mentioned authors) as an "unspoken 
understanding ( ... ) if the parties did not conform to Security Council 
resolutions." ; 
7. The unique political circumstances of those days suffered more from public 
opinion twists than from strategic guidelines. 22 Public opinion, particularly 
in Europe, with the memory of the Axis practices upon minorities and 
occupied nations, "demanded accountability and action" in Yugoslavia, 
pressuring UNSC permanent members to act swiftly; 
(8) The decision to establish the ICTY. 
The decision to establish the ICTY is said to have been "taken reluctantly by some 
or indifferently by others,,23 but, either way, well aware of the implications this step 
might have in future peace talks, when trying to reach agreements with the very 
leaders who would be under scrutiny by the Tribunal. The fact that the conflict was 
still ongoing could limit the Tribunal's capability to investigate and prosecute, a 
difficulty which might render the Tribunal inoperative but still an effective PR 
display of good intentions. 
An improbable success was also the political conclusion that the UNSC might draw 
from decades of unsuccessful studies and conferences on the creation of an 
International Criminal Tribunal. The newborn new world order was yet to start the 
21 UNSC Res. 780, 6 October 1992 - S/RES/780 (1992). 
22 The lack of recognizable bloc leaders with the end of the cold war confrontation and, more 
important to the Balkans, the disintegration of the eastern bloc of 
influence/support/deterrent, a scenario locally aggravated by the call of nationalism and 
ethnical divide as demagogic fast-track to political power. 
23 Shraga (1994: 361). 
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road of codification of International Criminal Law, and IHL. In the absence of such 
tools, and under pressure for immediate action, the facts that followed can be 
explained in two ways: 
1. The traditionally long process of negotiating a Treaty, adopting it, waiting for it 
to enter into force and then implementing the Tribunal (not even considering 
the negotiation with the countries and territories whose leaders were to be 
scrutinized) was in conflict with the ongoing conflict and international public 
opinion outrage, opening ways to an unprecedented and more proactive 
attitude of the UNSC. Such was in fact the option taken, when the UNSC 
assumed its intention 24 to establish a specific International Criminal Tribunal, 
asking the UNSG for an urgene5 report on this matter; and 
2. The factual and legal challenges for the ICTY to operate were such that, even 
after the establishment of the Tribunal, it might take years before: 
2.1. it was in place 
2.2. It could start and proceed with cases, on account of the problems in 
investigating and prosecuting or in hearing witnesses 
2.3. Its decisions might have a real effect upon persons still in conflict. 
So, from a political stance, the UNSC could answer western public opinion, without 
the objection of a protective eastern bloc, and not care too much with this first 
attempt, as all signs pointed to a profitable theoretical discussion, on ways to 
implement such a Tribunal in the future, but also to a practical improbability of 
successes of the ICTY itself. "Despite its desirability, it [was] probable that the 
tribunal [would] not be so effective" (Meron, 1993: 132). Although no definitive 
proofs can be drawn from this research, one should not deny the possibility that the 
ICTY was intended to be a first attempt only. As known facts we must refer to the 
24 "The use of Chapter VII of the Charter as the legal basis for the establishment of the 
Tribunal is perhaps the most visible and innovative aspect" Shraga (1994: 360- 361). 
25 Within 60 days (UNSC, Res. 808, 22 February 1993 - S/RES/808 (1993)). 
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calls, from the spring of 1992 until the adoption of UNSC Res. 827 26 on 25 May 
1993, from the USA, Germany and France for the creation of a Criminal Tribunal 
(Cassese, 2003: 336, 24n). 
Either way the ICTY was not only the first ad-hoc International Criminal Tribunal, it 
was also the first to be created by the UNSC, a move here "explained" both by the 
urgency to take measures (accountability) to stop the crimes - measures 
immediately taken as impossible, yet later proven otherwise - and by the pressure 
of "public opinion" on the political powers. 
Adopting Res. 827 was also a precedent for the Council to assume its own power 
to create a judicial organ, furthermore based upon the belief of acting vested with 
the power(s) of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
(C) The founding discourse. 
The ICTY affirms, n as doctrine28 does, to have been established in 1993 through 
Resolution 827, adopted by the United Nations Security Council, at its 3217th 
meeting, on 25 May 1993. The source of that claim lies within the scope of the 
current research, reason for which will be addressed infra (The Tadic case), where 
the precedent of Res. 827, like the initial jurisprudence of the ICTY, are discussed 
so as to determine the Tribunal's possible discourse of legitimacy. 
It is however important to notice that the public presentation the ICTY makes of its 
own Timeline reveals that great importance is given to results, be it proceedings' 
incidents or public illitiatives of the Tribunal, and only a very limited number of facts 
and references are made to issues connected with the creation of the ICTY. This 
absence could elsewhere be quite unsurprising, e.g. in well established legal 
26 S/RES/827 (1993). 
27 In the broadest of terms towards the general public in the ICTY website: 
http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY#, http://www.icty.org/sid/319. 
28 Cassese (2003, 337). Interestingly, this author presided over the Appeal Chamber of the 
ICTY which pronounced the Decision on the very same Tadic case we here review. 
systems with separations of courts according to subject matter (ratione materiae) -
where (e.g.), within Administrative courts new fiscal chambers are to be created. 
In fact, other than the reference to the UNSC Res. which established it, only 
experts end up finding the argumentation in the bases of the Tribunal's discourse 
regarding the legitimacy, or at least the legality, of its creation - found in the Tadic 
case29 - that will be the main subject of this research. A perceived weakness of the 
Tribunal in wishing not to publicize its discourse of legitimacy cannot be 
overlooked, however speculative it could be to try to pursue what can only be 
judged as "hearsay", rumour or mere opinion. 
The oddness, in the ICTY case, of judicious public display of arguments relating to 
its own legitimacy, is twofold: 
1. The ICTY is 
1.1. an International Tribunal; 
1.2. a Criminal Tribunal; 
1.3 an Ad-Hoc Tribunal; and 
1.4. a Tribunal created by the UNSC. 
2. The ICTY was the first ever tribunal simultaneously to aggregate all of the 
above-mentioned characteristics, i.e. the very first of its kind. Moreover, it has 
kept that leading role on until today, among the full set of only two of the same 
kind: ICTY and ICTR. 
The supra-nationality of its nature could well justify a more detailed attention to a 
self explanatory discourse towards, at least, the more classical actors of the 
International Community, i.e., the sovereign States. However, its criminal nature -
the personal jurisdiction (ratione personae), as individual criminal responsibility -
29 Under "Cases", "Completed cases", "Tadic", and then under "Appeals chamber decisions", 
regarding the year 1995. The relevance of this Decision, and the arguments therein -
including those carried from the Trial Motion on legitimacy - are inversely proportional to the 
display of relevance given by the ICTY itself, available at: http://www.icty.org/case/tadic/4. 
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would suggest, more than justify, that such explanatory and self-justification 
discourse was made to what we now call "international public opinion". Such 
discourse would hopefully be directed towards the communities and individuals, as 
they could be subjects of prosecution, over which the Tribunal was to have 
territorial jurisdiction (ratione loci), or otherwise towards its own "public", i.e. the 
public opinion of the powers imposing the Tribunal. In this last case, facing those 
who could support, and even cry for, the establishment of the ICTY, the non-
permanent nature of the Tribunal (Ad-Hoc), if for nothing else for its novelty, had to 
foresee possible historical confrontations or questions of posthumous prognosis -
if we/you/they can do this what if it was done in past cases? - and furthermore, 
given the length of its proceedings still in place, should publicise the arguments of 
its uniqueness as an open institution's answer to the application of different 
solutions afterwards. 30 
So, even if at the date it was established, the ICTY would disregard the passing of 
the message on the arguments for its creation, and conversely give a low key-note 
for its very special subject matter, later developments show just how important this 
dialogue attempt was, a fact that the tribunal explicitly admits by holding its first 
Outreach Symposium with judicial representatives from the Former Yugoslavia on 
15 October 1998, "thereby launching its pioneering communications programme 
dedicated to making the work of the Tribunal more accessible and intelligible to the 
local communities" 
The mystery deepens when we focus on the uniqueness of the Tribunal, and 
furthermore on its pioneering role, not in the self laudatory description above, but 
rather in view of the fact that the ICTY was, and will forever be, the very first 
tribunal to gather all the above-mentioned characteristics. Its work, useful or vain, 
good or bad, was the first and the one to be held as standard measure of others. 
30 The only other similar case was the ICTR, established 18 months later: ICTY in UNSC 
Res. 827 of 25 May 1993, and ICTR in UNSC Res. 955 of 8 November 1994. 
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The burden of such responsibility (and we are not even focusing on the 
consequences of jurisprudence arising from the common law insert) weighs 
heavier by considering that the ICTY was established by the UNSC, a political and 
non-representative organ of the UN, which assumed a gathering - and no 
separation - of powers to create the Tribunal. Anticipating a later discussion, it is 
enough here to say that the Executive decisions took, in this case, a legislative 
nature (UNSC Res. 827) expressly justified on self-referential considerations 31 that 
imply the qualification of criminal behaviour: a jurisdictional function. 
Considering that the first use of such powers by the UNSC might be challenged by 
claims that "by establishing the Tribunal the Security Council exceeded its powers 
under the (UN) Charter" (Cassese, 2003: 337, 8) it seems a little less than 
adequate that such a major question is dismissed by a single piece of the ICTY 
Appeal Chamber proceedings - Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal, §§ 9-40 (ibid.) - and 
that such Decision rests upon an answer of "Kompetenz - Kompetenz,,32 
It becomes clear that the legitimacy discourse we seek is limited to the Decisions 
(Trial and Appeal) on one particular case (challenging the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal). For the first ever institution addressing individual accountability regarding 
international criminal offences, the arguments in the sources mentioned above 
were expected to be exploited to the full extent in public awareness of the fervently 
desired accomplishment in the evolution of ICL. 
Disregarding facts that, though connected with the internal proceedings of the 
ICTY, do not havp a direct connexion with the international legitimacy of the 
Tribunal - for the purposes and within the scope of this research - a brief summary 
31 As per the recognition of a "threat to peace and security" and the assuming of (special) 
powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (see infra and Appendix I). 
32 As explained by Friman, Hakan. "Jurisdictional Challenges", in Cassese (2009: 399,400). 
A conclusion reached by the Tribunal that it has "jurisdiction to determine its own 
jurisdiction", also termed "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" or "Ia competence de la competence". 
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of the ICTY chronology, extends well beyond any selection one might reach from 
the dates the ICTY itself includes on its Timeline: 33 
Year Day/Month Action Source 
1993 25 May establishment of the ICTY by Res. 827 by the ICTY / 
UNSC; UNSC 
15 September election of the first judges by the UN General 
ICTY 
Assembly 
1994 8 July UNSC appoints the Prosecutor; ICTY 
7 November ICTY first indictment; ICTY 
1998 15 October the ICTY holds its first Outreach Symposium 
with judicial representatives from the Former 
Yugoslavia, "thereby launching its pioneering 
communications programme dedicated to ICTY 
making the work of the Tribunal more 
accessible and intelligible to the local 
communities"; 
1999 24 May The ICTY indicts Yugoslav President 
Siobodan Milosevic for crimes in Kosovo. 
This is the first time an international court 
ICTY 
indicts a sitting head of state34 (the charges 
against him are later extended to cover 
crimes committed against non-Serbs in 
33 Adapted from the ICTY website: http://www.icty.org/action/timeline/254, where the full 
version is available, dates and facts only indirectly connected with the legitimacy question 
are here marked in grey 
34 The indictment of the sitting Head of State is here considered as directly connected with 
the legitimacy question as an inescapable consequence of discuss the establishment of the 
ICTY outside the imperatives of the Law of the Treaties, i.e., without the need for the 
agreement of the State (Yugoslavia), through its representatives - the Head of state himself. 
The issue, though minor in face of the creation of the Tribunal, could become a keynote to 
the form used to approve the establishment of such a Tribunal. 
27 
Year DaylMonth Action Source 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
from 1991 to 1999). 
2003 15 January to The ICTY and the Office of the High 
21 February Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree 
on ways to develop the country's capacity for 
ICTY 
war-crimes trials and urge the establishment 
of a specialised war Crimes Chamber within 
the country's State Court. 
A tentative chronology, which partially includes dates and facts mentioned above 
on the ICTY timeline, is set out in the chart below referencing main events leading 
to, or resulting from, the establishment of the ICTY. This new chart also includes 
the events of the Dusko Tadi6 case, in particular the proceedings from the 
preliminary Motion challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction, until the ICTY Decisions, 
Trial an Appeal , here reviewed in search of a legitimacy discourse: 
Year Day/Month Action Source 
1993 22 February Res. 808 - Decides that an International Criminal 
Tribunal shall be established; requests a report UNSC 
from the UNSG. 
25 May Res 827 - Adopts the UNSG Report; Establishes ICTY 
the ICTY; and approves the ICTY Statute. UNSC 
15 September Election of the ICTY first judges by the UN 
ICTY 
General Assembly. 
1994 12 February Dusko Tadi6 arrested by German authorities. ICTY 
08 July UNSC appoints the Prosecutor. ICTY 
07 November ICTY first indictment against Dragan Nikolic; ICTY 
1995 13 February Initial indictment of Dusko Tadi6 by the ICTY ICTY 
24 April Dusko Tadi6 transferred from Germany to the ICTY 
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Year Day/Month Action Source 
ICTY. 
26 April Tadi6's initial appearance and plea of not guilty. ICTY 
23 June Tadi6 case - Filing of the interlocutory "Motion on 
the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal", by the Defence, ICTY 
in the "Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6" case. 
7 July Tadi6 case - Filing of Prosecution "Response to 
the Motion of the defence on the Jurisdiction of ICTY 
the Tribunal". 
17 July Tadi6 case - "Submission of the Government of 
the United States of America concerning certain 
arguments made by Counsel for the Accused in 
ICTY 
the case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal V. 
Dusan Tadic", a brief presented as amicus 
curiae. 
25-26 July Tadi6 case - Hearings of the Motion by the Trial 
ICTY 
Chamber II. 
10 August Tadi6 case - Trial "Decision on the Defence 
ICTY 
Motion on Jurisdiction". 
14 August Filing of the notice of Appeal, and of extension to 
ICTY 
submit further materials. 
25 August Filing of the Appeal Brief by the Defence. ICTY 
1 September Filing of the Prosecutor Response to the Appeal. 
ICTY 
First amendment to Tadi6's indictment. 
6 September Filing of a second Appeal Brief by the Defence. ICTY 
7-8 September Tadi6 case - Hearings of the Appeal to the Trial 
ICTY 
"Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction". 
2 October Tadi6 case - Appeal Decision on the defence 
ICTY 
motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction 
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Year DaylMonth Action Source 
14 December Second amendment to Tadi6's indictment. ICTY 
1997 7 May Dusko Tadi6 Trial Chamber judgment. ICTY 
14 July Dusko Tadi6 Trial Chamber sentencing (20 years 
ICTY 
imprisonment). 
1998 13 May UNSC Res. 1166 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
15 October The ICTY holds its first Outreach Symposium 
with judicial representatives from the Former 
Yugoslavia, "thereby launching its pioneering 
ICTY 
communications programme dedicated to making 
the work of the Tribunal more accessible and 
intelligible to the local communities"; 
1999 24 May The ICTY indicts Yugoslav President Siobodan 
Milosevi6 for crimes in Kosovo. This is the first 
time an international court indicts a sitting head of 
state (the charges against him are later extended ICTY 
to cover crimes committed against non-Serbs in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 
from 1991 to 1999). 
15 July Dusko Tadi6 Appeals Chamber judgement ICTY 
2000 26 January Dusko Tadi6 Appeals Chamber sentencing ICTY 
31 October Dusko Tadi6 transferred to Germany for the 
remainder of his sentence (credit for ICTY 
imprisonment time since 13 February 1994) 
30 November Res. 1329 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
2002 17 May Res. 1411 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
14 August Res. 1431 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
2003 19 May Res. 1481 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
2005 20 April Res. 1597 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
30 
Year Day/Month Action Source 
2006 28 February Res. 1660 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
2008 17 July Dusko Tadic granted early release. ICTY 
29 September Res. 1837 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
2009 7 July Res. 1877 - ICTY Statute amendment. UNSC 
(0) Preliminary conclusions 
As preliminary conclusions we can point out: 
a) The official arguments on the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY 
can be found in: 
i. the preparatory works of Res. 827 of the UNSC - maxime Res. 
808 and the following UNSG Report (S/25704); 
ii. Resolution 827 of the UNSC; 
iii. The Statute of the ICTY; 
iv. The Decisions (Trial and Appeal) on the Defence Motion (I for 
interlocutory appeal) on jurisdiction in the Tadic case. 
b) From these, we can ascertain as the Tribunal's Discourse on legitimacy, 
the arguments found in the Decisions, from Trial and Appeal, on the 
defence Motions challenging legitimacy in the Tadic case. 
c) The ICTY was established under very specific political and geostrategic 
circumstances, those favouring its creation as opposed its success; 
d) The ICTY was the first ad-hoc International Criminal Tribunal35, and still 
has the leading role on the matter; 
e) The main feature of the ICTY, shared only with the ICTR,36 is the use, by 
the UNSC of powers within Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to create a 
jurisdictional organ to guarantee peace and security. 
35 It is self evident the differences from previous occurrences of a military nature of (e.g. 
Nuremberg and Tokyo). 
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Section II - Blossoming powers in the establishment of the ICTY. 
(A) From intention to action in 92 days. 
The first statement of the UNSC on its intention to establish an ad-hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia appears in Res. 808 (unanimously 
adopted in 22 February 1993),37 whereby not only the Security Council "Decides 
that an international tribunal shall be established", 38 but also where the UNSG is 
asked, as a matter of urgency, to make such a report and recommendations 
needed for the establishment of that Tribunal. 
Despite the extremely short time conceded by the UNSC, only 60 days, for the 
enormous task as to envisage the needs, construct a possible legal frame and 
propose the appropriate solutions for such concept-changing novelty as a criminal 
judicial subsidiary organ, the UNSG did present its Report in 70 days, on the 3 May 
1993 (S/25704). 22 days later the UNSC adopted it (again) unanimously, in Res. 
827, on 25 May 1993. Altogether, from the announcement of the intention to the 
establishment of the ICTY in the spring of 1993, it took 92 days. 
Given that the UNSC Resolution in question (Res. 827), includes three 
distinguishable decisions - adoption of the UNSG Report; establishment of the 
ICTY; adoption of the Statute of the ICTY - it is at times difficult to address one of 
these without the context of the others. The hesitations, for the research at hand as 
for the Tribunal when deciding (see infra the arguments on the legal equivalency of 
the three decision of Res. 827), are particularly interesting in the ICTY public 
speech when referring to UNSC Resolutions while addressing, or better, 
presenting to the public, its Statute. 
36 Other shared characteristics in both institutions are, e.g. the composition of both Appeals 
Chambers by the same individual judges. 
37 Reproduced in Appendix IV. 
38 Idem. 
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As stated in page 23 above, the ICTY follows the established legal doctrine, in 
considering to have been established through UNSC Res. 827, on 25 May 1993. 
The very Res. which adopted the Tribunal's Statute, and was later amended 39 for 
nine times in: 
1. 13 May 1998 (Res. 1166); 
2. 30 November 2000 (Res. 1329); 
3. 17 May 2002 (Res. 1411); and 
4. 14 August 2002 (Res. 1431); 
5. 19 May 2003 (Res. 1481); 
6. 20 April 2005 (Res. 1597); 
7. 28 February 2006 (Res. 1660); 
8. 29 September 2008 (Res. 1837); and 
9. 7 July 2009 (Res. 1877). 
The updated Statute as published by the ICTY website is labelled as: "Not an 
official document. This compilation is based on original United Nations resolutions" 
The claim of non-authenticity, though applicable to UNSC Resolutions in 
themselves as they are here published by another institution, the ICTY, is however 
non convincing for the Statute itself, nor the specific listing chosen for the so called 
"compilation" . 
Since the Statute of the ICTY (SICTY) was adopted by the UNSC, it is arguable 
that such instrument is not a part of the Tribunal's own discourse. 
The fact that the SICTY was adopted and could only be amended by the UNSC, 
does not preclude that the SICTY must be an authentic document within the ICTY. 
Should that not be the case, the incapability of the Tribunal to recognise the 
authenticity of its Statute, amendments and other Resolutions, would obstruct the 
39 As per the September 2009 version of the Statute (partially included in Appendix V), and 
available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20LibraryIStatute/statute _ sept09 _ en.pdf, last 
accessed on 20103/2011. 
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capability for the Tribunal to "be", ad absurdum not recognising itself. The 
uncertainties arising for the interpreter from this excess of precautions, could give 
way to finding some unwillingness from the Tribunal in assuming its role and 
duties, given the novelty and uniqueness of its creation, an hypothesis which could 
imperil the belief in the capability of the Tribunal to construct a legitimacy 
discourse. 
Therefore, at least regarding the legal instruments it will have to use, the ICTY's 
official discourse must, first and foremost, state what it recognises as its own 
original founding acts, so as to be capable, by its proceedings, to affirm the 
authenticity of the decisions taken and published. In this sense the published 
version of the SICTY is in fact a primary source, not for the fact that it originates 
from the ICTY, but from the fact that the Statute is a condition sine qua non for the 
Tribunal to be able to determine its own jurisdiction, even if by 
Kompetenz/Kompetenz. This to say that for the Tribunal to apply a norm it must 
recognise such norm both as (i) applicable, as effective in itself, and as (ii) within 
the scope of the Tribunal's competences Uurisdiction). However, in so doing, i.e. 
reviewing, the Tribunal is making such a norm its own, in the sense that the norm 
incorporates the legal discourse, or accepted possible discourses, of the Tribunal 
itself. 
We can therefore conclude that the unavoidable need for a Tribunal to know of the 
jurisdiction to apply implies a judgement that validates the rules the Tribunal can 
apply, and by which it applies them: the competence to determine its own 
competence. Such a judgement, effectively handled in the Tadic case, translates 
the Tribunal's own discourse. I.e. the recognition of the norms for its own 
establishment implied the acceptance of pre-existing speech into the Tribunal's 
discourse. The incorporation of the externally drafted and approved Statute, in the 
Tribunal's discourse, makes it a primary source within our research, as the last 
legislative act becomes the first judgement of jurisdiction. 
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Oddly enough, this primary source, in the sense stated above, although containing 
a list of "ICTY RELATED RESOLUTIONS", immediately after Res. 827 and its 
subsequent nine amendments, places Res. 808 not among these "related 
resolutions", but rather prior to the founding Res. 827, without ever qualifying it. 40 
The nuance, casual as it may seem, acquires an important meaning when we take 
into consideration that, as the ICTY itself warns that "This compilation is based on 
original United Nations resolutions". So, despite explicitly acknowledging its own 
establishment under Res. 827, on this compilation the ICTY finds relevant the 
previous Res. 808, but not as a "ICTY Related Resolutions", in fact not giving any 
explanation for such inclusion. A somehow natural pre-history of the establishment 
might justify the inclusion, in which case - and taking Res. 808 as not particularly 
or inextricably intertwined with the establishment of the Tribunal - all other UNSC 
Resolutions, attempting to bring peace or evaluate the situation in Yugoslavia, 
should also be mentioned. 
If only UNSC Res. 808 is mentioned, there must be a special feature to it, a 
particular characteristic that differs from all its predecessors, and makes it relevant 
to be mentioned where others are ignored. And, in fact, there is; it was Res. 808 
and not Res. 827 which first set out the will to establish the Tribunal. From a 
certain perspective, the ICTY is created in Res.808, leaving the formal 
establishment to a later date when the needed preparatory work, i.e. the Statute, 
would be done. Mutatis mutandis, such a view is reflected in the adoption of a very 
complex legal instrument, the very first of its kind and a first exercise of such power 
by the UNSC, without any changes whatsoever. 
With all due consideration for the UNSG's work - a report accomplished in "no later 
than 60 days", and for which the SG should take "into account suggestions put 
forward in this regard by Member States" - it seems unique that the UNSC can 
adopt a Statute of the very first International Tribunal, for which it (the UNSC) is 
40 See Appendix V. 
35 
41 
using for the first time alleged powers to create a jurisdictional organ, in such a 
short time and with no amendments at all. 
The importance of the Statute for this thesis arises from its interpretation, while the 
legitimacy of the ICTY itself is questioned in court. For the references and 
confrontation needed in the review of the case the most relevant parts of the 
document are presented under Appendix V, while its discussion is inbuill in that 
review. 
(8) Initial conclusions. 
As preliminary conclusions, but already noting the culturally inbuilt character of a 
legitimacy discourse in the SICTY (as in UNSC Res. 827, of which it is part), itself 
no longer just a set of rules, we can state that: 
1. The documents published by the ICTY, as legal documents or compilations 
of documents, directly relevant for the Tribunals proceedings, be it norms 
of jurisdiction or procedure, are, in the sense of validation of own 
jurisdiction, primary sources on the Tribunal's discourse; 
2. The way in which the ICTY organized the so called "compilation" of its 
Statute reveals a judgement of relevance to the UNSC Resolutions, a 
conclusion drawn from the consideration given to pre Res. 827 materials;41 
3. The key note of the SICTY, regarding the legitimacy of the Tribunal, lies 
only upon "Having been established by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations"; 
4. Given that the UNSG Report was submitted on 3 of May 1993, the 
preparatory works of the Statute took at most 70 days; 
5. The concise, though dense, set of norms (included in only 34 articles, and 
now, after numerous revisions, in a somewhat larger 37) can at times be 
sufficiently vague so as to be opened to a broad spectrum of interpretation, 
particularly regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
See, for the relevance of the structure of such compilation, Appendix V. 
36 
CHAPTER 111- THE TADIe CASE 
(A) The Tadic case 
"This I do, not to show a mirror to the sun, but because I think it is 
necessary that the result of separate perceptions in respect of 
common matters may come on the record and provide food for 
thought in respect of some very serious and sensitive issues that 
have arisen before this nascent body, recently established by the 
United Nations, which is trying to find expression for itself." 
(Judge Sidhwa, separate opinion, §1, of the Appeal Decision) 
The first time the ICTY pronounced on the legitimacy of the Tribunal was in the 
judgment of a Defence Motion challenging the tribunal's legitimacy, in the Dusko 
Tadic case. 42 The Decisions of the ICTY (Trial and Appeal Chambers) did not only 
set a precedent, but also the standards of the judicial discourse regarding the 
legitimacy of ad-hoc tribunals (Alvarez, 1996: 245-246). First the Trial Chamber 
(II), and then the Appeal Chamber, had the opportunity to dissect the arguments on 
the limitations to the Tribunal's powers, vis-a-vis the superior determinations of the 
UNSC - therefore ascertaining the boundaries of the power to know its jurisdiction 
- and on the legitimacy of the establishment of those same powers, a possible 
indirect judgement on the legality of UNSC Resolutions. 
The importance of the case, for this research, lies not only on its subject matter -
the legitimacy and legality of the establishment and precedence of the ICTY - but 
also for the foundational character of the official discourse of the ad-hoc tribunals 
regarding their own legitimacy. 
42 Formally the Motion, filed on 23 June 1995, is entitled "Motion on the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal". Although both Motion and supporting Brief do present challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal (in particular regarding the primacy over domestic courts and 
questioning Article 2 to 5 of the SICTY), the relevant arguments of the Motion, as far as the 
present research subject allows, are initial arguments on the legitimacy of the establishment 
of the Tribunal, even though sometimes aimed at its legality. 
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In fact when researching the ad-hoc Tribunals', ICTY and ICTR, official discourse 
(which as earlier concluded is limited by their judicial powers and proceedings to 
their Decisions on challenges to the Tribunal's legality or legitimacy) we can find 
only four cases: 
1. The Tadic case, before the ICTY in 1995;43 
2. The Kanyabashi case, before the ICTR in 1997;44 
3. The Siobodan Milosevic case, before de ICTY, in 2001; and 
4. The Karemera (et al.) case, before the ICTR in 2005 45 
The primacy of the Tadic case, and the rationale for the focus on it in this thesis, 
become clear when we consider, in inverted chronology, that: 
1. The Decisions on the Karemera case consider that the same issues 
regarding the challenges to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal had already 
been decided in the Kanyabashi decision and the Tadic Decision, adopting 
those Decisions reasoning and findings;46 
2. The Milosevic Decisions directly refer to the Tadic case on this challenge; 
3. The Decision on the Kanyabashi case, following the same logic, and 
despite a more proactive attitude from the Trial Chamber by considering 
and debating subjective political concepts - such as "threat to peace and 
security" and "internal" or "international conflict" - follows and quotes the 
Tadic Decisions. 
So, apart from the legal instruments (Statutes, and UNSC Res as legislation), the 
suo motu discourse of ad-hoc Tribunals, regarding their own legitimacy (as legality) 
can be found: 
43 Case nO IT-94-1-AR72. 
44 Case n° ICTR-96-15-T. 
45 Actually filed by another defendant, Joseph Nzirorera, in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Edouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Joseph Nzirorera (case nO ICTR-98-44-R73) 
(Karemera case: ICTR-97-24). 
46 Trial Chamber III, Decision on renewed Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction ... , 5 
August 2005, §§ 5 and 6. 
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- In its jurisprudence (decisions); and within these 
- In the decisions regarding legitimacy/jurisdiction challenges, 
- On preliminary motions (as per the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR), 
- of which there are four cases - two in each ad-hoc Tribunal, 
- and they all follow the main arguments set on the first: 
- the Tadic case. 
The proceedings of all of the Dusko Tadit case are, for this research, of less 
interest, as only the separate proceedings on the cited Motion present an interest 
so as to extract useful conclusions. On a different ground - the authenticity of the 
research material - particular attention must be given to the Tribunal's own 
discourse, i.e., the ICTY Decisions. Such an option is primarily based in the need 
for a clear delimitation of the subject: the Tribunal's own self-legitimizing discourse. 
As a consequence, important parts of the proceedings (such as the Prosecutor's 
response to the defence Motion, or the submission by the US Government, 
relevant as they are for the understanding of the discussion) are not primarily 
sources of research. Despite being included in this group, the defence Motion (or 
Trial Motion, including motion and supporting Brief) will be thoroughly reviewed, as 
it sets the questions which the Tribunal must answer, even if by a recognition of 
lack of competence to answer. 
Section I - The Defence Trial Motion 
The Defence Motion, filed on 23 June 1995, that became the landmark of the 
challenges to the ad-hoc tribunals' legitimacy, is in itself rather simple and short. 
The review of arguments from this point on is not to be read from a legal theory 
perspective, but rather as a cultural analysis, aiming to find the gaps or references 
that made such discourse possible at the time of enunciation and decision making. 
In half a page, with three arguments, the Defence requests three alternative 
rulings, aiming to dismiss the case or the charges. 
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Firstly the Defence summons Rule 73 (A)(i) of the RPE - currently Rule 72 (A)(i)47 
- as the legal basis for challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, only then stating 
the Motion itself, in which affirming: 
1. That the Tribunal is legally unfounded, therefore: 
1.1. Its jurisdiction constitutes an infringement of the State's sovereignty; and 
1.2. Its primacy over national courts is also an infringement of that sovereignty. 
2. That the Tribunal does not have material jurisdiction to try the crimes under 
Articles 2_548 of the SICTY, as these fail to determine or describe the c o n ~ e n t s s
of the offences, as required in substantive law. 
The Motion ends requesting the dismissal of the case or, alternatively, of the 
charges, adding the formula - usual in most legal orders - allowing for other 
options the Tribunal might find to suit the request. 49 
Formally, in the Trial Chamber, the Defence Motion challenging the legitimacy of 
the Tribunal had three lines of argument: (i) the illegal establishment of the 
Tribunal; (ii) the wrongful primacy over national courts; and (iii) the lack of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae (subject matter jurisdiction). However, the first 
challenge will prove to be on the legitimacy of the tribunal (rather than on its 
jurisdiction), while the other two, both on jurisdiction, are divided into the 
questioning of primacy of jurisdictions (national v. international), and the specific 
SUbstantive law on the case (the operative articles defining the crimes) as per the 
indictment of Dusko Tadi6. 
47 The Rule "Preliminary Motions" adopted in the original version of the RPE on 11 February 
1994 was amended on 10 July 1998,4 December 1998, 21 July 2005 and 12 July 2007. 
48 Article 2: Grave breaches of the Geneva conventions of 1949; Article 3: Violations of the 
laws or customs of war; Article 4: Genocide; Article 5: Crimes against humanity. 
Note: the original version of the SICTY was first amended on 13 May 1998, by UNSC Res. 
1166, after the proceedings we refer to in this research. Furthermore all of the nine 
amendments refer to the Judges' Status or Mandate (term) or to the composition of the 
Chambers, with no amendment affecting the relevant Articles cited in the Tadic case. 
49 Requesting, as third option: "Such order(s) as the Trial Chamber may deem fit to make in 
the circumstances" (Trial Motion, Motion: 2). 
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(A) Preview 
It is important to note, first and foremost, that such challenges imply a variety of 
questions to the legitimacy of the ICTY rulings. Should the arguments of this case 
be taken, the consequences on the Tribunal's capability to hold ground as an 
organ created to restore international peace could fade. Before we even start to 
review the Tribunal's own line of argumentation, in the Appeal as in the Trial, it 
might be useful to clear up those consequences by analysing the Defence Motion 
arguments and discourse. 
1. Illegal establishment of the Tribunal. 
The argument here can be said to be somewhat internal in nature, as it appeals to 
the ICTY to address the UNSC Res. which established itself. This particular 
challenge - most important to our research - could have a string of consequences: 
1.1. If the Tribunal accepted to review such a challenge, it would no longer be 
defining the limits of its jurisdiction, i.e. the Tribunal would not be, by the use 
and consideration of known legal instruments, searching for the provisions it 
could and should apply in the cases it was empowered to review. On the 
contrary, the Tribunal would be stepping up a level, reviewing the legality of 
the procedure of the Organ which created the Tribunal, and furthermore, such 
a review would focus exactly on such actions as those that effectively created 
the Tribunal. A path which would be forcing one instance to review the action 
of another, while the first is created by the latter, and the reviewed action is in 
fact the creation of the first. Despite the paradox of addressing an organ for it 
to recognize the illegality of itself, the strength of a favourable decision would 
be unquestionable, as the ICTY, created by the UNSC, would be the one 
recognising the illegality of the UNSC action in creating it (ICTY). 
1.2. Disregarding the question of jurisdiction over the UNSC Resolutions, the 
ICTY, on reviewing the legality of its own establishment, would be judging in 
its own (interest) cause. If the Tribunal, i.e. the Judges, recognised an 
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applicable jurisdiction, or better still the criminality of the actions it was 
supposed to prosecute (in the sense of set of norms that address such events 
as the ones that occurred in the former Yugoslavia), it would forcefully be 
recognising the need for an instance to prosecute those crimes in - ie. a 
court. The only question to answer would be which court? A national or 
international court? Since the Judges who make up the ICTY would have to 
recognize the lawfulness of an organ they were nominated to, and accepted 
such nomination, any review of such legality could be biased. The argumE-.nt is 
particularly compelling if the decision favours the continuity of the tribunal, and 
the Judges, as it reinforces the legality of their own nomination. In the end, the 
very review addressing the question of illegal establishment of the Tribunal 
casts possible doubt on the impartiality of a negative decision for the Motion; 
1.3. Should a positive decision be reached, and a paradox created: the Tribunal 
would decide it was illegal to establish the Tribunal, making this latter"s 
Decisions void, or better, nUll, i.e. the consequence would affect the very 
Decision of lack of legality. But even then an effective consequence could 
arise: the possibility of a judicial review of an UNSC Resolution to declare this 
latter illegal. Even not considering, for this matter, the fact that the created 
jurisdiction would declare illegal the actions of its "legislative" creator, a new 
possible jurisdiction for the review of political decisions of the UNSC would be 
set. And the review would be of political decisions as that is the only possible 
type of action which would justify for a UNSC Res. to establish a subsidiary 
organ of a judicial nature. 
2. Wrongful primacy over national courts. 
The argument of primacy, though less appealing, could bear more practical force 
by its political implications, or lack of same. Not challenging the UNSC, nor the 
creation of the Tribunal, the argument conforms with the main points summoned to 
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legitimize the ICTy. 50 Such an attitude avoids the ill disposition as described 
above, over the consequence of the illegality of the establishment of the Tribunal 
altogether. Rather cleverly it implies that even when such an International Tribunal 
exists it would only have a supplementary role, when national courts would lack the 
capability to prosecute such crimes. 
This question might have a double standard consequence as (i) it might save the 
face of the UNSC determination to create a tribunal, and (ii) render it inoperative 
due to a national court's actions. 
The base line question would be the respect for sovereignty, whereby the Tribunal, 
i.e. the UNSC creation, should comply with due respect for the State's sovereignty, 
and only after proven - effective and not presumed - incapability for such State 
level institutions to render justice, would an International body, such as the 
Tribunal, be competent to step in. 
The underlying doctrine here would keep the inviolability of the State, interpreting 
the establishment of the ICTY not as an intervention, but rather as a 
complementary guarantee of justice. However, such an interpretation could easily 
lead us to consider the ICTY not as a subsidiary organ supposed to "maintain or 
restore international peace and security", but rather as a new and external 
jurisdiction, which would not be imposed, as intervention, in so far as it would 
respect the national courts primacy. Either way the claim of UNSC, acting under 
Chapter VII, as proposed in the UNSG Report and adopted by the UNSC, would 
fall. 
3. Lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
The very compelling argument rests upon the distinction between internal and 
international conflict. The case is that international jurisdiction, applicable to 
50 See generally Cryer (2005 127-142), particularly the framing of the primacy regime of the 
ICTY, 127-132. 
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international conflict, could only be considered, when facing internal conflicts, when 
international crimes were committed. In the case under review, should the ICTY 
consider the conflict as internal, only crimes against humanity could, according to 
the Defence, eventually be called upon for prosecution in an international 
jurisdiction, leaving, on the contrary, crimes of war outside the ICTY jurisdiction 51 
A side effect of such a review would be, and in fact was, the necessity for a Judicial 
body such as the ICTY to review a political conclusion over the Yugoslavian 
conflict(s). The case is particularly important given the legal justification for the 
UNSC intervention, in creating the ICTY, appealing to its conclusion that the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia represented an international threat. To review the 
issue the ICTY would have to make a political evaluation considering the facts, an 
option usually outside the competence of judicial bodies, given both the principle of 
legality (application of the law) and the separation of powers (making it 
inappropriate for courts to review policies or discretionary acts of political nature). 52 
(B) The Brief in support of the Motion. 
Separately the Defence filed a Brief53 in support of this Motion where arguments 
are put forward regarding each of the Claims: 
1. For the illegal establishment of the Tribunal: 
1.1. The lack of a Treaty; 
1.2. That only the UNGA might assure international legitimacy; and 
1.3. The lack of competence of the UNSC. 
51 As later discussed, when reviewing the Trial Decision, this understanding of the Defence 
is not settled, nor even generally accepted, as the customary nature of the "laws and 
customs of war" is widely accepted to limit the action of belligerents engaged in internal 
conflicts. 
52 Although outside the scope of this research, this question cannot be completely set aside, 
given its discussion as a central argument of the ICTY competence to pass judgment on its 
own legitimacy, i.e. to review the political act of its own establishment (see infra). 
53 "Brief to support the Motion on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal", filed in 23 June 1995, in the 
ICTY case: The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusko Tadic (Case n.o IT-94-T), hereinafter 
"The Brief', or, as reference "(Trial Motion, Brief)". 
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2. For the wrongful primacy over national courts - as a denial of accused right to 
be judge in their jurisdiction: 
2.1. The domestic jurisdiction within the internationally recognized sovereignty 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
2.2. Sovereignty of States; 
2.3. Jus de non evocando; 
3. For the lack of subject matter jurisdiction - mainly based upon the qualification 
of "internal conflict": 
3.1. lack of substantive law; 
3.2. lack of jurisdiction regarding the Geneva Conventions; 
3.3. lack of jurisdiction regarding laws of war; 
3.4. lack of jurisdiction regarding IHL. 
1. Illegal establishment of the Tribunal 
On the illegal establishment of the Tribunal three main sustaining arguments are 
set: (1.1.) the lack of a treaty; (1.2.) that, in the absence of such treaty, only the 
UNGA might assure the international legitimacy to establish the Tribunal; and (1.3.) 
the III-founded establishment of the Tribunal by the UNSC. So, after identifying 
possible consequences of the Motion requests, the analysis of the Motion's 
arguments is made based on this Brief (both hereinafter referred to as the Motion). 
1.1. The lack of a Treaty. 
The main argument presented being the need to respect State sovereignty. 
1.1.1.However, in an ambiguous way, the Defence argues the implied need for 
States to be able to make their (dis)approval known, i.e. the establishment of 
an international jurisdiction implies taking into account the State sovereignty, 
which in turn implies the opportunity to make their (State's) will known. 54 
54 Trial Motion, Brief: 2. 
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This argument does not, however, seem to be necessarily true, at least in the case 
of alternative measures of administering justice; i.e. should the tribunal not have 
primacy over national courts, and/or administer justice only outside national 
borders, then the State sovereignty would be respected within the State territory, 
the only loci submitted to that sovereign power, even though a different solution 
Uurisdiction) would be applied to every individual actor outside that territory. In 
such a case, the knowledge of the State's will is irrelevant for the jurisdiction to be 
established outside its borders, even if it relates to events which occurred withill its 
borders, on an internationalized version of internal rules regarding foreign actions 
(as, e.g., internal rules fighting international corruption or money laundering). 
Regardless of this, the first stone of the path the Defence describes, so as to 
connect the establishment of the Tribunal with the need for a treaty, can be 
summarized in the following link: taking into account the State's sovereignty (when 
establishing the jurisdiction) involves the possibility of the State's will to be known. 
1.1.2.Concurrently the Motion argues that for such (State) will to be known, the 
Tribunal should have been based on a treaty. 55 
Again - easy as it may seem to a post-Rome Statute reader - this does not seem 
to be necessarily the truth. A decision by an organ, of an international organization 
of which the State is Part/Member or is represented in, might just achieve that goal. 
The underlying argument that such an international organ/organization would itself 
be based upon a treaty cannot benefit the Defence's argument: as the UNSC 
emerges from the creation - by treaty - of the UN, which WOUld, following the 
Defence argument, legitimize the Tribunal. In fact that was the case here, as the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, with current Kosovo, and Montenegro) 
issued a letter on the matter addressed at to the UNSG, but explicitly aimed to 
reach both the UNGA (A/48/170) and the UNSC (as per S/25801), hereby 
55 Ibid. 
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exposing its disagreement to the establishment of the Tribunal. 56 The underlying 
question, therefore, is not whether a treaty form is needed for the sovereign will to 
be known, which is not the case, but rather if a treaty is needed for that will to be 
respected. At odds are the concepts of the UN as an intergovernmental 
organization or a supra-national organization, i.e. is the UNSC above sovereignty? 
Was there a freely willed full transfer of sovereignty from the State(s) to the UNSC, 
to which states are now subjects? And if so, does that transfer of sovereignty affect 
the State power to determine its jurisdiction, i.e. to prosecute and try its citiLens 
(Alvarez, 1996: 252, 256)? 
On an apparent reversal of its support for a universal criminal court,57 the 
Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) letter goes on to ascertain the illegitimacy, based on the 
illegality, of the establishment of the Tribunal (ICTY), as the UNCS would have no 
mandate under the Charter (Chapter VII and Article 29). Also referred to were past 
failures to establish a permanent Tribunal, because of the dissent of some nations 
or the concordance with the group following the thesis that such a Tribunal would 
have to be established by Treaty. Furthermore, again oddly, the Yugoslavia letter 
to the UNSG remembers the OSCE position, in which a UNGA decisive influence 
might be enough to legitimize such Tribunal. All these arguments the Defence Brief 
fails to explore, when calling on the need for the possibility of the will of the State to 
56 In so doing that State did not follow the Defence argument, as it considered that, for its will 
to be known, there was no need for a treaty, a simple letter to the International Organization 
was enough. 
57 Yugoslavia (F.RY) itself, in the above-mentioned letter - acknowledging its support for a 
permanent criminal court and a universal jurisdiction - leaves the emphasis on the 
discriminatory option to try war crimes and crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia, leaving 
all the others be (examples given such as: Korea. Vietnam, Algeria, Cambodia, Lebanon. 
Afghanistan, DRC. Iraq or Panama). On a parallel note, Yugoslavia claims that the 
universality of such war crimes makes it more difficult to accept a reduction of jurisdiction to 
the former Yugoslavia. an act that would no doubt violate the principle of universality. and 
that of equality, an argument later recovered by the Defense when arguing the lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. A final approach to this argument is made by questioning the 
impartiality of a Tribunal created by an Organ that already seems biased against "Serbs". 
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be known, without explaining why it would have to be through a Treaty, and not a 
letter to the UN (UNSG and UNGA) as issued by FR.Y. 
1.1.3.For such argument the Defence appeals to several authorities, but mostly to 
letters from UNSC members and others (States). 
The Defence summons, in support of its argument, the UNSG Report58 and eight 
letters or statements from member States, 59 all regarding the ICTY, forgetting 
however other submissions, such as those made by Italy, USA, Canada, and 
Egypt, but more significantly the above-mentioned letter by the F.R.Y. 
Overlooking the difference between political positions and effective binding legal 
norms, the Defence fails to derive legal interpretations of the Charter from these 
cited authorities. 60 If the (politically) preferred path of establishment would be a 
Treaty - not posing any theoretical doubts or difficulties, given its well established 
role in international law - that does not necessarily mean that, within a certain 
international organization, such as the UN, the will of the State could not be made 
known by a simple letter, declaration or vote. 
This chosen line of argumentation weakens the Defence point, as it does not attack 
the legality of the novelty, leaving the argument of lack of a treaty dependent on 
the form of notice of the State's will. This strategy does not put forward the issue 
that, according to the UN Charter, the UNSC lacked the power to supersede the 
State's judicial sovereignty, a compelling argument for the need of a treaty, and 
one abundantly exposed by several of the cited authorities on their own 
58 S/25704. 
59 Namely letters from Mexico (S/25417), Brazil (S/25540), The Netherlands (S/25716), 
France (S/25266), and Sweden, this last on behalf of the CSCE (S/25307), and the 
statements made in the proceedings of the UNSC by China, the UK and Spain (S/PV.3217), 
regarding the "undermining" of the ICC. 
60 Opposite of what it does later when addressing the competence of the UNGA, the 
Defence completely misses the direct confrontation between State legitimacy and UNSC 
legitimacy, a very compelling argument numerous times addressed in the wide range of fora 
for the much debated "lack of representation" of the UNSC. 
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statements: in particular the excuses in the UNSG Report for not choosing the form 
of a Treaty, and the cited subsequent positions by UNSC members which, though 
recognizing the emergency, do affirm their doubts on the new path, questioning the 
legality of the UNSC power to create Tribunals as a general rule. 
The tangential reference made by the Defence to the abnormality of such 
establishment rests: (i) on the fact that an ad-hoc tribunal was not intended as a 
general rule,61 a non-proceeding argument since the ICTY is an ad-hoc Tribunal, 
therefore non-permanent; and (ii) that such an ad-hoc Tribunal might undermine 
the intention to work on the creation of a permanent International Criminal 
Tribunal. 62 
Even not evoking our post-prognosis knowledge of the ICC, the authorities 
summoned in the Brief, as the UK and Spain statements (S/PV.3217), are the first 
to declare their will to continue to work towards the goal of a permanent court, 
therefore indirectly affirming that their vote for the establishment of the ICTY does 
not compromise the future creation of that other tribunal. Again, the argument by 
the Defence fails before showing its merits. Should the Brief go on to explain, in 
this context, why the UNGA should worry about the future creation of a permanent 
court, a point might be made relating to the recognized/recognizable powers of the 
UNSC v. UNGA. Quite on the contrary, the Brief only underlines those positions 
raised in the UNSC which detach themselves from the possible consequences 
regarding this particular case, thus summoning the reasons for this argument not to 
proceed. 
1.2. Only the UNGA might, in the absence of a Treaty, be able to assure the 
international legitimacy to establish the Tribunal. 63 
61 A reference made by summoning the "intention" of the International Law Commission _ 
point 1.2. See Trial (Motion, Brief: 2). 
62 Trial Motion, Brief: 3. 
63 Trial Motion, Brief: 2-4 
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This argument is here summoned in alternative to the previous, and not 
concurrently as we have referred to above. The Defence, by avoiding the issue of 
the powers of the UNSC v. UNGA, limits its argument on the need of a Treaty to 
the possibility of the (sovereign) State to make its will known - an argument that 
falls when (alternatively) considering a rightful establishment by the UNGA. 
The Brief claims that: only the UNGA is able to guarantee a full representation of 
the international community; the UNGA urged the UNSC to recommend the 
establishment of the Ad-hoc tribunal; the UNGA would have competence to 
establish a tribunal; and finally that the UNGA was also competent to amend the 
Charter. 
1.2.1. UNGA and representation of the international community.64 
All too briefly the Defence refers to the UNGA as the only international organ able 
to guarantee a full representation of the international community. Even if we can 
understand, within the international political stage, the almost self-evident nature of 
the claim, from a legal perspective the Defence takes for granted the irrelevance of 
numerous legitimacy challenges to the UNGA, in particular: 
a) The fact that not all the sovereign entities are represented in the UNGA; 
b) A discussion of the UNGA powers might raise the question of legitimacy, 
primarily regarding the majority rule and the absence of veto; 
c) The nature of the UN and its organs. 
The Brief ends up resting this argument on the accompanying argument that 
UNGA's competence might derive from the fact that a state's sovereignty was at 
stake. In so doing, regarding the UNGA, the Defence fails to address questions of 
an identical nature to those it poses to the UNSC. Furthermore, if, following this 
argument by the Defence, we can find - as we will - some sort of a "statement of 
intention", by the UNGA, favouring the creation of the ICTY, the way in which it is 
established might easily be justified by the arguments effectively used by the 
64 Idem, 3. 
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UNSG - i.e. if the UNGA's will is to create the Tribunal, the urgency of such action 
can justify the action of the UNSC. 
1.2.2.UNGA Resolution. 55 
Countering the previous line of argumentation, the Brief refers to a UNGA 
Resolution, adopted on 18 December 1992 (AiRES/47/121), whereby the 
Assembly urges the Council to "consider recommending the establishment of an 
ad-hoc international war crimes tribunal", as any further action by the UNGA would 
constitute a breach of the rule in Article 12(1) of the Charter (see Appendix I). The 
UNGA Resolution is cleverly used by the Defence to propose that such position 
shows that the UNGA did not intend to "give the Security Council a full and 
exclusive authority in the matter", a claim the brief supports with further reference 
to some State's statements, such as Mexico's (S/25417) and Brazil's (S/PV.3217). 
However, the conclusion of the Brief, on "the international community's intention to 
remain actively involved in the establishment of the Tribunal" (Brief, 2.2. § 2), as 
opposed to an action by the UNSC seems far-fetched, thus raising the doubt as to 
whether the UNGA - in breach of its objectives - was anticipating, and thus 
attempting to prevent, the UNSC from its "regular" use of powers under Chapter 
VII. 
The text of the UNGA resolution does in fact permit such literal interpretation, but it 
also entails the possibility that the UNGA, while assuming its own responsibilities, 
was only: (i) recognizing both the seriousness of the reported abuses in the Former 
Yugoslavia, maxime in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and (ii) the urgency for taking such 
decisions as to render effective previous resolutions, including, mostly UNSC 
Resolutions (UNGA Res., § 3.), and furthermore (iii) recognizing the need for 
measures to be taken under Chapter VII (UNGA Res., introduction, § 13), thus 
denying the underlining of any attempt to prevent the use of these powers. 
55 Ibid. 
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So, it does become clear, from the text of the UNGA Resolution, that the Assembly 
was "gravely concerned" (Idem, § 9) with the matter, and condemned the non-
compliance with previous resolutions (Ibid., § 10) both by the Assembly and the 
Council (Ibid., point 3.), but also convinced that the situation warranted "the 
implementation of decisive actions under Chapter VII of the Charter". Accordingly, 
even though expressing the intention to remain actively involved in the issue (both 
the situation in former Yugoslavia and the possible establishment of an ad-hoc 
Tribunal) the UNGA, representing the international community as proposed by the 
Defence, recognizes the urgency for measures to be taken under Chapter VII. As 
we know, Chapter VII is devoted to action(s) with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of peace and acts of aggression, all actions within the powers of the 
Security Council, as per Article 24, n.D 2 of the Charter. This argumentation, 
sufficient to clarify the possible (legal) intentions of the UNGA reference to Chapter 
VII, becomes clearer when the text of the resolution "urges the Security Council to 
consider recommending" (UNGA Res. 10.). In fact, according to the rules in 
Chapter VII, under which "decisive actions" the UNGA considers justified by the 
situation in hand, the UNSC "shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken" (Charter, Article 39). 
As a conclusion one might consider that the UNGA resolution not only expressly 
recognizes the situation as justifying actions under Chapter VII, i.e. within the 
powers of the Council, but also, and furthermore, implicitly recognizes the UNSC 
powers to decide on its own, thus (only) urging the Council to consider other 
options, i.e. recommending the action to the Assembly. The arguments set by 
Mexico and Brazil follow the same logic, preferring the involvement of the 
Assembly, but not refuting the Council's powers, in the case of Mexico, by using 
the term "should" when addressing the need for UNSC actions to respect 
sovereign rights of States (despite Article 24, n.D 1 of the Charter), and with Brazil 
expressly using the term "preferred", when addressing the possibility for the 
establishment of the Tribunal to allow a broader participation by all member States 
of the UN. Should these positions be less clear, and the quoted statement by Brazil 
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further reads that this State considered it appropriate for the matter also to be 
brought to the General Assembly, i.e. recognizing the UNSC action, but also 
considering it might, or should, be reinforced, but never questioning the UNSC 
powers. 
1.2.3. UNGA competence to establish the Tribunal 66 
The Defence then contests the UNGA competence to establish a tribunal. Without 
ever expressly stating this competence to be exclusive of the Assembly, the Brief 
does imply such limitation by asserting that "if any organ of the UN could be said to 
be competent to attribute jurisdiction to an International Criminal Court, it would be 
the General Assembly." 
To support the conclusion, the argument rests upon the UNGA's "competence in 
any questions or matters appearing within the scope of the Charter (Articles 10 and 
11)" vis-a-vis the power to establish subsidiary organs (Article 22). The systematic 
interpretation of the Charter makes it abundantly clear that this latter norm on the 
establishment of subsidiary organs does not add to the Defence argument. In fact 
Article 22 and Article 29 have exactly the same rule, regarding the UNGA and the 
UNSC respectively, whereby the key note, "necessary for the performance of its 
functions", refers to the only possible differences: each organ's functions. 
The Brief calls only on Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter to define UNGA 
competence within this matter, thus limiting the interpretations of those "functions" 
according to these powers. But the definition of the Assembly's functions and 
powers in Charter spans from Article 10 to 17. 
In Article 10 the Charter establishes the UNGA general powers to discuss, and not 
to decide, any questions or matters within the Charter, further clarifying the power 
to make recommendations, and not decisions, to States and the UNSC, "except as 
provided in Article 12". If this does not mean that the UNGA cannot adopt a 
66 Ibid., 3-4. 
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resolution including decisions, it does however limit those decisions, especially in 
regard to the UNSC sphere of action. 
In Article 11 the Charter lists some key examples of questions and matters to be 
addressed by the Assembly, namely: general principles; maintenance of 
international peace and security, "except as provided in Article 12"; and to bring to 
the attention of the UNSC situations likely to endanger international peace and 
security. Its the Charter which further clarifies that such powers do not limit the 
general scope of Article 10, contrary to the Defence line or argument.. 
In both Articles the Charter (i) does not mention the power of the Assembly to 
decide the taking of any action regarding international peace and security, but 
rather the power to discuss and recommend; and (ii) it explicitly recognizes due 
respect for the exception in Article 12. Now, Article 12 prohibits the UNGA from 
making even a recommendation regarding any dispute or situation which the 
UNSC might be addressing (exercising functions assigned to it in the Charter)67 
As a conclusion one may note the lack of a proper discussion on the possible 
confrontation between the powers of the Assembly and the Council. Limiting the 
argument to only two Articles further deepens the Defence's discourse logical gap 
between the invoked powers (Articles 10 and 11) and the proposed conclusion of 
the exclusive competence of the Assembly. The summoning of Articles where an 
explicit exception is operational would on its own weaken the argument, if, as in the 
case, the exception shelters the Council's actions from the possible interference of 
the Assembly, the argument invalidates the conclusions: 
a) The fact that the UNGA can address any questions, does not mean it can 
decide them; 
b) If the UNGA can make recommendations, it does mean the decisions rest 
elsewhere; 
67 See article 12, nO 2, reference to "matters relative to the maintenance of international 
peace and security", regarding the procedure of notification of the UNGA, clarifying which 
matters being dealt with by the UNSC (see Appendix I). 
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c) The general competence of the Assembly does not preclude specific, special 
or parallel competence of other UN organs; 
d) According to the summoned Articles, even these powers of the Assembly are 
somewhat suspended regarding matters being dealt with by the UNSC, as was 
the case; 
e) So, if the Assembly urges the Council to propose, it recognizes that the Council 
does not necessarily have to. 
Finally the Brief refers, by reference to the position of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (O.I.C.),68 the possibility of the UNGA approval of the Statute 
after "the adoption of the Security Council resolutions providing for the creation of 
the Tribunal". Disregarding the fact that the invoked position by the O.I.C. included 
a prohibition to challenge the courts legitimacy (S/25512, Annex, I, 5.), the said 
document expressly recommends the establishment of the Tribunal by the Council 
under Chapter VII, contradicting its misuse by the Defence. 
1.2.4. UNGA Competence to amend the Charter. 69 
In the same reasoning path, the Brief invokes the UNGA competence to amend the 
Charter (Articles 108 and 109), presenting a possible solution analogue to Chapter 
XIV (The International Court of Justice). The base line argument here would be to 
overcome a not invoked, but implied, lack of prevision for the solution at hands (the 
ICTY) within the Charter. When asserting the UNGA's competence to amend the 
Charter, the Brief fails to refer the role of the permanent members of the UNSC70 
Firstly one should note that the (Defence) challenge, to the solution followed in 
establishing the ICTY, does not imply invoking or proposing other solutions. Taking 
this approach, distancing the challenge from the facts that are towards hypothesis 
68 UN Doc. S/25512. 
69 Trial Motion, Brief: 3-4. 
70 The de facto veto power of any amendment given by the Charter to the permanent 
members of the UNSC - Article 108, in fine; and Article 109, n.o 2, in fine. 
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that might be, the Defence strengthens a reply addressing the UNSC powers, 
regardless of other possible solutions by the UNGA. 
Secondly, the intended analogy, between the ICTY and the ICJ, lacks the 
similarities needed for as: (i) the ICTY would be an ad-hoc court, as intended both 
by the UNSC (Res. 808) and the UNGA (resolution from 18 December 1992), 
unlike the ICJ, of a permanent nature; (ii) The ICTY was meant to deal Wit:l an 
ongoing situation posing a threat to international peace and security, while the ICJ 
aimed to deal with general future disputes; (iii) the ICTY would have to have a 
criminal jurisdiction, unlike the ICJ. 71 
Last, and more compelling to dismiss the Defence argument, the ICJ wasn't 
established by the UNGA but by treaty. Meaning that, again, a comparison with the 
ICTY would fail to prove the need for the intervention of the Assemblyl2 We recall 
the detour in the Brief, by which the power to amend the Charter is invoked in this 
regard, however, mutatis mutandis, the generally recognized urgency for a criminal 
jurisdiction ex post - also recognized by the UNGA in the 18 December Resolution 
- wouldn't be compatible with such due process. By calling on Articles 108 and 109 
of the Charter, the Brief refers to a particular process of amendment: the calling of 
a General Conference; 73 and the subsequent need for ratification. 74 This process 
would render impracticable and ineffective the establishment of the Tribunal for its 
announced purposes and with the recognized urgency. 
71 As recognized by the lJefence in the beginning of the hearing of the Motion (Affaire IT-94-
1-PT, 25 July 1995), in the preliminary intervention of Mr. Wladimiroff, by the Defence (Trial 
hearings: 194). 
72 One should take note of the lack of any explicit mention to specific ICJ proceedings, 
cases, in support of this argument. The reference, thus, should be understood as a mention 
to the Statute of the ICJ, as part of the UN Charter (Article 92). 
73 Or alternatively, with an abrogating interpretation of Article 108, by sheer power to 
propose amendments without a General Conference. 
74 "In accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members 
of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council" 
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As a conclusion one can speculate that a better strategy might be to keep only the 
challenge of legitimacy to establish the Tribunal to the all UN, should the Brief 
insist on recognizing the competence of the UNGA, neither the amendment 
procedure nor the given analogy favours the Defence quest. An alternative path 
might draw on the discussion of the powers of the UNGA to establish the Tribunal 
without amending the Charter, as any other option falls on a procedure analogue to 
a treaty. However, this line of argumentation, as much of the remaining ones, 
seems to fall into a confrontational rhetoric which, through the incoherence of tre 
mutually contradicting alternatives presented, lacks the appeal and acceptance 
and logical strength of culturally recognisable institutions. 
1.3. III-founded establishment of the Tribunal by the UNSC. 75 
The Defence finally addresses the question in review, UNSC powers, parting from 
alternative solutions which might or should have been. The key note of this 
challenge rests on the notion that the UNSC lacks the competence to create this 
subsidiary organ, and to delegate on it powers itself does not have, i.e. the 
possible violation of the principle nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse 
habet. 76 So as to support this claim of invalid establishment of the Tribunal, the 
17 . Brief summons seven main arguments: 
1.3.1.the inexistence of an international conflict; 
1.3.2.the lack of UNSC authority under Article 41 of the Charter (Brief: 58); 
1.3.3. the lack of authority under any other provision of the Charter (Brief: 60); 
1.3.4.no involvement in humanitarian law (Brief: 62); 
1.3.5.the subsidiary nature of the organ flack of independence (Brief: 66); 
1.3.6.the lack of exceptional circumstances (Brief: 68); and 
1.3.7.the lack of authority over individuals (Brief: 69). 
-----------------------
75 Trial Motion Brief: 4-8. 
76 Principle according to which an organ cannot delegate a power itself does not have. 
77 Trial Motion Brief: 4-8. 
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1.3.1. The inexistence of an international conflict; 
Here the key argument made by the Defence is to assume the need for an 
international conflict as a prerequisite for the UNSC to have the competence to 
determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security, i.e. the 
filling of a condition for the application of Article 39 (and all of Chapter VII) of the 
Charter. According to the Brief the Tribunal is not a measure included in Chdpter 
VII ,78 the conflict occurs within one State, making the conflict of an internal 
nature,79 there are no links between the factions and other countries,8o and there 
'11 81 was no Spl -over. 
Meaningfully the Brief fails to refer the first part of Article 39, according to which, 
and with no known literal or implicit condition or limitation, "The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression". Only after conferring such wide power to determine the threat, Article 
39 states the UNSC powers to be exercised "to maintain or restore international 
peace and security". So, it's the results that are expected to be related to 
international peace and security, and not the threat to peace that must be 
international, thus rendering these all line of argumentation useless to the Motion. 
We shall, however, review the arguments presented in support of this (erroneously) 
assumed precondition for the exercise of Chapter VII powers by the UNSC. 
1.3.1.1. That the establishment of the Tribunal is not a measure within the scope 
82 
of Chapter VII. 
A double approach call be considered regarding this specific point: 
a) an international conflict as the precondition for the UNSC to be empowered 
to enforce measures; and 
78 Trial Motion, Brief: 4 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Trial Motion, Brief: 4-5. 
82 Trial Motion, Brief: 4. 
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b) the inclusion or not (in Chapter VII) of measures of a judicial nature. 
As this latter argument is further presented, from the opposite perspective 
(besides denying the existence of the international conflict, autonomously 
challenging UNSC powers under Article 41 to take judicial measures - Brief: 5), we 
will leave than critique to the analysis of the claim that a measure of a judicial 
nature is not included on Chapter VII (Article 41). 
The first approach, expressly invoked by the Defence,83 rests upon the claim that 
"the conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims within the borders of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina is clearly not an international issue." Cleverly, the Brief uses the word 
"Issue" and not "conflict", thus implicitly questioning the international nature of the 
possible threat (as we've seen earlier an internal conflict can pose an international 
effect/threaUissue). This openness, to the possibility that even if the conflict is of an 
internal nature it might have international implications ("issues"), ends harming the 
Defence, as despite denying such international issues/effects, the sheer possibility 
reinforces the UNSC discretion to determine such threats. 
1.3.1.2. The territory of the conflict, Bosnia Herzegovina, is one State, making the 
conflict of an internal nature. 84 
The Defence argues with the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an 
independent State, and the lack of intention to recognize the Bosnian Serb 
Republic, mainly by the European Union. 
However, the claim on the internal nature of the conflict can only hold ground, so 
as to challenge the legitimacy of the ICTY, if the establishment of the Tribunal 
depends on the international nature of the conflict, in any other case, the 
inter/national nature of the conflict becomes irrelevant to the question. As we've 
explained above in this same point of the arguments, international is the peace and 
security the UNSC is due to protect, but the recognition of a threat, a discretionary 
83 Trial Motion, Brief: 4, pOint 3.1.1. in fine. 
84 Trial Motion, Brief: 4. 
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power of the Council, does not necessarily have to be international, e.g. the 
possible spill-over of a conflict or the domino effect from the struggle for resources 
in an exodus, but also the maintenance, by one single country, of a credible threat 
against international peace or security. 
Since, to legitimize UNSC action under Chapter VII, there is not a precondition of 
an internationalized conflict, the argument by the Defence, truthful or nut, is 
irrelevant for the legitimacy challenge to the establishment of the Tribunal. 
1.3.1.3. The lack of formal links between the factions and other countries. 85 
Oddly the Defence further pushes the argument of the internal nature of the 
conflict, and not of the threat, not to show the impossibility of such conflict to affect 
the international peace and security, but rather to almost recognize the 
international links of the parties in conflict. By stating that such links "have never 
been formally established and can anyway be considered to have been broken off', 
the Defence adds nothing to the legitimacy challenge, but implicitly admits that 
some international links from the factions in conflict - though informal or past -
might have occurred. An hypothesis which, on its own, raises the possibility of such 
conflict to have international effects. 
1.3.1.4. The continuous nature of the conflict (throughout three years) and the lack 
. 86 
of any spill-over. 
The Defence notes that throughout the period of the conflict "the fighting has not 
escalated and spread to other countries". Mutatis mutandis, the reasoning for the 
previous argument is equally effective here except, apparently, for the last part. 
Claiming the contention of an internal conflict might reasonably condition 
international intervention, however, the general provision of Article 39 seems to be 
wide enough to pose few if any limits on the Council's discretionary powers to 
85 Trial Motion, Brief: 4. 
86 Trial Motion, Brief: 4-5 
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"determine the existence of any threat to peace". In extremis the existence of a 
threat to peace does not even necessarily need the pre-existence of a conflict, but 
the verification of a threat. Again, it's not the occurrence of an international event 
that sets the standards for a UNSC Decision, but rather the possible effects on 
international peace and security, i.e. international peace does not have to have 
been affected, nor does the events that might be considered a threat need to be 
internationalized. 
1.3.2. The lack of UNSC authority under Article 41 of the Charter. 87 
In support of this point of the Brief, the Defence presents three arguments: that the 
list in Article 41 of the Charter does not provide for judicial measures; that such 
judicial measure is not effective, if not counterproductive, for peace; and that 
amnesty could be more effecting in reaching peace. 
1.3.2.1. The measures in Article 41 of the Charter. 
The Defence calls upon the list of non-military measures, in Article 41, to sustain 
the claim that "it is clear that the establishment of a war crimes tribunal was not 
intended." The Brief seems to contradict itself, on referring this list of non-military 
measures the Council may enforce under Article 41, as the Defence recognizes the 
list "may not be regarded as being exhaustive". The presentation of the literal 
argument (that Article 41 of the Charter does not provide for the establishment of a 
tribunal) although apparently accurate, reveals itself not to be correct, as further 
systematic interpretation of this Article leads to the conclusion that the provision 88 
not only reinforces the exemplificative nature of the listing, but actually shows that 
the UNSC has the power to decide any other non-military measures. 
The vague argument, that "it is clear that the establishment of a war crimes tribunal 
was not intended", is incompatible with an exemplificative listing of open-end 
87 Ibid., 5. 
88 That the Security Council has discretionary power to decide what measures to be 
enforced, not involving the use of armed forces. 
61 
solutions. Making the claim that Article 41 does not provide for the establishment of 
a tribunal, as many other measures, the Defence could only benefit if able to prove 
the list to be exhaustive or, alternatively, if it proved the existence of a limit to the 
possible solutions, which it fails to achieve. However, since the list of measures in 
the second half of Article 41 is not exhaustive, the general rule, in the first half, 
clearly states that it is up for the UNSC to decide what measures are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, with the only limitation of not involving the 
use of force. 
The additional argument (Brief: 5, in fine) that the measures listed in the Article are 
of economic and political natures, and "in no way suggest judicial measures" 
seems more compelling. However, it may be argued, still following a systematic 
interpretation of the Charter, that such measures can be a possible pressure 
adding to the call upon the parties, in line with Article 40. In the case, given the 
reports pointing to an ongoing "ethnic cleansing", and the public and publicized will 
of both the Council and the Assembly, implied an effective criminal responsibility to 
those, individuals involved in the "form of genocide" (UNGA Res. Introduction, § 9). 
So, the numerus clausus argument falls against the non-exhaustive list of 
measures, and the teleological argument falls also given the specific nature of the 
possible pressure to be added to the call upon the parties, in line with Article 40, 
i.e. the non aggravation of criminal acts which might now face prosecution. To 
suggest, here, that much of the Defence discourse is more rhetorical than 
persuasive, let alone logically convincing, namely underlines the lapse away from 
legal and ever towards political pleading. 
1.3.2.2. Effectiveness of such judicial measure for peace. 89 
On summoning this argument the Defence falls even further outside the scope of a 
judicial review, as the basic point is to question how the establishment of the 
Tribunal could contribute to peace, counter arguing that such Tribunal could even 
89 Ibid. 
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endanger a peace process, in a reference to the unwillingness of Uudicially) 
prosecuted leaders to compromise in peace agreements. 
However, mutatis mutandis, what we've said in the critique to the previous 
argument (on the form of pressure) could well justify the detente nature of the 
establishment of the Tribunal, at least facing a possible, and probable, aggravation 
of the reported "ethnic cleansing" in progress. On assuming its incapability to stop 
these actions and to enforce previous Resolutions, the UN (SC) could be using an 
individualized form of pressure, or promoting the individual consciousness of the 
criminal nature of ongoing actions by armed militias/military men. 
The claim, regardless of its truthfulness, would imply an even more political 
judgment then the one focusing on the determination of a threat to international 
peace. The likelihood, or otherwise, of the establishment of the Tribunal 
contribution or prejudice to peace is not a direct necessary and logical 
consequence which could be subject to judicial review. So, surpassing the 
competence argument, the adequacy of the measure chosen, though arguable, 
can not be legally challenged on these terms, or at least the UNSC discretionarily 
use of its own powers can not be judicial reviewed on the basis of opportunity. 
1.3.2.3. Effectiveness of an amnesty90 
The question mark the Defence poses at the end of this argument does not 
preclude its advisory nature. Trying to compare cases like Argentina and South 
Africa to an ongoing armed conflict with reports of ethnic cleansing in Europe 
reveals a bad strategy to support a legitimacy challenge, as the aim of the 
establishment of the Tribunal is not a change of regime, nor to facilitate a 
transitional period, but to stop a specific type of criminal action during a conflict. 
Again, the fusion, or calculated confusion, of the legalistic yet overtly political 
argumentation is only apparent. 
90 Ibid. 
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1.3.3. The lack of authority under any other provision of the Charter. 91 
After questioning the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY by the UNSC 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Defence tries to put aside any other possible 
source of legal legitimacy according to the Charter, to do so, the Brief makes two 
claims: that the continuous extension of UNSC powers under Chapter VII must be 
limited; and that the judicial measure under Chapter VII cannot be founded on the 
general provisions of Articles 24(1) and 24 of the Charter. 
1.3.3.1. Limitation to the extension of powers of the UNSC. 
This apparently compelling argument on a judicial stage, as per the democratic 
principle of limitation of powers, fails to identify which are those limits that must be 
and that the establishment of the Tribunal is indeed a violation of sur.h limits. So, 
even when agreeing with the general principles invoked, the Defence does not 
show nor prove any present risk of unlimited power. 
On another note, it seems counter intuitive, not to say improbable, that the 
establishment of an International Tribunal (by the organ entrusted with the 
maintenance of international peace within the most globally representative 
international organization, and aimed to prosecute individuals responsible for 
crimes against humanity, and furthermore limited to apply existing International 
Criminal Law) could be proved to promote unlimited power. On the contrary, one 
might question how legally and legitimately could such Tribunal represent enough 
power so as to avoid unlimited powers to pursue criminal actions against humanity. 
Either way, though invoking a respectable principle, the Defence fails to prove its 
violation, rendering it inoperative to support the legitimacy challenge to the ICTY. 
1.3.3.2. Judicial measures under Chapter VII unfounded in general provisions. 
The Brief claims that the establishment of the Tribunal under Chapter VII cannot be 
founded on Articles 24(1) and 25, of the Charter (Functions and Powers of the 
91 Ibid. 
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UNSC). The argument is unintelligible as the previous expositions in the Brief, also 
summoned here in support, contradict the claim: either the Tribunal was 
legitimately established under Chapter VII, and the connection with the general 
provisions of Articles 24 (1) and 25 follow the same path as any other measures 
under Chapter VII; or the establishment of the Tribunal was not legally established 
under Chapter VII of the Charter (as per the Defence previous claims) and the 
precondition of this current argument does not exist. If the tribunal was not 
established under Chapter VII, there would be no logical connection with such 
Chapter. Noteworthy Article 24 (1) refers to member states agreement that, when 
acting to maintain international peace and security, i.e. under Chapter VII, the 
UNSC is acting on their behalf, and, in Article 25 to the States acceptance of 
decisions of the UNSC according to the Charter (including Chapter VII). 
An intelligible interpretation of the argument would be to consider that the Defence 
is actually claiming that any measures under Chapter VII cannot be founded on the 
general provisions of Articles 24 (1) and 25. If both Article 39 and 41 state that the 
UNSC decides, or may decide, measures regarding international peace and 
security, it becomes difficult to support that the provisions of Articles 24 (1) and 25, 
regarding the due respect for UNSC decisions by States, do exclude precisely the 
most important of those possible decisions. An argument explicitly inconsistent not 
only with systematic reading of these Articles (given Article 24 (2) and the wide 
scope of application of Article 25) but also, in the particular case of the mentioned 
Article 24 (1), with the text of the rule therein: the reference made to the 
effectiveness of the norm regarding UNSC actions and powers "for the 
maintenance of international peace and security" cannot exclude, in any legal, let 
alone logical, interpretation the "Action[s] with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" as per the epigraph of Chapter VII. 
Another possible interpretation, arguing that this specific measure (the 
establishment of the ICTY) would violate articles 24 (1) and 25, would be illogical 
unless considering it a measure under Chapter VII, but limited by Articles 24 and 
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25. Even then, this interpretation could only be logical if Articles 24 and 25 would 
state explicit limitations to the discharge of powers under Chapter VII, a possibility 
which in fact occurs in Article 24 (2), but not incorporated by the Defence. 
Despite the possibility of, and excuse for, a quite literal counterproductive mention 
to Article 24 (2) textual reference to the discharging of powers under Chapter VII, 
one is faced with the doubt if, in the Defence Brief, the missing mention, to this 
limitation to UNSC exercise of powers, does not reveal a hesitation in the speech, 
an uncertainty from the cultural references of those days to fulfil the general 
concepts on the "Purposes and Principles", in the Charter (see Appendix I). 
1.3.4. No involvement in humanitarian law. 92 
Here the Defence presents two lines of argumentation: in the first claiming that the 
UNSC lacks the legitimacy to deal with humanitarian law, and that this is a neutral 
body of law; in the second, reinforces its argument by summoning the International 
Committee of the Red Cross position on the differences between Humanitarian 
Law and the maintenance of international peace and security. 
1.3.4.1. UNSC lack of legitimacy to deal with IHL. 93 
The Brief claims the lack of an express provision empowering the UNSC to protect 
humanitarian law. If the UNSC primary responsibility is to ensure prompt and 
effective action by the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security 
(Article 24, 1), we can hardly see how a known and continued violation of 
International Humanitarian Law could not justify such prompt and effective action 
hy the UN. The promptness being the fastest proceedings of the UNSC, but the 
action attributed to the UN as a whole. 
On a tighter net on UNSC competences, a possible decision, by the Council, that a 
specific violation of IHL constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
92 Ibid., 6. 
93 Ibid. 
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could, as earlier stated, overcome such lack of legitimacy, should it exist in the first 
place. In fact, which greater proof can one find, on the danger of a threat, then its 
lack of respect for a "neutral (widely accepted) body of international law"? That is, if 
the possible subjectivity, given its political contents, on determining a "threat to 
international peace and security" can on its own be questionable (though, as stated 
above still within the discretion of the UNSC), a founded suspicion or proof of the 
violation of IHL is undoubtedly a threat to international security. In this sense, one 
may wonder what is the determination of a "threat to international peace and 
security" but, facing a specific given fact or set of circumstances, becoming 
obvious that these are, indeed, that "threat" (e.g. I will know one when I see one). 
What the Defence could mean is that the UNSC role and competences are not to 
debate, study, endorse, promote or approve IHL. That "legislative" task still lingers 
in the widest stages of debate and cooperation between international actors: 
States and organizations. But the competence to recognize the seriousness of a 
threat to international peace and security from a continued violation of IHL, would 
actually be one of the most objective arguments to justify that qualification. 
1.3.4.2. IHL as a neutral body of law. 94 
It is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which underlines this 
very special characteristic, a conditio sine qua non for the action of humanitarian 
organizations. The same ICRC alerts for the need for immunity and right not to 
testify for its members and members of alike organizations, in line with the spirit of 
the Geneva Conventions (ICTR, 1993). 
However, politically neutral as it is, this body of law does prohibit and condemns 
criminal behaviours, even on non-international conflicts - see Geneva Convention 
111,95 Article 3 (1). To consider, pointing to the same conclusion, the growing 
convergence between IHL and the laws of war, since the 1977 Protocols to the 
94 Ibid. 
95 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. 
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Geneva Conventions, mostly by Protocol II through the inclusion of internal 
conflicts, and the coercive nature of any enforcement for violation of IHL. 
Here, however, the argument could only present an interesting point by raising a 
possible selectivity in the prosecution of international crimes (Cryer, 2005). Any 
other argument would fall into the determination of the applicable jurisdiction and 
not on the legitimacy of the Tribunal, i.e. raising the possibility that the defendant 
should be present for/judged by another jurisdiction, but adding nothing to the 
challenge on the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY. This central 
discussion on the political determination of international justice, interesting as it is, 
lies aside from the determination of the ad-hoc Tribunals own legitimacy discourse. 
If and when one reaches solid grounds on that legitimacy discourse, the discussion 
on the selectivity of the prosecution of international crimes could probably add to 
the path pointing to the de facto recognition of a de jure competence for the judicial 
review of, at least some, political acts of the UNSC. 
The argument can have three different approaches: 
a) In a first hypothesis, despite the ICTY, the crimes in the bases of the 
indictment should be tried under another jurisdiction, in which case the 
legitimacy of the ICTY is not challenged, but only its precedence in jurisdiction 
(see infra); 
b) In a second perspective, that there was a selectivity in the indictments from the 
ICTY Prosecutor. In which case, reviewable as it might be, the challenge was, 
at best, against the indictment and not the Tribunal's legitimacy; or 
c) Finally, that the Tribunal itself was limited, as legally bound, to prosecute only 
certain types of suspects, like Serbs, or non-Muslims, in which case, for a 
legitimacy challenge to occur, there should be at least mention to which rules 
the ICTY was limited by96 The Tribunal, ad-hoc as it is, is in fact limited, by a 
specific time/spatial frame: certain facts (serious violations of International 
96 Cfr. a contrario, the Nuremberg or the Tokyo trials, where legitimacy challenges were not 
permitted. 
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Humanitarian Law) that occurred in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
January 1991,97 on the contrary there is no personal limitation regarding 
personal jurisdiction (ratione personae). 
1.3.4.3. On the differences between IHL and the maintenance of international 
d 't 98 peace an secur! y. 
The reference, in the Brief, to a specific document of the Red Cross draws 
attention to the partiality of the absence of reference to another document, with the 
same origin, specifically directed99 to comment the creation of the ICTY (ICRC, 
1993). The well known support from the ICRC to the establishment of the ICTY is 
not overshadowed by comments the organization offers, so as to improve, or 
present notes, to particular aspects of the creation of such relevant and innovative 
Tribunal. 
The plethora of legal references should not be allowed to detour from the cultural 
framing of a paradoxical lack of reference, legal, political, cultural or otherwise, in 
which the whole debate takes place. The theoretical difference between IHL and 
the maintenance, or restoring, of international peace, real as it is, usually face the 
same opposition: the parties in conflict. Under the ICRC cape, the Defence forces, 
from an antonymous perspective, a differentiation argument that facilitation of the 
IHL application is based on consent, whilst actions to maintain or restore peace do 
not exclude coercive measures. Not only is such an argument not necessarily true 
(as coercive imposition of restrictions so as to enable the consent to humanitarian 
relief are possible, or any of the measures in Article 41 of the Charter can hardly be 
classified as coercive in the sense pretended by the Defence), but it does not 
present a nexus with the challenge to the legitirnacy of the Tribunal. From the 
91 Thus the ICTY formal designation: "The International Tribunal For The Prosecution Of 
Persons Responsible For Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
In The Territory Of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991." 
98 Points 3.4.5. and 3.4.6. of the Defence Brief, in the later quoting the ICRC Report on the 
Protection of War Victims, 1993, (Trial Motion, Brief: 35-36). 
99 See Kerr (2004: 36, n108). 
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difference between the facilitation of the application and the application itself, of 
IHL, to the responsibility for its violation, there is a wide field of action that the Brief 
overlaps. 
1.3.5.The subsidiary nature of the organ /lack of independence. 1oo 
The argument of the Defence is here two folded: the dependency of the UNSC, as 
the Tribunal is established as a subsidiary organ; and the paradox that, as an 
organ aimed at restoring peace and security, it's judicial nature would be fully 
operational only after such goal was attained. 
1.3.5.1. The argument on the lack of independence. 
The Defence claims the lack of independence of the judicial organ based on the 
subsidiary nature of the tribunal, vis-a-vis the UNSC, and on certain Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE). 
On the first approach, the Brief summons the UNSG report (S/25704) as well as 
the Brazilian statement on the establishment of the Tribunal (S/25540), to question 
the independence and impartiality of the court. However, those very same 
documents either aim to avoid such a possibility, in the Brazilian case (whereby 
special attention should be given to the guarantees of that independence) or 
affirmatively state, in the UNSG Report case, that despite being a subsidiary organ, 
the judicial function must not be subject to the authority or control of the UNSC. 
The fail to provide further proof of such claimed lack of independence is itself a 
demonstration of the fragility of the argument. Nevertheless, and regarding the 
legitimacy challenge of the Motion, one can call on the restrictions arising from the 
separation of powers: the setting up of a jurisdiction, a legislative power, does not 
mean such jurisdiction is less independent, nor that the legislative will to change 
the Law can be seen as an intrusion into the judicial function. We understand that 
the subsidiary nature of the Tribunal can, in fact, question the separation of 
100 Trial Motion, Brief: 7. 
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powers, but given the right limitations to the authority of the UNSC, that 
independence could at worst be faced with the public inability to carry out its 
duties. That is to say, should there be any possible "intrusion" of the UNSC into the 
judicial proceedings, it would represent a visible obstruction to the proceedings 
themselves. So, quite on the contrary to what the Brief claims, the annual report to 
the UNSC could in fact denounce the obstructions the tribunal might face. 
The keynote of these claims rest more on the UNSC powers to establish the 
Tribunal, and not on the Tribunal itself, contrary to the Brief, for if such conditions 
are met that guarantee the independence and impartiality of the tribunal (e.g. 
independence of Prosecution, Trial, Appeal as well as Defence), the proceedings 
can be as impartial as any others, it's the legitimacy of the subsidiary nature itself 
which could be questioned. 101 
1.3.5.2. The restored peace and security as a limit to the judicial function of the 
ICTY. 
There are two questions in this argument: the political recognition of peace and 
security, and the potential supervening inutility. The first question has already been 
addressed when we established how the UNSC can discretionarily recognize a 
threat to peace and security, and furthermore the central role of the perceived 
threat, and not so much the breach of peace and security. Yet the Brief quotes 
again the UNSG report without realizing that the connection there established 
between the Tribunal and the restoration and maintenance of international peace 
and security, more than questioning it, ends justifying the continuity of the ICTY as 
a mean to restore some peace, as detente to certain ongoing crimes, but also to 
maintain that same peace, by avoiding retribution or vengeance resulting of the 
lack of justice. The Defence's confusion between "conflict" and "threat to peace 
101 i.e. the recognition of the ICTY as a parallel organ, even if created by a "legislative 
power" of the UNSC, or, alternatively as a recognition of the incapability of the UNSC to 
perform some of its competences without detaching, into a subsidiary organ, the actions 
needed to attain such duties. 
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and security" is here very clear, as the Brief supposes that the cause for Tribunal's 
existence will cease with the end of the conflict, that being also the case with the 
scattered mentions, in all of point 3.5 of the Brief,102 surrounding the allusion to the 
Tribunal's role "as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII". For the Defence, 
the comparison is narrow, following only the military interventionism type of 
measures. As we already mentioned above, regarding the authority under the 
Charter, this new type of measure, though not expressly foreseen, can still be 
regarded as a non military measure as per Article 41 of the Charter. 
1.3.6. The lack of exceptional circumstances. 103 
The understanding that UNSC assessments can be reviewed by the Tribunal is yet 
again the base line of such argument. Should the recognition of urgency or 
exceptional circumstances, by the UNSC, be questionable, it would take a judicial 
reviewing body with authority to reach such a conclusion. Not taking this issue into 
consideration, the attempt to establish the ICTY competence to review UNSC 
decisions amounts to an unreviewable argument. 
The cases mentioned by the Defence (point 3.6.3)104 give an impressive, though 
not thorough, list of cases where the UNSC did not meet the expectations it 
assumed in respect of the Former Yugoslavia. It is common knowledge that the 
chronological primacy of the ICTY is not based on lack of horror, in the form of 
grave breaches of IHL or the Laws of war, but rather in the proactively innovative 
decisions of the UNSC. There is, therefore, an underlying argument in the claim of 
selective approach - point 3.6.4. 105 
That does not mean that there was any lack of exceptional circumstances, nor 
urgency. The Experts interim report (S/25274) referring, among others, to an 
ongoing ethnic cleansing, politically magnified by its geographical occurrence as it 
102 Trial Motion, Brief: 7. 
103 Ibid., 7-8. 
104 Ibid., 8. 
105 Ibid. 
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might have been, in comparison with other cases, points to exceptional 
circumstances of such gravity as to be considered an urgent matter. As a 
consequence, the Defence case allegations show no logical link between the lack 
of action, by the UNSC, in other cases and the inexistence of exceptional 
circumstances or urgency in this one. The critique, appealing as it can be, is of an 
indelibly political nature, where the judicial objection could only lay in the 
selectiveness of such actions. The Motion on the challenge to the Tribunal's 
legitimacy does not present, in this argument, a legal claim to the legality of the 
establishment of the ICTY and, if any, only an argument for the UNSC to follow this 
example more widely. 
There is, however, in the text of this argument, an implicit recognition of the 
Tribunal's capability, though "highly doubtful" to have a deterrent effect on the 
crimes committed. The Brief supports a view that the crimes have already been 
committed, concluding from that view that the Tribunal's actions cannot reverse 
those facts, thus implicitly recognizing that crimes were committed, allowing the 
question of punishment to arise. That same question can answer the doubts the 
Defence presents on the deterrent effect of the Tribunal, as the continuity or 
renewal of such crimes, now in retribution, could endure and result in the 
maintenance of a threat to peace and security. 
Once again, it becomes obvious that the very scattered nature of the arguments 
derive less from any legal confusions than from the apparent reluctance on all 
sides to recognize the enmeshedness of the legal, the political, and cultural 
conceptual frame in which the debate occurs. The presumed pre-legal institutions 
are not mentioned or never tested on their (im)possible shared interpretation. 
1.3.7. The lack of authority over individuals. 106 
On an extraordinarily brief point, the Defence claims the lack of UNSC authority 
over individuals, implying that the Tribunal, as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC, 
106 Ibid, 8. 
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would have that same limitation. But there are cases, even prior to the Yugoslav 
one, of sanctions against individuals, 107 the Security Council Sanctions Committees 
itself explains that: 
"relevant Security Council decisions have reflected a more refined 
approach to the design, application and implementation of mandatory 
sanctions. These refinements have included measures targeted at specific 
actors, as well as humanitarian exceptions embodied in Security Council 
resolutions. Targeted sanctions, for instance, can involve the freezing of 
assets and blocking the financial transactions of political elites or entities 
whose behaviour triggered sanctions in the first place." 
(Security Council Sanctions Committees)108 
Travel bans are nowadays a common restriction, and the fact that the UNSC has to 
rely on member States to impose such measures does not affect their legitimacy, 
but only its efficacy.10g On another note, the setting of the Tribunal, to which States 
can be said to have vowed, as mentioned above on the UNGAIUNSC debate, 
indirectly legitimizes the resigning of the equivalent sovereignty over individuals. 
2. Wrongful primacy over national courts. 
On the wrongful primacy over national courts, as a denial of the accused right to be 
judge in their jurisdiction: 
2.1. The domestic jurisdiction within the internationally recognized sovereignty of 
B . H . 110 oSnla- erzegovlna; 
107 The Iraq and Kuwait case with: List of Individuals Established Pursuant To Security 
Council Resolution 1483 (2003), by The Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. An earlier case, 
though wider in scope, can also be found in Resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 
regarding the "illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia". 
108 See http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ 
109 Birkhauser, 2007. 
110 Trial Motion, Brief: 8-9. 
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The undisputed jurisdiction ratione loci of the independent State of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, is presented by the Defence both as a guarantee of prosecution and 
as sovereignty to be respected. The double argument rests upon the international 
recognition of that independent State, and the effective exercise of jurisdiction even 
in cases of alleged violation of the laws of war, i.e. crimes of war. The Brief 
supports the argument by pointing out the national prosecution of Mr. Karadzic, 
interestingly by resource to the (ICTY) Prosecutor's application for deferral of the 
case unto the ICTY. 
In this argument, the Defence does make the point on the existence of national 
jurisdiction, yet avoiding the main question of the primacy of the ICTY over 
domestic courts, thus making it an interlocutory argument for its case challenging 
the ICTY primacy over those courts. However, there is no evidence that that 
primacy was set with a condition of lack of domestic jurisdiction, for even if the 
capability, independence, effectiveness or fairness of state jurisdictions might be 
such a condition, making an International Criminal Tribunal a subsidiary 
jurisdiction, those arguments are not here presented by the Defence. 
2.2. Sovereignty of States;111 
After ascertaining the recognition of the States sovereignties, the Brief immediately 
states limits to such sovereignties to assume domestic jurisdiction on crimes 
outside their territory unless if justified by "a reasonable interest, recognized by 
international law". In the case of universal interests (expression under which one 
can understand IHL) the mentioned recognition by international law would be, 
according to the Brief "a treaty or customary international law, or an opinio juris on 
the issue". Once again the quotation supporting the argument is self-destructive: 
from all of the analysis made by Rijpkema, quoted in the Brief,112 the chosen 
phrase clearly states that "[Adoption by resolution] only constitutes an indication of 
111 Trial Motion, Brief: 9. 
112 As quoted by the Defence (Trial Motion, Brief: 9): "P. P. Rijpkema, 'The Nicaragua case', 
XX Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 99-107. 
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an opinio juris".113 So, if the Defence acknowledges the validity of the opinio juris to 
recognize a reasonable interest, and then summons an authority which in turn 
recognizes the adoption of UNSC Resolutions as an indication of such opinio juris, 
it is logically recognizing the validity of the UNSC Resolution (if not as stated in the 
said quotation to accept rules as binding, at least) to indicate an opinio juris. 
From previous debates (the mention to the Commission of Experts Interim Report 
and its opinio on the establishment of an ad-hoc International Criminal Court), we 
can only conclude that the Defence failed to prove that there is no justified 
reasonable interest recognized by international law. And all of this without even 
summoning the contributions offered by the UNSG following Resolution 808, and in 
preparation of the establishment of the ICTY in Resolution 827 - most of which 
referring to experts in International Law and their opinion on the then current 
development of International Criminal Law. 
Lastly the Brief recalls its position on the UNSC competence regarding IHL to 
challenge the primacy of the ICTY over domestic courts, an argument already 
debated above. 
2.3. Jus de non evocando;114 
Reviewing previous arguments,115 the Brief tries to present yet an alternative, by 
affirming that the consideration of an international conflict would lead to the implicit 
recognition of an Bosnian Serb Republic, a quite bold political statement (or goal?) 
for the Counsel of the Defence to make in international criminal proceedings. 
Altogether the Defence claims that either the conflict is of an internal nature, in 
113 Ibid. 
114 Trial Motion Brief: 9- 10. 
115 On the lack of competence of the ICTY to prosecute violations of IHL; the exception to 
national jurisdiction based on inadequate prosecution; the national jurisdiction of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, here stating its advantage to prosecute in absentia, unlike the ICTY; and the 
argument of the internal nature of the conflict. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, or that there is a proper national jurisdiction, on a Bosnian 
Serb Republic. 
The first argument was already debated and relates to the confusion between the 
reason for the UNSC competence, based upon the recognition of a threat to 
international peace and security rather then an international conflict. 
The second line of argumentation can be contradictory with the previous claim of 
containment within the same State: Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the later claim of jus 
de non evocando implies the independence of the Bosnia Serb Republic, the 
above-mentioned exception could be opposed to the argument. In fact, the 
individuals to be prosecuted would come from the forces responsible for such 
State. On the contrary, even considering a proper prosecution by the Bosnia-
Herzegovina jurisdiction (disregarding the "winner's law") the possible effects of 
such prosecution could mount to the promotion of the very threat the UNSC should 
aim to avoid, as the ethnic conflict, even if in detente, might easily be reignited by 
questioning the motifs under such trials. The Tribunal's very name points in this 
direction, "Former Yugoslavia", recognizing the potential threat posed by ethnic 
divide, as any solution incorporating the ethnic divisions (between prosecutors and 
prosecuted) would, even if in court, maintain the conflict. Quite contrary to the 
previous claims of selective prosecution, the establishment of the Tribunal for the 
whole of the former Yugoslavia was the only way to surpass the root causes of the 
conflict. The critique also seems to stand under legal grounds: the consolidation of 
the deep changes provoked by the collapse of the Former Yugoslavia were still to 
settle, as later seen between Serbia and Montenegro, and the former and Kosovo. 
The recognition of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't, per se, stopped the conflict in 
the country, nor in the region. Thus, with the various possibilities open by the 
evolution of the sovereignties, but also by the nationalities of the perpetrators, 
during the crimes and afterwards, might pose unforeseen difficulties in the 
probable need for "international" cooperation between neighbouring States. A 
legal frame under which the principle of jus de non evocando would remain 
uncertain, given the (r)evolving jurisdiction at play. 
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3. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
On the lack of subject matter jurisdiction the Defence arguments are mainly based 
in the qualification of "internal conflict". For its possible relation to the challenge on 
the Tribunals legitimacy, these arguments will now be addressed. However, one 
should note that the questions here raised by the Defence are connected with the 
Tribunals jurisdiction, rather then with its legitimacy, meaning that the challenge is 
presented to the competence of the Tribunal, jurisdiction stricto sensu, and not to 
the legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunal itself. 
The Brief starts by claiming that Articles 2 to 5116 of the Statute of the ICTY 
(SICTY) have not created substantive law, reviewing then individual arguments for 
each of these Articles, with the exception of Article 4 ("Genocide"), never to be 
expressly mentioned, nor individually challenged, by the Defence. 
3.1. Lack of substantive law; 117 
According to the Brief, Articles 2 to 5 of the SICTY did not create substantive law, 
describing only the jurisdiction, ratione materiae, of the ICTY. 
Both in Articles 2 and 3 we find a list of acts, i.e. concepts, under the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, without proper objective description of such "crimes" - Article 2 (a) to 
(h), and Article 3 (a) to (e). However, the introductory text is very explicit in the 
reference made to "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely the "following acts against persons or property protected under the 
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention", in Article 2, and to "violat[ons of] 
the laws or customs of war", in Article 3. In so doing the SICTY refers to such 
substantive law as it may be understood by the Geneva Conventions. The 
concepts in the above-mentioned lists are not, therefore, more abstract or less 
complete as what can be understood by the provisions of those Conveiltions. I.e. 
116 In fact the Brief questions the application of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the ICTY Statute 
(SICTY). 
117 Trial Motion, Brief: 10-11. 
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even from a customary point of view, the international recognition of such crimes, 
be they war crimes or crimes against humanity, accepts the Geneva Conventions 
as starting point of codification on the matter. Therefore, the SICTY mentions to 
that source as the origin of the concepts latter listed can in no way be understood 
as an innovative and hollow reference to a crime to be prosecuted. Still in this 
sense, should the Brief be right, it would only reinforce the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction, which it formally seeks to challenge. 
To a certain extent, although without a clear reference to a previous source of 
International Law, the same can be said of Article 5. In this latter case, the sheer 
mention to crimes against humanity, in the Article's title, is enough to limit the 
scope of the definition of the substantive law, at least with respect for the rights 
recognized by the UN Charter. 
In Article 4, none of this question holds grounds, as the acts, themselves, are 
described in that very Article. 
Yet from another perspective, though questionable on the UNSC legislative 
competence, the SICTY is itself a codification instrument, at least in the sense that, 
according to the Charter, the member States are represented by the UNSC, when 
this last is discharging its duties according to the Charter (Article 24, § 1, in fine). 
Whereby the concepts in these Articles might be a reference to rules within the 
Geneva Conventions as substantive law. 
The challenge to the Tribunal's legitimacy should, therefore, not be base upon the 
argument of lack of substantive law, already internationally recognized at the time, 
but to the legitimacy of the establishment of the organ charged with trying and 
reviewing the prosecution of that pre-existent substantive law. 
3.2. Lack of jurisdiction regarding the Geneva Conventions; 118 
118 Trial Motion, Brief: 11-12. 
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With a loop argument, the Brief tries to prove that the references to the "Grave 
breaches" of the Geneva Conventions act as a limit, as they would imply the full 
enactment of those rules by the Tribunal. That is to say, that the references made 
in the SICTY to certain type of crimes, as those in the Geneva Conventions, would 
imply the full implementation, by the Tribunal, of all the rules in those Conventions. 
Following this line of reasoning, the Defence further states that the qualification of 
the conflict, as internal or international, would in light of the referred Conventions 
be outside the competence of the ICTY. 
The loop argument does not stand, firstly as the Tribunal is not an organ envisaged 
in those Conventions, but a subsidiary organ of the UNSC; secondly as the 
reference, in the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Tribunal, to a renowned and 
widely accepted source of International Criminal Law only simplifies the possible 
doubts on the meanings of the substantive law to be discharged, thus reinforcing 
the Tribunals legitimacy by, contrary to the Brief's claim, accepting recognized 
substantive International Criminal Law in its jurisdiction. As such, the concepts in 
the Statute could at worst be considered as a reference to crimes as described in 
the Geneva Conventions, the fact that the Conventions, as a full legal document, 
may imply the existence of an international conflict, are of no value here, as the 
question posed refers only to certain rules of the Convention. However, the 
creation of the ICTY derives only from the UNSC perception of a threat to 
international peace, meaning that, the Statute of the ICTY can be limited to 
prosecute only some of crimes (the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction) under 
certain circumstances (ratione loci and tempon). The fact that the characterization, 
i.e. the material contents of the crimes, is better described in a well-known 
instrument of International Law, even considered customary, does not affect the 
power to choose, when creating a new jurisdiction, as the SICTY, the specific 
conditions for the prosecution of those crimes. The Defence argument appears to 
part from a radically positivistic stand, not recognizing the Common Law, not even 
the competence, by reference, in continental law. In either case, the substantive 
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law invoked is not itself described in the mentions to its rules, but rather, avoiding 
dissent, accepted by reference to precedents or to other laws. 
Even the claim that the Tribunal has no competence in determining the nature of 
the conflict, internal or international, as a consequence of the lack of incorporation 
of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions in the SICTY, disregards the fact that in 
this case, acting under the UN Charter, it is for the UNSC to determine the 
existence of a threat to international peace and security, as already mentioned. 
3.3. Lack of jurisdiction regarding laws of war; 119 
I The Brief objects to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over violations of laws or customs of 
war, primarily based on the presumption that Article 3 of the SICTY does not relate 
to Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions but rather on the (1907) Hague Convention, 
which in turn would only apply to international conflicts (armed conflict between 
States).120 But even when considering the Hague Conventions, the Defence could 
not ignore the potential wider understanding of the Martens Clause,121 of which, 
although still subject to debate, the Natural Law character of the Clause (Ticehurst, 
1997),122 would justify its application to a variety of armed conflicts. 123 In this sense, 
119 Trial Motion, Brief: 12. 
120 As we have seen before, the particulars of the novelty of the establishment of the 
Tribunal (as with the challenge to the Tribunal's legitimacy, rather then jurisdiction) are 
connected to the consolidated power of the UNSC to determine what can constitute a threat 
to international peace and security, regardless of the nature of the conflict (internal or 
international) . 
. 121 The Martens Clause, as included in the cited Convention (Respecting The Laws And 
Customs Of War On Land - Hague IV, 18 October 1907), reads: "Until a more complete 
code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to 
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and 
the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of 
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience." 
122 Ticehurst (1997), elaborates on the Natural Law character of the Clause wilen quoting 
Schachter (O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1991, p. 36): 
"In contrast to positive law, natural law is universal, binding all people and all 
States. It is therefore a non-consensual law based upon the notion of the 
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the customary rules of war are inextricably intertwined with the origins of modern 
IHL,124 and therefore not limited to international conflicts. 
As a conclusion one might draw two objections to the Defence argument: (i) the 
internal or international nature of the conflict as irrelevant for this case, both by the 
UNSC powers to determine the existence of a threat to peace and security, and the 
wider interpretation on the Martens Clause; and (ii) but also because of the 
prevalence of right and justice. Natural law was to a great extent displaced by the 
rise of positivist interpretations of international law. According to Schachter, '[i]t had 
become evident to international lawyers as it had to others that the States that 
made and applied law were not g o v e ~ n e d d by morality or 'natural reason'; they acted 
for reasons of power and interest. It followed that law could only be ascertained and 
determined through the actual methods used by the States to give effect to their 
'political wills'. However, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which to a great 
extent relied on natural law to determine the culpability of the Nazi high command, 
confirmed the continuing validity of natural law as a basis for international law in the 
twentieth century." 
This last thought serves also to object the Defence interpretation on the inspiration of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal in Article 3 of the ICTY. See Trial Motion (Brief: 12, point 10.1, 
in fine). 
123 Ticehurst (1997): 
"Judge Shahabuddeen, ( .. . ) referring to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 78 
and 84, where the Court determined that the Martens Clause is a customary rule 
and is therefore of normative status. In other words, the Clause itself contains 
norms regulating State conduct." 
Also, the same source, quoting the UN Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Forty-sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, GAOR Al49/10, p. 317., reaffirms that 
"[the Martens Clause ] ... provides that even in cases not covered by specific 
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience." 
124 Ticehurst (1997) quoting J. Pictet (Development and Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff and Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1985, p. 62): 
"The principles of humanity are interpreted as prohibiting means and methods of 
war which are not necessary for the attainment of a definite military advantage. 
Jean Pictet interpreted humanity to mean that ' ... capture is preferable to wounding 
an enemy, and wounding him better than killing him; that non-combatants shall be 
spared as far as possible; that wounds inflicted be as light as possible', so that the 
injured can be treated and cured; that wounds cause the least possible pain; that 
captivity be made as endurable as possible.'" 
A definition that would be consistent with a substantive rule when defining war crimes in the 
ICTY. 
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customary International Criminal Law that the Hague Convention became, 
therefore applicable outside the initial positivist perspective of its negotiation. 
3.4. Lack of jurisdiction over violations of humanitarian law.12s 
Although the Brief explicitly mentions "humanitarian law", the arguments presented, 
under this particular question, point to the consideration of IHL.126 In fact, when 
challenging Article 5 of the SICTY, again a challenge of jurisdiction more than a 
challenge of legitimacy of the Tribunal itself, the Defence confronts this rule with: (i) 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, (ii) a UNGA 
Resolution 127 and (iii) the Geneva Conventions; so as to attempt to prove that this 
rule only applies to cases of international conflict. 
125 Trial Motion, Brief: 12-13. 
126 See Harvard's International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative introduction, available 
in: http://ihl.ihlresearch .org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page .viewpage&pageid=2083: 
"IHL is a branch of public international law (which is also known as the law of 
nations). The extent to which IHL relates to International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
and the nature of that relationship are not uniformly agreed upon. The International 
Court of Justice (the UN's principal judicial organ) held in 1996 that assessment of 
whether the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, which is guaranteed in IHRL 
treaties, has been violated in an armed conflict must be determined by reference to 
IHL. In subsequent cases, the ICJ held that depending on the situation, certain 
rights may be exclusively matters of IHL, exclusively matters of IHRL, or matters of 
both branches of law. 
International Criminal law (ICl) - which may be defined as the body of rules that 
proscribes international crimes; imposes duties on states to investigate, prosecute, 
or extradite offenders; and regulates such judicial proceedings - serves as an 
enforcement regime for violations of IHL. Depending in part on their severity, 
violations of IHL may amount to war crimes. Other international crimes include 
crimes against humanity and genocide, though neither of those technically requires 
a link to an armed conflict, unlike war crimes, which do require a sufficient link to an 
armed conflict. War crimes include Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions as 
well as other serious violations of the laws and customs of war." 
127 Erroneously quoted in the Brief as a 1948 Res. (UN Document NRES/95/1), the 
resolution in question - "Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal", was adopted in 1946, and is available at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NROI033/46/IMG/NR003346.pdf?OpenElement 
83 
The expression used by the Defence, dropping the "international" in "International 
Humanitarian Law", seems to support the challenge based on the 
internal/international nature of the conflict. However, and in view of the customary 
sources of IHL, that absence might be understood differently, i.e. as a detour from 
the probable objection to this argument based precisely on that customary nature 
of IHL, which would reintroduce the "international" in the "humanitarian law" in the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY, thus understood, at least in its widest interpretation, as 
generally applicable to any armed conflict (see note 113). 
Regarding the war crimes, the Brief goes as far as claiming that the SICTY, 
broadening of the cases to which such rules may apply, ends up conflicting with 
the principle of nulla poena sine lege, i.e. the principle of the non retroactivity of 
criminal law. Such claim depends on two conditions: (i) the dependence of Article 5 
interpretation on the quoted previous references (both Nuremberg and the 1948 
UNGA Resolution, had as preconditions the existence of an international conflict); 
and (ii) on the absence of any other such rules that might enforce, and 
consequently legitimize the prosecution, of identical norms. 
As earlier stated, the SICTY is, per se, an independent codification of ICL. 
Questionable as it might be in the creation of new rules which would in effect be 
retroactive - particularly within the scope of its retroactive enforcement - the 
positive recognition or clarification of pre-existent rules in ICL does not present any 
exception to its possible, and legitimate, enforcement. The, so often quoted, work 
of the ILC is a commonly recognized source of both clarification and support for the 
recognition of existing customary rules in International Law, whether or not adopted 
on a positive instrument. 
On the contrary the Defence, by not calling "international" to humanitarian law, as 
does the Statute, seems to be trying to say that the Tribunal cannot enforce a non-
existent law, i.e. as if humanitarian law had to be international to be applicable. 
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(C) Preliminary conclusions 
The Brief presented in support of the Motion appears to hesitate between 
objectives rather then clearly stating them alternatively. The initial Motion, quite 
accurately titled "Motion on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal", is primarily aimed to 
submit questions on the rules applicable by the court, but it then takes a wide 
interpretation of such objective, namely by addressing both the legitimacy of the 
establishment of the Tribunal, as well as the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 
For the purpose of the current research, this latter question lies beyond our 
subject, as the legal debate on which rules to apply, or whether certain bodies of 
law can or cannot be applied by the Tribunal, pose no difference to the simplest 
version of the known principle of the "competence de la competence", i.e. a 
legitimate court of law can, and often must,128 be able to determine which laws it 
can apply and which laws are applicable to a certain case. 
A wholly different question is posed by the challenge to the legitimacy of the 
establishment of the Tribunal itself, regardless of the jurisdiction it will or can apply. 
Therefore, a number of questions posed by the Defence, both in the initial Motion 
and supporting Brief, that is all those relating to the ICTY jurisdiction, are here 
considered only in their framing character. 
However, the Brief does bring out a number of arguments challenging the 
Tribunals legitimacy, which can be divided in 3 groups. A first one including: 
1. No establishment by Treaty; 
2. No establishment by the UNGA; 
3. III-founded establishment of the ICTY by the UNSC; 
3.1. No international conflict, as a pre-condition for the use of powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter; 
3.2. No authority of the UNSC under Article 41 of the UN Charter; 
128 As per its specific role in the judicial order or as a consequence of the succession of 
laws. 
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3.3. No authority of the UNSC under other provision of the UN Charter; 
3.4. No involvement or rather no authority of the UNSC in humanitarian law; 
3.5. The limitations of a Subsidiary organ of the UNSC, as the ICTY; 
3.6. Lack of exceptional circumstances; 
3.7. The lack of authority of the UNSC over individuals. 
A second question, primarily on jurisdiction but with possible connexion with a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY, is the: 
4. Primacy over domestic courts; 
4.1. Existence and capability of a domestic jurisdiction, 
4.2. Sovereignty of States, 
4.3. Jus de non evocando. 
In the third, among the initial objectives of challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction, 
and therefore outside the legitimization of the establishment of the Tribunal itself, 
the Brief still argues the: 
5. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Where, as discussed above, the Defence 
challenges certain Articles of the SICTY, namely Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the 
SICTY. 
As a preliminary conclusion, one can note that only the arguments set in the first 
group, a) to c), might present a relevant challenge to the legitimacy of the 
establishment of the Tribunal. Consequently, arguments to which the Tribunal's 
review is of particular interest for the purpose of identifying a self-legitimacy 
discourse, as envisaged in this research. So as to clarify the arguments to be 
followed, they can be summarized as follows: 
1. The question on the legitimacy of a leT established without a Treaty; 
2. The question on the legitimacy of a ICT not established by the UNGA; 
3. The question on the legitimacy of a ICT established by the UNSC without the 
precondition of an international conflict; 
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4. The question on the lack of legitimacy under Article 41 of the UN Charter, for 
the UNSC to establish the ICTY; 
5. The question on the lack of legitimacy under any other provision of the UN 
Charter, for the UNSC to establish the ICTY; 
6. The question of lack of authority of the UNSC to deal with humanitarian law; 
7. The question on the limits of a subsidiary organ of the UNSC, and in 
particular regarding a judicial organ as the ICTY, the lack of independence; 
8. The lack of exceptional circumstances, presumably for an innovation such 
as the ICTY; 
9. The lack of authority of the UNSC over individuals. 
On a different level (although must probably discussed as the possibility of the 
State's will being known in the absence of a Treaty and the establishment by the 
UNSC and not the UNGA) also to be followed is the argument on: 
10. The respect for the sovereignty of States and its jurisdiction. 
Section II - The Prosecutor's Response 
(A) Proceedings and submissions prior to the Decision 
After the Defence Motion on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal had been filed, on 23 
June 1995, and before its hearing (25 and 26 July), the Prosecution submitted its 
response, on 7 July. Furthermore the Trial Chamber received, ten days later, on 17 
July, a Submission of the Government of the United States of America, as an 
amicus curiae, "concerning certain arguments made by counsel for the accused in 
the case of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic" (sic). 
The Prosecutor's "Response to the Motion of the Defence on the Jurisdiction of the 
Tribunaf', filed on 7 July 1995 is, as earlier stated, not a primary source for the 
current research as the Tribunal should, and in fact must, answer the Defence 
Motion, regardless of any other inputs, for it cannot be identified with the Tribunal's 
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discourse, nor is it a limitation to such possible discourse. The right to file a 
Response, as the will to submit an amicus curiae brief, enlightening or helpful as 
they may be, do not condition nor limit the Chambers Decision or speech therein. 
The Chamber's Decision might therefore contain three types of speech: 
a) The ruling, with or without review, on the subject presented to it, i.e. the 
Defence Motion; 
b) The ruling, its grounds and reasoning, be they by: 
b.1. The Chamber's own references, arguments or reasoning; 
b.2. The Chambers adoption or rejection, as their own, of presented 
arguments: 
b.2.1.From the Defence; 
b.2.2.From the Prosecutor; 
b.2.3.From the submitted briefs by amicus curiae. 
As far as the hearings are concerned, although not a primary source of our 
research, the dialogical debate therein could be important only inasmuch as it may 
reveal, at times, the central role of the legitimacy challenge even when timidly 
named as a challenge on the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Given the written statement of 
arguments, setting the grounds for the Decision, and the resources available to the 
Tribunal so as to produce that Decision, the judicial character of the hearings loses 
relevancy for the research, given the broader subjectivity of the spoken speech in 
the full transcripts. For its occasional value, in clarifying the intended meaning or as 
validation of our interpretation, only such excerpts of its contents will be mentioned, 
by reference and quotation, keeping a close connection with their exact context. 129 
Again, on a search for a Legitimacy Discourse of the Tribunal, only the positions 
attributable to the Tribunal can constitute a solid ground of research. The fact that 
such positions include the adoption of others' opinions is for this purpose irrelevant 
as, on adopting them, the Tribunal is incorporating them into its discourse. The 
129 The full transcriptions are available in the ICTY page, after registration with the ICTY 
website in http://icr.icty.org/ 
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only two possible exceptions (though for the same legal conditioning) have 
different results of relevance for the research: 
a) In the case of the Defence Motion, its framing and questioning may, but does 
not necessarily, limit the scope of the Tribunal's Decision, review or matters 
addressed. If the Trial Chamber must address all the challenges presented by 
the Defence, that is a good enough reason for reviewing the terms in which the 
Motion presents the Chamber with challenges. That, however, does not mean 
that the Chamber is limited in that speech and arguments: e.g., the sheer 
acknowledgement of lack of competence regarding any of those, might justify 
the lack of further review and analysis. 
b) In the case of the Prosecutor's Response, unlike the self-evident 
complementary nature of the amicus curiae submission, the explicit rejection, 
by the Prosecutor, of arguments set forth by the Defence could have a legal 
reading: that of rejecting possible relevant legal arguments as presented under 
a right to do so, thus surpassing, and possibly limiting, the discretion of the 
Tribunal (i.e., unlike with the complementary nature of the amicus curiae 
submissions ). 
However, such legal entanglements are of no relevance for this research, as 
the result of the researchable ground would still remain the same: the 
Tribunal's own discourse of legitimacy. Field for which the legal nature of the 
submission of arguments is mainly irrelevant, with a possible exception of the 
initial challenge on the legitimacy. We will therefore only consider the revision 
of the arguments presented in the Response regarding that first challenge to 
the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY, leaving aside the reasoning 
regarding the primacy of the Tribunal as the lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 130 
130 Important as these might be, the argumentation on these two challenges is not so directly 
connected to a possible rejection of relevant legal arguments on the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal as to limit the review made by the Trial Chamber to reach a Decision. 
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Mutatis mutandis, the interventions of the Tribunal during the hearings are not, in 
themselves, an established position or opinion by the Tribunal. The possible need 
to clarify arguments presented, or the opportunity given to further elaborate or 
complement these, does not compromise any conclusion for the identification of 
the final position of the Tribunal based on its actions during the hearings. However, 
inasmuch as the Trial Chamber can comment, on a dialogical manner, with the 
actors of the case on certain arguments, its behaviour in those hearings could be 
reviewed. This, as in the documents filed by the Prosecutor or by the USA 
Government, will only be brought to light in the context of the research, if and when 
a possible (aprioristic) logical connectioll might be drawn with the final, and thus 
official, position of the Tribunal as set in the Decision. 
(8) The Prosecutor's Response 
"Response to the Motion ofthe Defence on the Jurisdiction of the Tribunaf' , filed on 
7 July 1995, hereinafter "Trial Response" or "Response". 
The rather systematic way in which the Response begins by presenting its 
Contents (p. 2), especially after the presentation of the "Summary of Arguments" 
(pp. 5-9), where each topic is described with the anticipation of the position held 
therein, makes it almost as helpful as an abstract, a useful tool to synthesize the 
whole document. 131 
1. Jurisdiction of the ICTY. 
Focusing our attention on the Prosecutor's Trial Response arguments most 
relevant to a possible contribution for a legitimacy discourse by the Tribunal, at the 
Trial Chamber, we can highlight a number of these, from a disconnected 
131 For its value to frame the full extent of the Prosecution's position regarding the 
challenges to the ICTY jurisdiction, as presented by the Defence Motion, and given the 
above mentioned revealing position of the Response from its Contents and "Summary of 
arguments", which follow the Contents Table, we find it useful to reproduce it in full, under 
Appendix III. 
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perspective regarding the legal dialectical exchange of arguments within each 
particular issue. That is, although it is now rather clear that only the first part of the 
three challenges presented by the Defence Motion directly relate to the legitimacy 
of the establishment of the ICTY, we can list arguments that might add to this 
discussion regardless of the respective challenge intended to be responded to. 
Among these we can find different approaches: 
1.1. The normative approach to the ICTY jurisdiction over UNSC Resolutions when 
highlighting: 
a) The lack of references, by the Defence, to authorities attributing the ICTY 
the power ("right" in the Prosecution's wording) of judicial review over 
UNSC actions, Resolutions in particular; 132 
b) That the SICTY does not indicate, not even implicitly, any intention to 
confer the power of judicial review of UNSC Resolutions to the ICTY; 
c) That the ICTY subject-matter jurisdiction does not extend to "general 
interpretations of the Charter" nor to the judicial review of UNSC powers; 
1.2. The authority, and analogy, of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Referring the "categorical statements" of the Ici 33 denying the existence of 
any power of judicial review of the UNSC actions. 
The argument set by the Prosecution is that, based in the ICJ advisory opinions, 
the powers of judicial review of UNSC Resolutions had already been addressed, as 
a precedent (?).134 According to this line of argumentation if the ICJ, a general 
permanent International Court, had already established the inexistence of such 
powers, it wasn't an ad-hoc Criminal Tribunal which could override such 
conclusions. 
132 Tadic case, Trial, Prosecutor Response, II (A) 1., § 1 (Trial Response: 10). 
133 Trial Response: 10-11. 
134 The Prosecutor does not make it clear if the references to the ICJ are made as an opinio 
juris or with the value of a precedent, as in Common Law. 
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This interpretation may lead us to conclude that, for the Prosecutor, the advisory 
opinions of the ICJ are truly "precedents" which the ICTY cannot override. However 
arguable the issue may be, given the different jurisdictions, it appeals to the 
concept of precedent as a well established institution, in Common Law, from where 
to interpreter and then construct a legitimacy discourse. As such, it offers the ICTY 
a cultural reference, upon which do decide its lack of competence to review UNSC 
Resolutions. 
To support further this argumentation the Prosecutor's Response includes 
throughout references, made to a number of cases before the ICJ, where the 
question of these judicial review powers are addressed. 135 It is here, and by the 
Prosecutor, that references are first made to certain cases in the ICJ, something 
that, despite its further discussion during the hearings of the Motion, is later 
referred to by the Trial Chamber, on the Decision, as an argument by the Defence. 
1.3. The authority, and attempted analogy, of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE) 136 
As a complement to the references to the "principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations" (the ICJ), the Prosecutor makes references to the IMTFE, and this 
Tribunal's conclusions on the unreviewable nature of its legal acts of 
establishment. The reference made has a compelling argument given the ad-hoc 
nature of the IMTFE, implicitly drawing an analogy with the ICTY as another ad-hoc 
Tribunal. No reference is however made to the military nature of the first, nor the 
rather opposite proceeding leading to their establishment. 137 
135 In particular: (i) the "Namibia advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reps. 1971, at pA5, para.89"; (ii.) 
the "Lockerbie case (I.C.J. Reps. 1992, art p. 26)"; and (iii.) the "(Expenses advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reps. 1962, at p. 168)". 
136 Quoting from "(Record of Proceedings of the international Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, Judgment, at ppA8,435-48,437}." 
137 As the IMTFE was a recognizable military Tribunal set up by the conquering power 
(USA), although with the support of its allies, while the ICTY was established directly by the 
UNSC. 
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1.4. The UNSC actions on determining the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security, and measures relating to such threat. 
The Response starts by asserting the political nature of the fulfilment of the 
conditions for the use of Chapter VII powers, by the UNSC. The main line of 
argumentation lies in the political nature of the acts of recognition of a threat to 
international peace and security, as well as the measures deemed appropriate 
under such circumstances. Although the Response goes on to describe the textual 
basis of the step-by-step approach of the UNSC, 138 the conclusion remains that the 
political nature of the questions posed to the UNSC are non-justiciable. 
For this conclusion the Prosecutor's Response calls, again, on the ICJ opinions. 139 
The conclusion proposes three key arguments: a) claiming the political nature of 
the determination of the existence of a threat to international peace and security, 
as well as b) which "measures are available and practicable, which of them should 
be selected, what scope they should be given and by whom they should be 
applied",140 but also c) clarifying the understanding that the UNSC "enjoys wide 
political discretion" when acting on these power. 
Thus, the said conclusion makes the decisions under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter strange to juridical assessments originally arrived at in the UNSC debates. 
Although supporting these claims with further references to the ICJ works,141 the 
Prosecutor's wording can be understood as making a double assessment on the 
political nature of the UNSC action under Chapter VII: as a political act it is 
judicially unreviewable, and given its political nature, no juridical assessments are 
made or needed on those Decisions, making them objectively unreviewable, even 
138 Namely the connexion between the reports of violations of IHL, its character as a threat 
to international peace and security, and subsequent adoption of ad-hoc measures 
considered able to achieve and contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace 
(Response, II, A, 2., §2). 
139 Tadic Case, Prosecutors Response, II, (A), 2., §3-5. 
140 Ibid., on quoting the ICJ ("Namibia advisory opinion. at pp. 55") 
141 By quoting from the Lockerbie case (I. C.J. Reps. 1992, at p.17 and p.66). 
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if such powers existed. Deepening its understanding of this argument, the 
Response, at the risk of compromising its own status, highlights the impossibility of 
"objective legal determination,,142 of a "threat to international peace and security, as 
it "is a subjective concept".143 So as no doubt might be cast on the deep meaning 
or historical evolution of the concept (and we can not avoid thinking of the 
possibility of self-contained practices evolving into customary international law) the 
incapability of objective legal determination, of both any "threat to international 
peace and security" and "appropriate measures", according to the Prosecutor, "is a 
matter depending on the interplay of States' interests,,144 Ipse dixit ... for what legal 
system pretends otherwise? Therein I ~ e s s the ambition, or frailty, of the whole 
discourse. 
1.5. The presumption of legality of measures adopted under Chapter VII.145 
Resorting to the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter,146 and again an ICJ 
advisory opinion,147 the Response asserts a four steps frame so as to claim the 
presumption of legality of the ICTY: 
a) Firstly that the UN Charter aims at granting the widest discretion to the use of 
powers under Chapter VII, both in determining the conditions for its use and 
the appropriate measures to adopt (travaux preparatoires); 
b) Secondly asserting that the sole limit,148 "only restriction", to the UNSC powers 
under Chapter Vilis 149 that it acts "in accordance with the purposes and 
142 Response, II, (A) 2. §5, at p. 13. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Response, II, (A) 3. pp.14-16. 
146 In particular: the work of Committee 1, as quoted in the Response (The United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, Commission I, Doc. 723, 1/1/N19, 1 June 1945, at 
p.700); and Committee 3 (The United Nations Conference on International Organization, 
Commission III, Doc. 134, 111/3/3, 9 May 1945, at p. 785). Both quoted as "supplementary 
means of interpretations" of the UN Charter. 
147 Expenses advisory Opinion, at p. 168. 
148 Note the singular. 
149 As per Article 24 (2) of the UN Charter. 
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Principles of the United Nations", these being 150 "To maintain international 
peace and security"; 
c) Thirdly, that the actions of the UNSC under Chapter VII, and with the same 
aim as the purposes and principles of the Charter, i.e., the maintenance of 
international peace and security "must be presumed to be legally valid". (ICJ, 
Expenses advisory opinion); 
d) Finally, by considering that the UNSC was addressing a possible threat to 
international peace and security, thus opening the possibility for the use of 
broad powers under Chapter VII, and then explicitly recognizing such threat 
and aiming to adopt appropriate r.1easures, which in the case included the 
establishment of the ICTY, the Prosecutor reaches the conclusion that that 
presumption of legality, of the measures under Chapter VII, so long as they 
are intended to restore international peace and security, as was the case with 
the ICTY, apply to the establishment of the Tribunal. 
1.6. The lack of need for a Treaty. 
Resorting to the same line of argumentation, and therefore reinforcing it, the 
Response claims that, as the establishment of the ICTY was a measure under 
Chapter VII, and therefore a legal one, no treaty was needed, but still arguing with 
different approaches that: 
a) The establishment of the ICTY followed very opened proceedings. The 
Response goes at lengths to show the validity of this argument by referring 
to the "complex drafting process which involved the participation of at least 
thirty States (".) as well as ten non-governmental organizations. It was by 
b 't '1 I ,,151 no means an ar I rary or Un! atera measure . 
b) According to Articles 103 and 25 of the Charter,152 the actions of the UNSC 
supersede States' obligations under Treaties. 
150 As per Article 1 (1) of the UN Charter. 
151 Response, II, (A) 4. §2, p.17. 
152 Reinforced by a reference to the ICJ Lockerbie case (p.15) 
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c) Finally, that the treaty approach, as set aside by the UNSG,153 did not 
guarantee the effectiveness of the measure making it less then appropriate, 
particularly by the double uncertainty of the lengthy process of adoption 
(negotiation and ratification of the treaty) as well as the needed ratification 
by the States directly concerned. 
With the exception of the mention to Articles 103 and 25 of the Charter, the 
Prosecutor's discourse ends pointing to the discretion of its own assessment by the 
evaluation of subjective concepts, i.e. the: participation of States (in the above 
mentioned way), effectiveness, appropriateness and even uncertainty regarding 
ratification. 
One must remember that the uniqueness, the novelty, of the ICTY implies a path 
which misses the advantages of resourcing to older, well established legal 
institutions and extensive debates on the meaning of concepts. This wishfully legal 
speech of the Prosecutor, aimed to support the legitimacy of the ICTY, debates 
rather than affirms subjectively arguable concepts as the grounds to ascertain the 
appropriateness of novelty, in surpassing a Treaty in the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court empowered to prosecute individuals. 
1.7. Lack of conflict between the establishment of the ICTY and the (then) 
prospective International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The Prosecutor notes that the Defence argument, that the ICTY would undermine 
the initiatives for the establishment of a permanent international penal Tribunal (the 
now ICC), seems to be based upon the idea that a UNSC role "in the protection of 
humanitarian and human rights law",154 particularly from an ad-hoc perspective, 
might harm the intention for the constitution of a more global and permanent 
criminal jurisdiction. 
153 And quoted in the response from UNSG Report, S/25704, p. 7, §20, and later, but still on 
the same topic, from Sharga & Zacklin (1994: 361) and Kolodkin (2002: 170 [1994: 386]) 
154 Response, II, (A) 5., § 3, in fine, p. 19. 
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Counter arguing, the Response refers to the International Law Commission Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court,155 on which ad-hoc cases are provided 
for, both in relation to States which are not part and referred by the UNSC. This 
possibility of an ad-hoc jurisdiction by the (then future) ICC, is then said to reinforce 
the powers of the UNSC under Chapter VII, to establish such jurisdiction (in the 
absence of the ICC, by the lawful establishment of the ICTY). 
Although apparently, and inevitably, rhetorical (as it presumes the consequences 
of the establishment of the ICTY on a then not yet existing jurisdiction) this 
perspective ends addressing the key issue of the legitimacy of the ICTY: claiming 
"the central role of the Security Council in the protection of humanitarian and 
human rights law", implying the lawfulness of the establishment of the ICTY by the 
UNSC acting under Chapter VII. Even the common doubt about the imposition of 
an ad-hoc criminal jurisdiction is contemplated by the reference to the Draft Statute 
by the ILC. 
1.8. On the relation between the powers of the UNSC and the UNGA. 
The Response denies the primacy of the UNGA over the UNSC, by claiming the 
same statute for both organs. 156 Furthermore, the Prosecutor does not miss the 
distinction between articles 11 and 12 of the Charter (see Appendix I, 148-149), 
claiming the limitation to the UNGA powers when the UNSC "is exercising in 
respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present 
Charter".157 Nor does it pass the opportunity of stressing the primacy of the UNSC 
in relation to the "exercise of powers for the maintenance of international peace 
and security" (Article 24). 
155 Report of the I.L.C. on the work of its forty-sixth session, U.N. Doc. AJ49/10 (1994), 
particularly Article 23 of the draft Statute. 
156 Again with the resource of the ICJ advisory opinions (Admissions advisory opinion, I.C.J. 
Reps. 1950, p. 8) 
157 Response, /I, (A) 6. § 2, p.20, quoting from Article 12 (1) of the Charter. 
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After these compelling arguments, the Prosecutor's Response then engages in a 
somewhat entangled defence of the participation of the UNGA in the ICTY. The 
Response loses its line of argumentation into procedural and lateral aspect of the 
functioning of the Tribunal. By mentioning the election of the judges of the ICTY, as 
the inclusion of ICTY expenses in the regular budget of the UN, both to be 
approved by the UNGA, and the annual report the President of the ICTY has to 
submit to both UNSC and UNGA. The main question, on the legitimacy (or legality), 
of the establishment of the ICTY by the UNSC was already set by the previous 
legal arguments. Rejecting the central role of the UNSC, or claiming a shared role 
with the UNGA, does not add strength to the legal basis for the UNSC actions 
under Chapter VII. By elaborating on these other topics in an otherwise well-
structured legal speech, the Prosecutor weakens its discourse, with this pursuit of 
a hesitant line of argumentation. 
1.9. On the non-extension of powers of the UNGA. 
Yet again supported on a ICJ advisory opinion,158 the Response denies the 
possibility raised by the Defence Motion of the extension of UNGA powers to adopt 
mandatory enforcement measures, namely the establishment of an International 
Tribunal. The argument rests on the sole competence of the UNSC to adopt 
measures which require enforcement by coercive action, i.e., Chapter VII of the 
Charter. Yet again a return to that well-structured line of argumentation based on 
the provisions of the Charter, i.e. the normative speech, but avoiding any novelty 
despite the uniqueness of the ICTY. 
1.10. The violation of Humanitarian Law as a threat to international peace and 
·t 159 secur! y. 
156 Expenses ... , p. 163. 
159 Response, II, (8), 1. 
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Changing its focus onto the validity of the ICTY as a measure under Chapter VII 
(and for such purpose objectively reviewing UNSC Res. 827) the Response dives 
into the particular circumstances, historical facts and perceptions of the events in 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991, aiming to provide proof for the reasonableness 
and lawfulness of the exercise of UNSC powers under Chapter VII. 
In its reasoning the Response calls on the authoritative Experts Reports,160 so as 
to support a two-step connection of the conflict with the concept of threat to 
international peace and security. The Experts' Reports, serve here to prove a) the 
ongoing ethnic cleansing, and b) that such ethnic cleansing was the basis, as goal 
to be achieved, of the conflict; practices here deemed to constitute a "serious 
violation of humanitarian law"; 161 which in turn "constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII". 
Reasonable as it may seem, the sheer consideration, on a judicial environment, of 
the adequacy of facts to the fulfilment of the concept of "threat to international 
peace and security", and all the subsequent provision of powers in the Charter, 
mount to a review of the actions of the UNSC. Adequate as it seems to prove the 
material truth, if the UNSC Resolutions are judicially non-reviewable, the effort 
made by the Prosecutor could end proving counterproductive. In fact, by reviewing 
and arguing the fulfilment of the conditions for the UNSC to consider a given 
situation as a threat to international peace and security, the Response is indirectly 
recognizing the possibility of such Resolutions to be reviewed in a judicial 
proceeding. 
160 As quoted by the Prosecutor (Response, II, (8), 1.): "Report on the situation of human 
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1993/50, p. 7, para.16 
(1993)." And "Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Sixth period report on the situation of human rights in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1994/11 0, p. 44, para.283 (1994)." 
161 The expression used by the Prosecutor, "violation of humanitarian law" (Response, II, 
(8), 1. § 2, in fine), is however slightly different from the one used in the first of the above 
mentioned Experts' Report (previous footnote), "massive violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law". 
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The idealism of the speech, in support of the righteousness of the actions of the 
UNSC, seems to lose its references on the underlining debate on legitimacy of the 
powers at play. In this case, answering to the Defence Motion regarding specific 
conditions of the conflict, even if to contradict their conclusions, opens the 
reasonableness for its discussion in court: precisely the point aimed by the 
Defence in sustaining the ICTY implicit powers to review the lawfulness, and 
legitimacy, of its establishment by the UNSC. 
1.11. Impunity and the restoration of peace and security. 
Still driven by the wish to counter argue the Defence, the Prosecutor elaborates on 
the possibilities of the criminal prosecution to act as an impediment to the 
restoration of peace and security, as claimed by the Defence. 
The expected conclusion of the Response, in denying such possibility, is mainly 
based on an inextricable relation 162 between international peace and justice. An 
argument in which the Prosecutor does not hesitate to make (in our view political) 
considerations on the essentiality of individual responsibility for "countering the 
misinformation and indoctrination which breeds ethnic and religious hatred".163 
Somewhat more relevant are the references summoned to support this conclusions 
(the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Experts' 
Reports 164 and doctrine) 165 as they call on the presumption that individual criminal 
responsibility in cases of ethnic divide, not only is connected both with justice and 
peace as it is also necessary to build international peace, i.e. the objective for 
which UNSC powers under Chapter VII are set. However, the calling of such 
162 Response, II, (8), 2. § 1, p. 22. 
163 Ibid. § 3, p. 23. 
164 As quoted in the Response, from "Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Second periodic report on the 
situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1994/4, 
at p. 9, para. 43 (1993)."; and 'Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Sixth Eighth periodic report on the 
situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. 
E/CNA/1995/10, at p. 3, para. 11 (1994)." 
165 Meron (1993: 134), as quoted in the Trial Response. 
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authorities in this particular regard, translates the adoption by the Prosecutor of 
considerations of a political nature, an option that not only opens the otherwise 
normative discourse to the subjectivity of politics, but also appears to cast doubts 
on the certainty of the Prosecutor's cultural references in that particular period of 
History. 
1.12. Humanitarian and Human Rights Law as a legitimate area of UNSC action. 
The defence of the legitimacy of the UNSC actions regarding both Humanitarian, 
and Human Rights Law is, ab initio, pre-justified by the previous argument. For if 
serious violations of these laws constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, so are consequently justified the actions of the UNSC under Chapter VII 
to restore peace and security. The novelty 166 in the Response is the conclusion that 
"being an independent and impartial tribunal, the ICTY is in a position to apply 
international humanitarian law on a neutral and consistent basis.,,167 A conclusion 
for which no further reasoning is offered immediately, leaving the doubts over a) 
the effectiveness of other previous courses of action, as over b) the independence 
and impartiality of the Tribunal, and c) the role of humanitarian organizations, such 
as the later-mentioned Red Cross, in the exercise of Humanitarian Law. 
In fact the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is mentioned but with 
another purpose: so as to contradict the superficial reading by the Defence of the 
ICRC position, regarding the establishment of the ICTY. As earlier noted, the 
Defence fails to mention the support this international humanitarian organization 
extends towards the establishment of the ICTY, focusing its (Defence's) attention 
on a possible critique of the entanglement between humanitarianism and 
maintenance of international peace and security. Acutely, the Prosecutor's 
Response highlights the flaw, by bringing up the ICRC support for the ICTY which 
is welcomed as a "positive development [in] all efforts aimed at ensuring respect 
166 Other then references to UNSC actions (Resolutions) regarding previous situations -
such as in Southern Rhodesia (1965/66), Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993) and Haiti (1993). 
167 Response, II, (8),3. § 1, in fine, p. 23. 
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for International Humanitarian Law" .168 The specificity of the reference doubly 
founds the legitimacy (lawfulness) of the UNSC to take action in the protection of 
this body of Law: on the one hand it contradicts the Defence argument, on the 
other highlights the ICTY as a protection of Humanitarian Law, and a "concrete 
expression of ( ... ) the legal obligation ( ... ) undertake to ensure respect for these 
instruments [Geneva Conventions]" .169 
This line of reasoning logically concludes for the non-collision of roles between the 
ICRC and the ICTY regarding Humanitarian Law, as the first basis its action on 
consent, but "there is nothing to suggest that this body of law excludes 
enforcement by non-consensual or coercive measures, or that such measures 
would in any way put into question the neutral character of this body of law.,,17o The 
Prosecutor thus cleverly extends the welcoming of the enforcement of the Geneva 
Conventions, made by the ICRC, as a waiver to the legitimacy of the UNSC use of 
powers on the matter. 
1.13. The UNSC authority over individuals. 
This debate is somewhat less interesting for our research, as we focus on the 
legitimacy of the means chosen to subject individuals to their criminal responsibility 
(establishment of the ad-hoc Criminal Tribunal) and less on the relation of powers 
between the two poles (UNSC and individuals). From a simplified perspective, in 
the long relation between the UNSC and the individual, we are only interested in 
the possible discourse of the middle man (the ICTY), regarding its perception of 
legitimacy in the shorter relation of the ICTY with its creator, the UNSC. 
168 As per the quotation of the Prosecutor (Response, II, (B), 3. § 2): "(Some Preliminary 
remarks by the international Committee of the Red Cross on the Setting-up of an 
International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian law Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 
DDM/JURl422b, 25 March 1993, at paras. 1 &2}." 
169 Ibid. 
170 Response, II, (8), 3., § 3, p. 24. 
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Nevertheless, one can summarise the Prosecutor's Response position on this 
issue by noting its two arguments: a) that the individual responsibility for serious 
violations of International Humanitarian Law is a "well-established principle of 
international law" 171 (even though, according to the reference quoted, one of 
customary origin, born in the Laws of War but "Similarly" applicable to "offences 
against the peace and security of mankind"),172 and b) that it is human individual 
conduct that allows the exteriorization of the action of States, and that for the 
enforcement of UNSC actions related thereto, attribution of individual responsibility 
is a fundamental feature to express such enforcement actions (i.e., implicitly, 
Chapter VII measures of a judicial nature ).173 
1.14. No limitation to the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the UNSC with a 
judicial character. 
Of far greater reach could be the argumentation of the Prosecution in this respect. 
In fact the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY is inextricably connected 
with the legitimacy of its creator to do so, i.e. for the UNSC to establish an ad-hoc 
subsidiary organ of a judicial character. 
The Response lucubration presents two rather feeble lines of argumentation: a) 
one on the unpredictability of the evolution of constitutive texts, namely the Charter 
(thus opening the possibility of change, at least through interpretation, precedent 
171 Response, II, (B), 4., § 1 & 2, p.24 - in this last paragraph by quoting from (sic): "Robert 
Y. Jennings & Arthur watts (eds) 9 th ed., 1 Oppenheim's International Law (1992), p. 17" 
172 Ibid. 
173 In this not so attained argument, the Response calls on the authority of the Nuremberg 
Trial ("Trial of the Major war Criminal before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
14 Nov. 1945 - 1 Oct. 1946, I official Documents (1947), p. 223") to concretise abstract 
responsibility, i.e., to point to individuals to be prosecuted for the expression of the will of the 
State. Of greatest interest as it is, to concede to the temptation of embarking on a critique of 
the Prosecution's summoning of a Military Tribunal (set up by the victorious part of a war) on 
which challenges of legitimacy were not permitted, such critique is here off topic, as it 
presents no possible achievements on determining the possibility of an ICTY own legitimacy 
discourse. 
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and conventions, from what could be foreseen on its creation) 174 and b) the 
consistent interpretation of the Charter in the practice of the relevant organs of the 
If, on the first case, the argument for the reconnaissance of the expression of the 
will of the State is not only arguable, but irrelevant for the current research, the 
second calls on examples that could shed some light on the possible analogies to 
such unique exercise of powers, i.e., to find other possible examples of legitimacy 
in the establishment of ad-hoc International Criminal Tribunals by the UNSC. 
However, our high expectations fall through by the only two examples offered by 
the Response: a) the Kuwait Compensation Commission (aimed pecuniarily to 
compensate for losses) 176 and b) the Rwanda solution with the establishment of the 
ICTR, a later development then yet to face the same challenges of legitimacy as its 
twin brother ICTY was already facing. 177 
Drawing proof of consistency in the interpretations, of the almost 5 decades old 
UNSC regarding the establishment of judicial subsidiary organs with a penal 
character, from a Compensations Committee and a posterior copycat of the ICTY 
itself (neither further apart then 26 months from the establishment of the ICTY) 178 is 
at least an unfortunate option to reinforce the argument. 
174 With a single reference when quoting from "J. Brierly, "The Covenant and the Charter", 
23 British Yearbook of International Law (1946), p. 83" to, on a presumption of posthumous 
prognosis, boldly conclude that the States parties "implicitly accepted a liberal and 
contemporaneous interpretation ( ... ) which allows the organs of the United Nations to adopt 
measures which may not have been expressly recognized ( ... ) at the time of its conclusion". 
175 The Prosecutor relies here (Response, II, (B), 5. § 4, p. 26) on a quotation from its 
reference to the ICJ and the Law of the Treaties: "(Admissions case, I.C.J. Reps., 1950, at 
pp. 8-9; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), article 31 (3)(b))". 
176 As quoted by the Prosecutor's reference (Response, II, (B), 5. § 5, p. 26): "U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/68?, 3 April 1991 ,operative paras. 16-19) 
177 Idem, when referring to UNSC Res. 955(1994): "U.N., Doc. SC/RES/955, 8 November 
1994". 
178 Kuwait on 3 April 1991, Yugoslavia on 25 May 1993, and Rwanda on 8 November 1994. 
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Facing the far-reaching field of argumentation on the evolution of the interpretation 
of the UN Charter, the Response appear to miss the trends of those times, i.e., the 
cultural references to consubstantiate a then contemporary reading of the Charter, 
so as to hold ground for its legal arguments. After opening the possibility of re-
interpretation of the Charter, the Prosecutor was expected to elaborate on exactly 
that, by not doing so one might question his motives. Fear of the unknown? 
Uncertainty on the mainstream's leadership in the new world order between 
shrinking super-powers and a wishful Security Council? What was, then, 
legitimate? 
1.15. On the independence and impartiality of a UNSC subsidiary judicial organ. 
The Prosecution Response offers three quite separate lines of reasoning regarding 
this topic: a) the conditions for the independence as set in the statute (SICTY); b) 
the lack of relation between the proceedings of the ICTY and the restoration of 
peace, and also c) the broad discretion of the UNSC political powers (so as to deny 
the Defence accusations of discrimination justified by the lack of a "consistent and 
uniform legal basis .. 179 in the repression of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law by the UNSC). 
From all of these only the last one seems to present a potential input to a 
legitimacy discourse, inasmuch as it addresses, to denial, the discrimination 
charges on the uniqueness of the establishment of the ICTY. 
2. Other challenges addressed in the Prosecutor's Response. 
The Prosecutor's Response then addresses the challenge to the ICTY primary 
jurisdiction (primacy), 180 and to the Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction. 181 
179 Response, II, (8), 6., § 4 
180 Response, II, (C), p. 28-35. 
181 Response, III, (A), p. 36-46 (for Article 2 of the SICTY); Response, III, (8), p. 47-53 (for 
Article 3 of the SICTY); and also Response, III, (C), p. 53-59 (for Article 5 of the SICTY). 
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As earlier stated, when addressing the Defence Motion and Brief, the subject of 
these two types of challenge is of lesser interest for the framing in which a possible 
legitimacy discourse might be elaborated by the Trial Chamber. Even if some of 
the arguments presented within these other debates might be retrieved by the 
Chamber, they are only relevant if and inasmuch as they have a direct relation with 
the establishment of the ICTY, accordingly, any such arguments will only be here 
reviewed if and when adopted by the Tribunal in its Decision. 
Some remarks, included in the Prosecutor's Response, consubstantiate this 
understanding: 
2.1. Right in the beginning of the Response's reasoning on the primacy of the 
ICTY, the Prosecutor makes it explicitly clear that: a) within this issue of 
primacy matters relating to the establishment of the ICTY were already 
addressed on the previous arguments; and b) the ICTY lacks the competence 
to review UNSC Resolutions. The uncommon bluntness of the opening 
remarks on the primacy can only be read as a condensate conclusion of the 
Prosecution on previous matters, the legitimacy of the ICTY: 
"To the extent the issue of primacy over domestic courts relates to the 
scope of the security council powers in the establishment of the ICTY, 
reference is made to the above arguments, including the argument that the 
ICTY cannot review decisions of the Security Council. Any challenge to the 
establishment of the ICTY is a matter for the Security Council or other 
relevant organs of the United Nations. " (Trial Response: 28)182 
-------------------------
182 For the sake of clarity on the apparent inconsistency of references, our reference 
(AuthorlTitle, date: page) is here repeated according to the Prosecutor's Response system, 
as earlier quoted in this sub-title: Response, II, (e), § 1, p. 28. 
Having made the point of returning to our general system of references, but still aiming to 
facilitate its search, we will keep the Prosecutor's system during the remaining review of its 
argumentation (so as to, regardless of possible secondary sources, keep and objective 
reference to the text). 
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A statement that reinforces our option of limiting the review, of additional material 
in the proceedings, to the central challenge on legitimacy. 
2.2. With the sole purpose of register lines of argumentation, for possible further 
reference partial mentions are made to the contents of the remaining 
arguments regarding primacy, as present in the Response in specific issues, 
namely: 
a) That serious violations of humanitarian law are matters of universal 
jurisdiction. Decomposing the argument into four layers: that the community 
of sovereign States "may choose to vest their combined jurisdiction in an 
International Tribunal"; the crimes, by their nature, "are not crimes that are 
purely domestic"; that "In such circumstances, the sovereign rights of States 
cannot and do not take precedence over the right of the international 
community to act"; and finally that, on establishing the ICTY, "the Security 
Council, was acting on behalf of the member States of the United Nations" 
(Response, II, (C), 4., §1 & 2, p. 32-33). 
b) That the Defence argument on the principle of jus de non evocando does not 
affect the primacy of the ICTY, both because such principle "does not defeat 
the right of a State to confer jurisdiction on the ICTY" (thinking of the 
German case, where despite the constitutional norms referred to by the 
Defence, the ICTY jurisdiction was accepted), and because, by denying the 
universal character of this principle, the Prosecution considers that no 
challenge is made by a particular national jurisdiction, adding doubts on the 
lawfulness of such possibility (Response, II, (C), 5., p. 33-34). 
c) That in some cases, including serious violations of humanitarian law (and 
international human rights), "States have obligations towards the 
international Community as a whole. Such obligations erga omnes ( ... ) 
require that the sovereign rights of States be subordinated to the common 
interest of the world community in the suppression of serious violations of 
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international human rights and humanitarian law through means such as the 
ICTY" (Response: 34).183 
d) That the use of powers by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter 
"overrides the sovereign rights of States". The claim is that the establishment 
of the ICTY is an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, which in turn, 
and by means of "Article 25 obligates the members of the United Nations 
( ... ) 'to carry out the decisions of the Security Council' including binding 
resolutions" .184 A conclusion further based upon the exception in Article 2 
(7), in fine of the Charter, when referring to the principle of non intervention, 
by the UN, in matters essentially of domestic jurisdiction: "this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" 
(Trial Response: 35). 
Section III - The USA Brief 
The amicus curiae "Submission of the Government of the United States of America 
concerning certain arguments made by counsel for the accused in the case of The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal V. Dusan Tadic" (sic), hereinafter "amicus curiae brief' 
or "USA brief'. 
(A) The USA brief, with the above mentioned limitations as a primary resource 
for our research, presents two different lines of argumentation: 
1. A first approach, denying the ICTY competence to review UNSC actions, i.e. 
Resolutions, both when considering the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security (and therefore for the UNSC to act under Chapter VII) and 
183 In this reference the Response quotes from (sic): "(Barcelona Traction Case, I.C.J. Reps. 
1970, at p.32); (See also Robert Y. Jennings & Arthur Watts (eds.) 9th ed., 1 Oppenheim's 
International Law (1992) at p.5), (Response: 34). 
184 References summoned in support of this argument include quotation from the: Lockerbie 
case, (I.C.J. Reps. 1992, p. 15) and Bruno Simma (ed., The Charterofthe United Nations: A 
Commentary, 1994, p. 143). 
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to review the appropriateness of the measures taken, i.e. the establishment of 
the ICTy. 185 
On a very short presentation,186 when compared with the later reasoning on 
arguments already put aside as unreviewable, the USA brief claims that: 
1.1. The legitimacy challenge must be addressed to the UNSC. 
The ICTY, as a subsidiary organ, "cannot be asked to review and overrule the 
actions of its parent body".187 In support of the affirmation that "Within the U.N. 
system, challenges to the validity of the creation or mandate of a subsidiary 
organ must be directed to the principal organ which created it",188 the USA 
brief calls upon (the already mentioned, in the Prosecutor's Response) 
positions of the Ici89 and the travaux preparatoires of the adoption of the 
SICTY by the UNSC190 where, according to the USA, "the lines of argument 
raised by the Counsel for the Accused in the present case were considered 
and rejected by the [Security] Council at the time it created the Tribunal" .191 
1.2. According to Chapter VII, the UNSC has "exclusive authority to determine the 
existence of a threat to international peace and security and to decide what 
measures shall be taken in response" .192 
1.3. The previously mentioned determinations of the UNSC, on the existence of a 
threat to international peace and security and on what measures to take in 
response, "are not subject to judicial review within the U.N. system".193 One 
understands for the lack of provision for such empowered organ (i.e. the lack 
185 Such is the case for the arguments presented in the first point of the amicus curiae 
submission, (USA brief: 1-4). 
186 Five paragraphs in little more than 3 pages (1-4), from a total of 38 pages. 
187 USA brief: 2. 
188 USA brief: 1. 
189 Ibid, n 1 references to the ICJ "Namibia Advisory Opinion", "Lockerbie case" and 
"Expenses Advisory Opinion". 
190 USA (brief: 2, n 3), references to: the "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808" (S/25704); "Note Verbale from the 
Netherlands" (S/25716, 1993); and, "Letter from France" (S/25266 (1993)). 
191 USA brief: 2. 
192 USA brief: 2-3. 
193 USA brief: 3. 
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of provision of such powers in the ICTY Statute) and the previously 
mentioned194 reluctance of the ICJ to assume such reviewing as to its 
com petence. 
1.4. Such determinations of the UNSC, on the existence of a threat to international 
peace and security and on what measures to take in response, "are of a policy 
and political character and are not susceptible to judicial resolutions".195 The 
apparently thin distinction from the previous argument is actually rather 
important, as it adds a (proposed) objective impediment, i.e. material 
impossibility, for a judicial organ to determine the fulfilment of necessary 
conditions for the powers unleashed by Chapter VII to become operative. In 
this sense, even if such power of judicial review of UNSC Resolutions were to 
exist, it would still be unable to decide on the appropriateness of the UNSC 
determination of the existence of a threat to international peace and security, 
as it was by nature a political question. Implicitly, the subjective judgement of 
the political organ (UNSC) is granted unlimited discretion. 196 History has 
proven more cautious, by retrieving the well-established Treaty proceeding in 
establishing the ICC, (to which the USA government, here amicus curiae, 
holds its reservations), but this particular argument, at that particular time, 
seemed to push the defence for the novelty of the International Criminal 
Tribunal (ICTY) to a point where its creator could not be contested. Was the 
UNSC to become the World Government? 
2. A second approach, where despite the prior objection to the review, the amicus 
curiae presents arguments denying the claims of the Defence both regarding 
194 See USA (brief: 1, n 1). 
195 USA, brief: 4. 
196 Previous references (on discussing the Prosecutor's Response), on limits to this broad 
powers of the UNSC, as the then mentioned Principles of the Charter, would be of little use 
in the absence of an external power of review. 
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the lawfulness of the UNSC actions 197 and the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
ICTy. 198 
With our well-established subject of research (on a possible legitimacy discourse 
by the ICTY) the material arguments, as presented by the amicus curiae, on the 
characterization of the process leading to the recognition "of a threat to 
[international) peace" and security by the UNSC (USA brief: 5-9), the legitimacy of 
this latter's involvement in humanitarian law (USA brieF. 22-25), and the debate on 
the sovereignty of states (USA brief: 19-22), are all beyond the subject. The first for 
it would be the competence for the exercise of such powers that might matter for 
the research; the second as it is not the involvement of the UNSC in any body of 
International Law, but rather the creation of a specific judicial criminal organ, within 
that possible involvement, that might characterize the legitimacy of that 
establishment; the third as the relation between the UN organs and the sovereign 
States is a condition, rather then a source, of legitimacy for the establishment of 
the subsidiary organ under scrutiny. 
The same reasons being valid to dismiss the critical review of the reasoning 
presented in all of point 3 of the USA brief. 177 In fact, the debate on the jurisdiction 
of an already established International Tribunal, interesting as it may be, is a 
debate that does not address the legitimacy of the establishment, but rather the 
framing of its powers. The two sets of arguments (USA brief: 5-24 and 25-38) are 
therefore here treated uniformly, as they both are aimed to answer the material 
challenges of the Defence, but those of which the previously mentioned line of 
argumentation denies the legitimacy of the judicial review, for which it now offers 
197 Namely arguments presented under n° 2. (a. to e.) of the USA brief (p. 5-25): (a.) 
regarding the existence of a threat to peace; (b.) the authority (of the UNSC) under Chapter 
VII to create a Tribunal; (c.) the independence of the Tribunal; (d.) the sovereignty of States; 
and (e.) the (UNSC) involvement in humanitarian law. 
19B Arguments presented under nO 3. (a. to d.) of the USA brief (p. 25-38): (a.) on whether 
there was an international armed conflict; (b.) on the grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions; (c.) on the jurisdiction over violations of laws or customs of war; and (d.) on the 
tribunal's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. 
I I I 
arguments. Reason for which, when focusing on the legitimacy discourse, one can 
split the contradictory lines of argumentation, i.e., the USA brief claims the non-
judicial review (USA brief. 1-4), and then offers the Trial Chamber arguments (USA 
brief. 5-38) for such review. 
The only possible research material 199 is consequently limited to: a) the authority of 
the UNSC under Chapter VII to create a Tribunal (USA brief, 2. b.);200 and b) the 
independence of the Tribunal (USA brief, 2. C.).201 Even here only as a cautionary 
consideration of possible new arguments on legitimacy. 
However, we find it useful for its introductory character, and as a guide for 
interpreting that subsequent argumentation, to refer the initial statement in the USA 
brief right after the first approach. In fact, the second part of the argumentation 202 -
"The validity of the Security Council's Decisions" (USA brief: 5-24) and "The 
Subject-matter Jurisdiction of the Tribunal" (USA brief. 25-38) - contains an 
affirmation supporting our conclusion: 
"Although the Tribunal has, in our view, no authority to consider these 
challenges to the decisions of the Security Council, we would not wish to leave 
unchallenged for the record the arguments presented by the Counsel for the 
Accused. We address each in turn:" (USA brief. 5) 
This "wish" will later be followed by the ICTY in the Trial Decision, where the 
Chamber, recognizing its lack of powers to review UNSC Resolutions, still 
addresses the challenge as it "considers that it would be inappropriate to dismiss 
without comment the accused's contentions" (Decision: 4). 
199 Even though point 2. d. of the USA brief (USA brief: 19) responds to the Defence 
challenge on the primacy of the ICTY (referring the sovereignty of States) and thus not 
prima facie relevant for the legitimacy discourse research, a reference will be made to one of 
the arguments then presented by the amicus curiae (see infra, preliminary conclusions 
footnotes ). 
200 USA brief: 9-18. 
201 USA brief: 18-19. 
202 As per our division. 
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2.1. The long reasoning regarding the "Authority [of the UNSC] under Chapter VII 
to create a tribunal" (USA brieF. 9-18) rests upon: 
a) The interpretation of Article 41 of the Charter (see Appendix I) as a broad 
discretionary power, where measures are listed only in an exemplary way, 
an argument for which the amicus curiae refers to a number of precedents of 
non mentioned measures in Article 41: no fly zones;203 creation of safe 
areas;204 humanitarian corridors;205 compensation for victims of armed 
attack;206 delimitation of borders;207 and prohibition of acquisition or 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. 208 
b) The interpretation of Article 29 as a broad discretionary power, where there 
is no limitation to the character of such subsidiary organs. An argument for 
which the amicus curiae refers, again, a number of precedents of the variety 
of subsidiary organs created by the UNSC: observer teams and 
peacekeeping forces;209 investigation commissions;210 commissions for the 
enforcement of restriction on weapons and military activities;211 commissions 
charged with demarcation of boundaries;212 and committees charged with 
interpreting and administering sanctions regimes. 213 Separately (for its 
alleged "quasi-judicial functions,,)214 the USA brief also mentions "the U.N. 
203 UNSC Res. 781 (1992) and Res. 786 (1992) on Bosnia and Herzegovina (USA (brief: 10, 
n 15). 
204 UNSC Res. 819 (1993) and Res. 824 (1993), idem, footnote 16. 
205 UNSC Res. 918 (1994), ibid., footnote 17. 
206 UNSC Res. 687 (1991), ibid., footnote 18. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Idem, p.11, footnote 20. 
209 Idem, footnote 21, but also Res. 758 (1992) and Res. 814 (1993), as also quoted by USA 
(brief: 11, n 21). 
210 UNSC Res.866 (1993), and Res. 955 (1994), as quoted by USA (brief: 11 ,n 22). 
211 UNSC Res.687 (1991), and its implementation Report by the UNSG, as quoted by USA 
(brief: 12, n 23). 
212 Ibid., footnote 24. 
213 UNSC Res.661 (1990), Res. 724 (1991), Res. 748 (1992), and Res. 918 (1994), as 
quoted by USA (brief 12, n 25). 
214 USA brief: 12. 
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Compensation Commission,,215 and the ICTR,216 this last example of 
particular significance for its posterior establishment, to that of the discussed 
ICTYone. 
c) The appropriateness of the establishment of the ICTY, as per the threat to 
international peace and security character of the violations of international 
humanitarian law, themselves here seen by the amicus curiae as an 
"obstacle to peace ( ... ) as they provide motivation for revenge and fuel ( ... ) 
hatred among groups",217 thus concluding the pivotal role of individual 
responsibility, as provided by the ICTY, as a suitable measure for the 
restoration of international peace and security. 
d) Backtracking on its previous decision to address each issue of the Defence 
challenges, regardless of the prior denial of its judicial review, the USA brief 
begins to claim the "judgement of policy and politics,,218 character against the 
Defence argument that the establishment of the ICTY would "obstruct rather 
then assist in the peace process".219 Furthermore the USA brief goes as far 
as stating its understanding that such political judgements are "give[n] by the 
U.N. Charter to the Security Council, and there is no basis for a judicial body 
to questions that judgment".22o Still the amicus curiae brief ends up 
addressing the material challenge, by denying its conclusions primarily 
based on the notion that the individual responsibility judgments, as 
committed to the ICTY, facilitate the peace negotiations as it has "relieved 
the peace negotiators of the difficult burden of negotiating arrangements for 
the prosecution of war criminals" .221 A rather subjective conclusion by all 
means of legal interpretation and historical experience, especially without 
215 UNSC Res. 687 (1991) and Res. 692 (1991), as quoted by USA (brief: 12, n 26). 
216 UNSC Res.955 (1994), as quoted by USA (brief: 13, n 27). 
217 USA brief: 13. 
218 USA brief: 14. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 USA, brief: 15. 
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mentioning the possibility that the representatives of the States in peace 
talks could, themselves, be subjects of indictments. 
e) That the creation of the ICTY does not infringe the authority of the UNGA. A 
conclusion based upon the lack of Chapter VII powers by the UNGA, and if 
that would not be the case, upon the primacy conferred to the UNSC 222 for 
the exercise of Chapter VII powers under Article 12 (see Appendix I). 
Despite this reasoning, the USA brief still highlights, as per UNSC Res. 827, 
the "ample role for the Assembly in the creation and operation of the 
Tribunal, including the election of its judges and the approval of its 
funding".223 Actions which, according to this presentation, "expressed its [the 
UNGA's) full support for the Tribunal".224 The argument, though sustainable 
when considering the legal framing of UN organs' powers, is less compelling 
when levelling the exercise of accessory powers to the legitimacy of the 
establishment of the ICTy. 225 
f) The Defence challenge on the lack of "exceptional circumstances", 226 is 
denied in the USA brief, with a double argument: identifying the "particular 
circumstances" mentioned in Res. 827 regarding the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia, with those "exceptional circumstances" as referred to by the 
Defence;227 but also by the summoning of a legal argument with political 
meaning, i.e, the legally established discretionary of the UNSC to deal with 
222 USA brief: 15-16. 
223 USA brief: 16. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Another line of argumentation was also offered, regarding the composition of the UN 
organs (UNSC and UNGA), with the USA brief dismissing its relevance, as per the goals 
inherent to the granting of Chapter VII powers to the UNSC by the Charter (and thus 
implicitly accepted by member States, although such reason is not explicitly invoked by the 
amicus curiae). 
226 As quoted by the amicus curiae (USA brief: 17), by reference to the possibility, raised by 
the Defence, that the exercise of (denied by the Defence) powers of the UNSC, did not arise 
from any "exceptional circumstances". 
227 An argument which, ad absurdum, would support the Defence claim of questioning the 
(initial, regular) competence of the UNSC to establish a Tribunal under Chapter VII powers. 
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each particular threat to international peace and security as it deems fit, 228 
even if by different actions and exercise of powers.229 
g) Somewhat in relation to this latter line of argumentation, the USA elaborates 
on considerations of the evolution of the "system of international law". Still 
denying the Defence attempt to compare the actions of the UNSC (regarding 
the cases of the former Yugoslavia versus past conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, 
Algeria Cambodia and Congo), the amicus curiae claims that, if those 
different approaches by the UNSC were to constitute a limitation to its future 
actions, that limitation could imperil the development and advancement of 
the International Law.230 An argument which implicitly recognises the novelty 
of the Tribunal, as well as lack of references to ground a discourse of 
legitimacy. 
2.2. The reasoning regarding the "Independence of the Tribunal" (USA brieF 18-
19) rests upon: 
a) The conclusion that (contrary to the Defence claim that the creation of the 
ICTY by the UNSC "impairs the independence of its judicial functions,,)231 
the independence of any judicial functions are not endangered by the 
political nature of its creator, as "all judicial bodies are created by political 
228 "As a matter of law, there is no requirement under Chapter VII that the Council take 
similar action in dealing with all comparable threats to the peace, nor a prohibition on 
Council Action if it has failed to take such action in similar previous cases. The Council has 
the discretion, as it must in cases involving such great consequences, to judge in each 
particular case whether action is prudent and appropriate, based on its own evaluation of all 
relevant considerations" (USA brief: 17). 
229 Further references are made to the possible consistency of the posterior evolutions, such 
as the creation of the ICTR, and the expression of a wishful thinking that such evolution 
could remain "consistent". See USA (brief: 17, in fine). 
230 (USA brief: 18): "It is unconvincing to suggest ( ... ) that the Council's failure to take similar 
action with respect to conflicts of past decades ( ... ) somehow estops it from acting now. 
Such a concept would condemn the international community to refrain from actions 
necessary to maintain the peace because such actions had not been taken in the past. It 
would effectively prevent the international community from developing and advancing the 
system of international law." (sic) 
231 USA brief: 18. 
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acts,,232 The key standard for the evaluation of the independence is then 
identified, in the USA brief, with the contents of the mandate and rules of 
those judicial organs,233 mandate and rules which, in casu, are no others 
then the UNSC Res. 827 and the RPE. A reasoning by which, in 
contradiction with the first line of argumentation (on the non-judicial 
reviewability of UNSC Resolutions), points to the review of Res. 827 
(mandate: the establishment; and Rules: the SITCY) and eventually the RPE 
as sole mean to conclude for the independence of the ICTY. 
b) Accordingly, and supporting our last conclusion, the USA brief then 
elaborates on the affirmation of the ICTY independence, by reference to 
specific Articles of the SICTy234 and the oath of office by the judges. The 
lack of reference to the RPE - approved by the judges - takes no strength to 
our conclusion that the USA brief implicitly recognizes the Uudicial?) review 
of UNSC Res. 827 - establishment and adopted Statute of the ICTY - as the 
standard by which the independence of the ICTY can be measured. 
Inasmuch as the legitimacy of the Tribunal can depend on its independence, 
so this standard would become essential for the confirmation of the ICTY 
legitimacy. 
(8) As preliminary conclusions one can highlight that, according to the USA brief 
1. The main argument presented rests upon the lack of competence for (any) 
judicial review of UNSC actions, maxime the ICTY incompetence to review 
UNSC Res. 827; 
2. That even if that would not be the case, the UNSC has wide discretionary 
powers (considering Articles 29 and 41) to act under Chapter VII, namely in 
the consideration of each particular situation and broadness of possible 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid.: [referring to judicial bodies] " ... their degree of independence depends on the 
mandate and rules that govern their operations." 
234 Ibid., summoning Articles 12, 13, 16, 20, 21 and 26 of the SICTY. 
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solutions to adopt, including an unlimited character of subsidiary organs to be 
created; 
3. The political, and thus judicially non-reviewable, nature of UNSC decisions; 
4. The legitimacy of UNSC actions under Chapter VII, vis-a-vis the UNGA, as 
well as the implicit acceptance by UN member States of such framing of 
powers;235 raises the question, for the interpreter, whether the USA 
Government is, by this reasoning, accepting a broad power of intervention by 
the UNSC? 
5. The possibility of evolution of the "system of international law" by means of 
UNSC innovative actions; 
6. That the independence of the ICTY (without any reference to its connection 
with the legitimacy of the Tribunal), does not depend from the nature of the 
organ that established it, but rather from its legal framing, namely UNSC Res. 
827 and the SITCY. 
Section IV - The Trial Decision 
In the Trial Chamber's Decision of 10 August 1995 (Trial Decision) none of the 
three arguments of the Defence Motion were accepted, but on different grounds: a) 
on the illegal establishment of the Tribunal, i.e. on the legitimacy of the 
establishment of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber refused to rule, though presenting 
arguments on the matter; on both the b) wrongful primacy over national courts; and 
c) the lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae, the Trial Chamber dismissed the Motion. 
235 In this regard, as a lateral reference, as we have already set aside the full argumentation 
on the sovereignty of States (USA Brief: 19-22), it might be worthwhile quoting the very first 
argument offered by the amicus curiae for the dismissal of the Defence claim over the 
sovereignty of States, even if presented in point 6. of the Defence brief, to challenge not the 
legitimacy but the primacy of the ICTY: 
"The Tribunal was created pursuant to a treaty - the U.N. Charter - to which all 
relevant States are party. This acceptance of the Charter system was an exercise 
of the sovereignty of Member States and not an infringement upon it." 
(USA brief: 19). 
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a) Regarding the illegal establishment of the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber refused 
to rule, considering that the Motion arguments "go, not so much to its [ICTY's] 
jurisdiction, as to the unreviewable lawfulness of the actions of the Security 
Council" (Trial Decision: p.17). 
b) Regarding the wrongful primacy over national courts, the Trial Chamber 
dismissed the Motion, basing its decision in three arguments: 
i. the primacy was established by a UNSC Resolution, therefore lacking 
(the ICTY), jurisdiction to review such Resolutions;236 
ii. the accused lacks the legitimacy to contest a violation of sovereignty, 
both because: 
he, the defendant, is not a State, sole legitimate author of a 
Motion for violation of sovereignty;237 
• the States directly involved, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Germany, 
accepted the primacy of the ICTy. 238 
iii. The crimes sub judice are international in nature,239 thus not subject to 
a specific national jurisdiction, and the UNSC action under Chapter VII 
of the Charter constitutes an explicit exception to the prohibition of 
intervention by the UN, as per Article 2(7) of the same Charter. 
c) Regarding the lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae, the Trial Chamber also 
dismissed the Motion. 
i. In what refers to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, the basis for such decision 240 lay in the conviction that the 
crimes to be prosecuted are enumerated in Article 2 of the SICTY, 
where the reference to the Geneva Conventions is only contextual. 
ii. In what refers to the violations of the laws or customs of war the 
Trial's decision 241 is based upon the dismissal of the distinction 
236 Trial Decision:17-18 
237 Trial Decision: 18. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Trial Decision: 19-22. 
241 Trial Decision: 22-29. 
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between international and internal conflict, in so far as the Defence 
argued that only in an international conflict would such crimes be 
subject to this jurisdiction. 
As earlier envisaged, in the Introduction as in Chapter I of this thesis, what is clear 
is the central role of the first challenge, formally on jurisdiction, for the analysis of 
the legitimacy discourse. With the framing of the case pointing towards the minor 
importance of the arguments relating to the third challenge, on subject-matter 
jurisdiction (Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SICTY), and a lateral role of the second 
challenge, on the primacy of the ICTY, for the legitimacy discourse. 
Although aware of this primary concern with the Decision reasoning facing the first 
Challenge (legitimacy), the sometimes intertwined arguments for the other two 
challenges justify, at times, references to those parts of the Decision, in particular 
in relation to the second Challenge (on the primacy), when it clarifies or reinforces 
the ICTY reasoning of its own legitimacy. 
1. Illegal establishment of the Tribunal - laying the foundations of a 
legitimacy discourse. 
On the challenge over the legitimacy of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber identifies the 
arguments of the Defence242 with the questioning of the competence of the UNSC 
242 The Decision enumerates, systematically, and extensively, the challenge and its 
arguments, ten in total (Trial Decision: 3): 
1. Before its creation an ad-hoc court was never envisaged; 
2. No involvement of the UNGA; 
3. UN Charter never intended the UNSC to establish a criminal tribunal; 
4. Inconsistency of UNSC actions regarding other cases; 
5. ICTY did not promote international peace; 
6. UNSC could not create criminal liability on individuals; 
7. Inexistence of any international emergency; 
8. Incapability of a political organ (UNSC) to establish an independent tribunal (ICTY); 
9. Defect in the creation of the ICTY ex post facto; 
10. Primacy over national courts inherently wrong. 
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to (i) establish, and (ii) adopt the Statute of, the ICTy. 243 In so doing the Chamber 
limits its review of this challenge of the Trial Motion to the possibility of reviewing 
the legality of UNSC Resolutions: 
"Essential to these submissions is, of course, the concept that this Trial 
Chamber has the capacity to review and rule upon the legality of the acts 
of the Security Council in establishing the International Tribunal." 
(Trial Decision: 4) 
Having identified the question to be answered, the Trial Decision does not argue 
any further so as to present the reasons for its (pre)announced decision: 
"The Trial Chamber has heard out the Defence in its submissions involving 
judicial review of the actions of the Security Council. However, this 
International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up to scrutinize the 
actions of organs of the United Nations. It is, on the contrary, a criminal 
tribunal with clearly defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited 
criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to those specific 
limits, it will have no authority to investigate the legality of its creation by 
the Security Council." (Trial Decision: 4) 
Even if holding back on the affirmation of the "decision to be", such an introduction 
to the main challenge amounts to a questio iudicata. Despite this introduction 
where the Trial Chamber clearly limits its own powers to the judicial review of 
criminal offences according to its Statute244 (mandate) therefore ascertaining that 
243 According to the Trial Decision the Trial Motion sustains "that the action of the Security 
Council in establishing the International Tribunal and in adopting the Statute under which it 
functions is beyond power; hence the International Tribunal is not duly established by law 
and cannot try the accused" (Trial Decision: 3). 
244 By the indirect reference to Article 1 of the SICTY, see Trial Decision: 4, § 4. 
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the challenges presented by the Defence are unavoidably connected with a power 
to review the legality of UNSC acts,245 
"the Trial Chamber considers that it would be inappropriate to dismiss 
without comment the accused's contentions that the establishment of the 
International Tribunal [ICTYj by the Security Council was beyond power 
and an ill-founded political action, not reasonably aimed at restoring and 
maintaining peace, and that the International Tribunal is not duly 
established by law". (Trial Decision: 4 )246 
And no doubt about the object247 of this position can be raised, as it's the Decision 
that titles it "REASONS FOR DECISION" subdividing them into: "I. The 
Establishment of the International Tribunal; A. Legitimacy of creation" (Decision: 3). 
Given the preannounced reason for not deciding on the lawfulness of its own 
establishment (deciding for its lack of competence to review the challenges to the 
establishment of the ICTY) it becomes apparently difficult to justify the need to 
comment on a subject it has no competence to review. In fact, and despite the 
uniqueness of the ICTY, there are only two possibilities: 
1.1. There is a possibility of judicial review of UNSC Resolutions. In which case 
such judicial review - an essential feature to the balance of powers under a 
democratic Rule of Law comprising a separation of powers (Hamilton, 2003: 
477)248 - can take two forms: 
245 Trial Decision: 3-4. 
246 Trial Decision:4, § 6. in fine, see also the equivalent reasoning in USA (brief: 5). 
247 The context is addressed infra, when considering the Trial Decision introduction to this 
very quotation, of which the initial wording will be repeated. 
248 Federalist 78, for the reversion from the Portuguese version, we follow Vanberg, also for 
our adhesion to his argument (Van berg, 2005: 9): 
"By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions 
to the legislative authority [; such as, for example, that it may not approve laws which 
suspend civil rights, ex post facto laws, and alike.] Limitations of this kind can be 
preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose 
duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void." 
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a) A Tribunal, at a Trial level, does have the power to review the legality 
(or better yet to hold a Constitutional review, with all variations 
therein)249 of any legal acts it has to apply, even if subject to a possible 
appeal; or 
b) There is such an organ or judicial body to which such challenges may 
be addressed other then the trial court, regardless if any possible 
d· 250 suspensive effects on the procee tngs. 
1.2. There is no possibility for judicial review, in which case we can envisage two 
other possibilities: 
a) The lack of competence, both to review or to refer such review, renders 
any comments of no know judicial value; or 
249 Cavari (2004), our bold: 
" Constitutional Review, meaning the power of court to declare a statute legally null 
because it conflicts with a higher norm, bears tension with one of the main pillars of 
democratic idea, that of granting judges the authority to annul majority's decision. In spite 
of this tension, understanding the intricacies of constitutional democracy and the 
adoption of a constitution in most of the western democracies, we witness an ongoing 
spread of constitutional review, which differentiates in pattern and power. (. . .) I assume 
that the pattern finally adopted expresses the balance of powers within a given political 
arrangement. A pattern which will be of any deviation from this balance of power could in 
fact be adopted but might lead to a collision between the Constitutional Review Institute 
and the political-institutional structure. In order to find such a connection I present a 
study of five countries representing different prototypes of constitutional review: 
Declaring nullity by the regular court hierarchy (u. S.A); Declaring nullity in a 
constitutional court (Germany), Declaring nullity as a semi-official part of the legislative 
process by a constitutional council (France); Declaring nullity of legislation which is 
limited by an over-ride of the parliament (Canada); Declaring unconstitutionality without 
the authority to nullify (Britain)." 
250 For the purpose of this research it less interesting to ascertain if such a body (with 
competence for constitutional reviews) is of a judicial, legislative or political nature. For the 
same reason, the hierarchical relation, and proceedings, between the trial court an such 
organ does not seem to present relevant consequences to the discovery of a legitimacy 
discourse by the trial court itself. In fact, the only relevant issue might be summarized by 
answering a question on why would the trial court present arguments on the legitimacy of its 
own establishment: either it was entitle to do so, by a competence to review these acts of 
establishment, even if subject to an appeal decision; or it is presenting its view on an issue it 
lacks the competence to review. 
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b) Despite de lack of competence (of the court or of any appeal organ) the 
Tribunal's opinion may be regarded, at least, as doctrine, i.e. opinio 
juris. 
In both cases the possible value of the precedent (as understood in Common Law) 
might be argued However, that could not be the initial intention of the Tribunal, for 
in such case it would be aware that a precedent is only set by ruling - which the 
Trial Chamber does not, by recognizing the lack of competence to proceed with the 
inherent review. Yet another possibility, by considering the recognition of the lack 
of competence as a ruling in itself, does not justify the argumentation presented (at 
least from a precedent point of view) on any of the two only possibilities. 
First if considering that it incorporates a non-ruling. The recognition of the lack of 
competence states both the need to review UNSC Resolutions, so as to effectively 
address the challenges set by the Defence Motion, and the lack of competence to 
do so. Accordingly, the Trial Decision is not in this matter a ruling but rather a non-
ruling, thus rendering unjustifiable the need for addressing the object of the 
challenges to the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY posed by the Trial 
Motion of the Defence. 
Secondly, even if it were to be considered as a ruling, the Trial Decision could only 
be so in what relates to limiting the object of the challenges of the Defence Trial 
Motion to the Tribunal's legitimacy, presenting the needed argumentation to 
support the "ruling" on the lack of competence. Thus rendering unjustifiable the 
need to address the object of those challenges, i.e., the verification that the 
material questions posed laid beyond the competence of the Tribunal (that which 
might be considered as a ruling), would only justify the presentation of reasons to 
so consider, regardless of the merits of the object of the challenges themselves. 
Either way, given the fact that the jurisdiction itself was novel and the Tadic case 
the first, it would be unlikely if not impossible to find such legal references as 
similar to the rule of precedent in Common Law. In fact, it took more than five 
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years for the ICTY even to pronounce on the matter of the value of the precedent, 
and even then to accept it with limitations. 251 
Since the subject of the current research is not to scrutinize the powers of the 
UNSC (at least per se) nor the existence of an organ with such powers, but rather 
to examine the Tribunal's own speech in search for a self-legitimacy discourse, one 
can and in fact must concentrate on the above options a) and b), following the Trial 
Decision's proper rulings, i.e. decisions affecting the proceedings of the Trial 
Motion, formally challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and de facto challenging its 
legitimacl52 as well. According to these rulings, hypothesis a) i. does not operate, 
for lack of competence, and hypothesis a) ii. Should not either, as in such case the 
Tribunal would refer the Trial Motion to such organ, or at least mention this 
possibility in the comments it fund "inappropriate" to skip. 
In face of the remaining options, it would be unintelligible to confront the inefficacy 
of such comments according to option b) i., as the due justification of lack of 
competence would be enough for a judicial decision. Any other argument, namely 
the will to address the Trial Motion challenge regardless of its judicial effectiveness. 
could be said to outreach the judicial function, or worst, to incorporate a will to 
engage in rhetorical confrontation with the Defence. The proclaimed fairness and 
independence of the Tribunal are evidently incompatible with such an attitude. Yet, 
251 See HRW (2004 263), and the reference therein to the Aleksovski case before the 
Appeals Chamber (24 March 2000). 
252 In the Trial hearings argumentation the entanglement between the concepts of 
jurisdiction and legitimacy become more obvious and Judge Stephen calls for a clarification. 
"Judge Stephen What you are really dealing with is not jurisdiction; it is the validity of the 
establishment of the Tribunal, is it not?" (Trial hearings: 210) 
And later: 
"Judge Stephen Yes, so it is not at all the breath of our jurisdiction that you are 
challenging; it is the very existence of the tribunal and whether it was validly 
established?" (Trial hearings: 211) 
To which the Defence ends concluding that those are, in casu, not separate matters, as the 
challenge on the ICTY Jurisdiction implies, or might imply, questioning the legality, and thus 
the legitimacy, of the act of establishment, without which all jurisdiction is void (Trial 
hearings: 210-211 ). 
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as has been suggested on several occasions thus far, the legal minds behind such 
actions and attitudes operate in a manner culturally closed off from any thinking 
outside the discursive legalities that they continue to manipulate and deploy. 
We are then left with the last hypothesis. The Tribunal (rendering explicit some 
implicit or customary rule; recognizing an ongoing legal debate; or ascertaining the 
self judicial framing upon which it recognizes its own powers) prolifically addressing 
the questions on its legitimacy, i.e., at minimum, the legality of its establishment. 
Such an hypothesis might, for lack of an immediate alternative, make us realize 
that we are confronted with the first signs of evidence of an ad-hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal discourse of legitimacy. In fact the judicial function, in what 
relates to the solving of a case, does not seem to operate here, for the 
argumentation on the object of the challenges to the Tribunal's legitimacy, set 
forward by the Trial Chamber, as the Trial Decision itself recognizes, has no 
effective value to the case. Thus making it possible that the Tribunal's reasoning 
(speech), whatever the intention might be, incorporates the Tribunals 
understanding of the problem presented, i.e. a discourse on its own legitimacy. A 
statement of sort. 
An apparently lateral point, presented by the Trial Decision as context and not as 
content, could otherwise prove our last hypothesis right: on the Tribunal's need, or 
the will to proclaim, a self-legitimizing discourse. As shy as with the unnecessary 
reasoning in an already adjudicated Decision, so does the Trial Chamber search 
for references, out of the legal and into political and cultural uncertain evolution of 
the 1990s, by ways of a mere introduction to the "appropriateness" of further 
comments on the Challenge of legitimacy, almost an excuse for its unasked 
leading role (the bearer of a new International Justice?): 
"The force of criminal law draws its efficacy, in part, from the fact that it 
reflects a consensus on what is demanded of human behaviour. But it is of 
equal importance that a body that judges the criminality of this behaviour 
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should be viewed as legitimate. This is the first time that the international 
community has created a court with criminal jurisdiction. The establishment 
of the International tribunal [ICTy] has now spawned the creation of an ad-
hoc Tribunal for Rwanda. Each of these ad-hoc Tribunals represents an 
important step towards the establishment of a permanent International 
Criminal Tribunal. In this context, the Trial Chamber considers that it would 
be inappropriate to dismiss without comment the accused's contentions .. " 
(Trial Decision: 4 )253 
The aim is then, according to the Trial Chamber, to (cor)respond to context. Not an 
internal judicial case context, but rather an ongoing, unreferenced and uncertain 
evolution of International Criminal Law. A changing world in which the ICTY, 
bearing the burden of Adam, "considers that it would be inappropriate" not to share 
the knowledge, Even if unwillingly and full of caution. 
Clear is, however, that the recipient of the (ICTY) words is not the already dealt 
with causer of the case (Tadic), but rather that future messiah (ICC) already 
envisaged in the offspring (ICTR) of the messenger. 
Even though following the same order of approach to the Trial Decision as to the 
Defence Motion, as a global speech, this first particular point is the primary source 
of research, having then to be closely explored so as to objectively identify what 
can only be understood as a possible legitimacy discourse and what content it may 
reveal. An assignment which importance can be gauged even from a quantitative 
perspective, as 40 out of the 83 paragraphs, of the "Reasons for [the] Decision" in 
the Trial Decision, relate directly with the "Legitimacy of creation" of the Tribunal", 
an issue the Trial Chamber finds to lack competence to review, a deep fall after 
temptation. 
253 First half of § 6., of which the last part is quoted above. 
127 
2. The legitimacy discourse in the Trial Decision reasoning. 
2.1. The first reason presented by the Trial Chamber relates to the power of the 
UNSC to establish the ICTY. The argument is set by initially invoking the UN 
Charter, namely Article 24 (1 ),254 in ascertaining the discharging of the UNSC 
powers regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
stating that such powers are set out in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. 
The line of thought follows the teleological scope of the UNSC (maintenance of 
international peace and security) so as to find the Charter's rule(s) upon which 
such ethos converts into effective powers. Once recognized the link between duty 
and norm, in Article 24 (1) of the Charter,255 this translates into specific rules, 
Article 24 (2), on how such powers can be discharged (Chapters VI, VII, VIII and 
XII). Having been given the powers to intermediate between State and Peace, the 
Organ is vested in the hierarchy needed to act on behalf of its congregation. The 
argument thus marks out the legal norms that can be summoned by the UNSC to 
exercise the competent powers regarding peace and security, and avoiding 
references to further hypothesis, such as the need for other organs (UNGA) to be 
involved in this specific exercise of powers. 
From the frame of rules found to be able to legally back the UNSC powers, the 
Trial Chamber then states the use, in this particular case, of powers under Chapter 
VII. This broad sense in which the norms are referred to has particular aim: to 
underline the wide scope of actions able of being included in the granting of the 
254 See Appendix I. 
255 See Appendix I, our bold: "Article 24 - Functions and Powers 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." 
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respective power. The Trial Chamber affirmatively recognizes both the discretion 
granted to the UNSC, and the "few limits on the exercise" 256 of those powers. 257 
This broad discretion of powers is then taken by the Trial Chamber as a suggestion 
of non-reviewability of, in caSD, the UNSC Resolutions. In a sense, all references 
become self-contained and self-explanatory, as the greater goal of international 
Peace not only entails the surrender of the will of the States to the UNSC, but also 
justifies its broadest, unquestionable and nearly unlimited powers, contrary to the 
Defence claim for material legitimacy, 258 i.e.: 
a) by virtue of Article 24 (1) of the Charter, the States confer and recognize 
particular powers to the UNSC, for the maintenance of international peace 
and security; 
256 Despite the references made to the travaux preparatoires (quoting from the Statement of 
the Rapporteur of the Committee 111/3, Doc. 134, 111/3/3, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 785, 1945) the 
Tribunal itself asserts that "the International Tribunal was established under Chapter VII. The 
Security Council has broad discretion in exercising its authority under Chapter VII and there 
are few limits on the exercise of that power" (Trial Decision; 5). Interestingly, on the nature of 
such limits, the Trial Chamber does not affirm by itself, but rather adopts by (the same) 
quotation, the view that these limits are reduced to "the sole reserve that it should act 'in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the [United Nations].'" 
257 See Appendix I, our bold: 
"Article 24 - Functions and Powers 
( ... ) 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the 
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, 
VIII, and XI!." 
258 In the Trial hearings, after having set the ground for the ICTY to proceed with a possible 
consideration, whether in review or just by viewing, of the legality of its own establishment, 
the Defence, wishing to counter argue the Prosecution Response, denies the self-contained 
competence of the UNSC to determine its own competence. For the implications of the 
argument when later reversed unto the ICTY, and the bluntness of its presentation, we 
quote it as self-explanatory: 
"The opinion put forward implicitly in the Prosecution's argument, namely, that the 
Security Council is completely competent to determine its own competence - the 
Germans call this, as you know, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz - would render the UN 
Charter completely meaningless as a source of legal protection" (Trial hearings: 212). 
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b) these particular powers of the UNSC are directly connected with a specific 
objective: international peace and security; 
c) The particular political nature of the powers makes them unreviewable; 
d) Only when a threat to that objective is recognized (a threat to international 
peace and security) may the UNSC embody those powers; 
e) Both the condition (threat) and the cause (powers) are contained in Chapter 
VII of the Charter; 
f) The ICTY was created by virtue of those very same immaculate powers in 
Chapter VII; 
g) Even if the ICTYI had the competence to review actions of the UNSC, it 
would not be able to do so in this particular case, as the object of review 
would be a fruit of those special, unquestionable powers. 
2.2. The Trial Chamber then turns into the Defence Trial Motion arguments 
regarding the fairness of the trial as a basic human right. 259 
Although mentioning the Defence's understanding of a fair trial as a basic human 
right,260 by reference to the need for a competent, independene61 and impartial 
259 Trial Decision: 5-6. 
260 In the Trial hearings, the Defence argues that the right of the accused to challenge the 
legitimacy of the ICTY is in fact a basic human right: 
"The Tribunal's competence to judge this question ( ... ) derives, in the Defence's opinion, 
from the general principle of justice, that one of the preconditions that derives from the 
principle of justice that we have to comply with human rights is that a criminal court will 
be legitimately established.( ... ) 
Then, in the light of these guarantees to a fair trial, it is a completely legitimate Defence 
to question the origin of the jurisdiction. If the establishment of a court were to be judge 
exclusively by the founder, in this case the Security Council, the guarantee to legality 
would be devoid of all meaning. Should the judge be bound by the founder's judgment 
(and purpose) concerning the legality of the establishment, the guarantee of 
independence would be limited to a considerable degree." (Trial hearings: 197-199). 
261 The Defence proceeds finding two relevant elements of this right to the case: (i) 
"independence of the court" and (ii) "establishment of the court by law" (Trial hearings: 199): 
"The independence of the court is presented by the Defence as a precondition for a fair 
trial, but also as a legal ground for the competence of the ICTY to review the legality of 
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Tribunal established by law,262 the Trial Chamber leaps unto the statement that 
"there can be no doubt that the international tribunal should seek to provide just 
such trial".263 The fundament for such unquestionable engagement of the Tribunal 
being the "Security Council to have taken every care to ensure that a structure 
appropriate to the conduct of fair trials has been created",264 by the Statute,265 that 
the trials are in fact public and fair, and the "scrupulous regard" taken by 
themselves, Judges, in framing its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). 
There is immediately space for doubt, as the positivism of the argument might fall 
into a formal guarantee which could in turn be interpreted so as to abrogate the 
teleology of the rule. That not being the case, as per the non-subjective text of the 
norms in Article 21 of the SICTY,266 the lack of such explanation by the Trial 
Chamber on this "reason for decision", either assumes the interpreters' good-will 
towards the Tribunal understanding, or falls short of presenting a solid confirmation 
its own establishment. In this sense, the neglect to consider a plea on the legality of the 
court would amount to the denial of a fair trial by an independent judge" 
(Trial hearings: 206). 
The independence is here underlined in support of the competence to review UNSC actions. 
Although apparently circumlocutory, the lack of any other such organs with competence to 
review the constitutional lawfulness of the act of establishment, the direct operativeness of 
the principles of International Criminal Law can justify the argument especially when based 
on human rights as the Defence did by recognizing one in the right to a fair trial. 
On a wider perspective, the defence argues the possibility of the "testing" of the legitimacy of 
the ICTY against the framework of the UN Charter (Trial hearings: 214-215). 
262 Further reaffirming, now in the Trial hearings, the arguments presented in the Defence 
Brief, namely the understanding that the Tribunal's jurisdiction, as set by SICTY Article 1, 
does not limit the broadening of competence (as per RPE 73 and 91). Mr. Wladimiroff, after 
being so questioned by the presiding Judge (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald), admits that the 
competence of the ICTY to review its own legality "is not a res judicata. It is not a matter not 
to be discussed" (Trial hearings: 204). Although this specific competence "has not been 
provided with in the Statute [SICTYj. The Statute just leaves it open" (Trial hearings: 201). 
263 Trial Decision: 5. 
264 Ibid. 
265 The Trial Chamber calls, as an example, on Article 21 (Rights of the accused) of the 
SICTY as the guarantee of the accused right to a fair trial, and on Article 20 
(Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings), this so as to clarify the obligation of the 
Trial Chambers to ensure that the trial is fair. 
266 See Appendix V. 
131 
of the material fairness of the trials. Precisely the point made by the Defence in the 
arguments debate during the hearings, and here ignored by the Chamber when 
invoking the formal structure of the guarantee rather than its material contents. 
This is not however the most interesting question for now, as the summoning by 
the Trial Chamber of norms adopted by the UNSC, i.e. rules set in the SICTY, 
immediately raises the standards of interpretation towards the acts of the UNSC, 
namely its Resolutions, by which both the Tribunal was established and the Statute 
adopted, thus putting on the same footing the Law(s): Statute and establishment of 
the ICTY. 
This argumentative path, concurrent with the recognition of the Tribunal's lack of 
competence to review UNSC Resolutions, has another possible interpretation: the 
equivalence in the hierarchy of legal instruments between the Statute and the 
establishment of the ICTY, setting aside possible dissent on the nature of the 
respective "norms". A result not avoidable with the argument that both acts were 
part of the same Resolution (827),267 in fact it is common for the UNSC to approve, 
adopt or decide different matters, relating to the same issue, in a single Resolution 
(thus the usual numerous paragraphs both of considerations and of the decision of 
each Resolution). Accordingly, it might be understood that the establishment of the 
ICTy268 and the Statute can embody different institutions of International criminal 
Law. That should, at least, be the intention of the adoption of the Statute, as the 
"prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law" envisaged both by Resolution 808 and 827269 follow the prinCiple 
of nulla poena sine lege, thus referring to a crime (violation of the norm) already 
267 See Appendix IV. 
268 Arguably established by Resolution 827, as the (UNSC) decision to engage in such path, 
in exercising powers under Chapter VII, was already taken in Resolution 808. In a certain 
way the formal confirmation of the decision to establish awaited the conclusion of the 
respective legal frame, the Statute. 
269 See Appendix IV. 
132 
occurred vis-a-vis and already existing law (in the broadest sense)no In this sense 
only the jurisdiction (court) where such crimes (law) are to be prosecuted is left 
open. Other options, or even the use of more vague terms, could open the 
possibility of prosecutions by ex post facto substantive laws, a result the UNSC 
clearly avoids. 
On the contrary, the establishment of the Tribunal is, self evidently, a novelty. A 
novelty in International Criminal Law created after the crimes were committed. The 
novelty of the organ does not carry any consequence to the pre-existence of the 
norms it has to apply,271 but unlike these it can be challenged on its own 
legality/legitimacy. Even the framing of the ICTY proceedings, from the Resolutions 
to the RPE, passing the Statute, tend to assure the agreement of the novel with the 
institution, the instrument to the task, the Tribunal to the existing norms to be 
applied. Such care does not, however, preclude the novelty of the jurisdiction, if the 
criminal law is older and well established so where other national jurisdictions, 
which previously faced numerous challenges both on their legitimacy and 
jurisdiction, while this new instrument of enforcement of International Criminal Law, 
the ICTY, had yet to prove its worthiness. 
It is therefore quite limited the Trial Chamber's attempt to level the existing 
International Criminal Law that must be the core of the Statute, which at best 
operationalizes those norms, and the act of establishment of the ICTY. This 
conclusion is also backed by the Trial Chamber differentiation made in the same 
argument: 
270 The reasoning of the decision follows the argumentative path of the UNSG Report, thus 
considering that the subjective International Criminal Law to be enforced is "beyond any 
doubt part of customary law" (UNSC Report: 9). For the current purpose it is immaterial to 
know if the norm derives from natural law, Treaty or is a customary one. The essential 
feature for this argument is the pre-existence of a norm, as the condition sine qua none for 
the violation to occur, thus making it possible the qualification of a crime, without the charge 
of the biased creation of new norms the accused had no knowledge at the time the facts 
occurred. 
271 UNSG Report: 8. § 29. 
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"it is one thing for the Security Council to have taken every care to ensure that 
a structure appropriate to the conduct of fair trials has been created; it is an 
entirely different thing in any way to infer from that careful structuring that it 
was intended that the International tribunal be empowered to question the 
legality of the law which established it. The competence of the International 
tribunal is precise and narrowly defined; as described in Article 1 of its Statute" 
(Trial Decision: 5-6). 
Although the final sentence of this paragraph does appeal to the narrowness of the 
competence of the ICTy,272 the above mentioned differentiation is made within the 
same object, the Statute. The Trial Chamber's earlier identification, between the 
conditions for a fair trial and both the Statute and the RPE, makes it now 
impossible not to understand the reference to the first part of the above quotation 
as the Statute, also mentioned at the end. 
So for the Trial Chamber, both Statute and the establishment of the Tribunal seem 
to be levelled as acts of the UNSC, and the Statute's rules regarding the 
guarantees of a fair trial do not include the competence of the Tribunal to review 
UNSC Resolutions legality. 
In a way, the Trial Decision reasoning seems to be using the positivism of the norm 
to include the political act of its own establishment. The clear conclusion legitimizes 
the Tribunal (to consider its structure appropriate for a fair trial)273 and limits its 
competence (so not to have competence to review the lawfulness of the act that 
created that "appropriate" structure) by reference to one single argument: the 
equivalent legal value of the full content UNSC Resolution 827, including: UNSG 
Report, establishment of ITCY and adoption of ICTY. 
272 " ... to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, subject to spatial and temporal limits, and to do so in accordance with the Statute. That 
is the full extent of the competence of the International Tribunal" (Trial Decision: 6). See also 
Appendix V, article 1 of the SICTY. 
273 Trial Decision: 5, § 8 
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2.3. The third line of reasoning 274 is then devoted to this same theme of 
reviewability of UNSC Resolutions by the ICTY form yet another perspective. 
The Trial Chamber argues the intention of the Defence to "extend the 
competence of the International Tribunal [ICTy] to review the actions of the 
Security Council by reference to certain Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
[RPE] of the International Tribunal.,,275 
This proposed frame of reasons separates considerations on the RPE from the 
previous joint discussion of both Statute and establishment of the ICTY: yet 
another argument favouring the notion that as far as the Trial Chamber is 
concerned, Statute and establishment of the ICTY share the same legal hierarchy. 
Here the Trial Chamber limits its argumentation to the Rules mentioned in the Trial 
Motion, Rule 73 (A) (i) and Rule 91.276 
a) The first of these Rules, 73 (A) (i), is set aside by the Chamber on the 
basis that such Rule relates to challenges to the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
and not on the legality of the UNSC action (Resolution), in establishing 
the ICTY, as the Defence claims. 
This might very well be the first implicit recognition by the Tribunal that its 
legitimacy does not derive from a Rule (or Article from the Charter), a norm of 
some sort, directly related to jurisdiction. 
Such finding also involves that the body of Law which defines what might be 
jurisdiction, International Criminal Law, is not of the essence to the Tribunal's 
legitimacy (at least legitimacy of establishment). We reach such conclusion as the 
challenges of the Defence, though named at the Tribunal's jurisdiction, do include 
challenges to its legitimacy, by questioning the legality of the establishment of the 
ICTY, thus, the reason the Trial Chamber presents here derives the legitimacy of 
274 Trial Decision: 6. 
275 Ibid. 
276 See Appendix II. 
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establishment of the Tribunal from the legality of the UNSC Resolution (of a 
political nature), claiming this to be judicially unreviewable. 
Given the Trial Chamber understanding of the Motion, even after considering that 
the ICTY does not have, prima facie, explicit competence to review the legality of 
its own establishment, as argued before, we are left with the hypothesis that it 
might extend its competence from either: 
i. the analogy to inherent powers, as already exercised by the Judges in the 
RPE by extending the ICTY competence regarding false testimony (infra, 
next argument on Rule 91); or 
ii. the logical argument of need, as by having competence to exercise a 
explicitly attributed power (i.e. the power to rule on motions challenging its 
jurisdiction as per Rule 73 (a) (i) of the RPE) the organ needs the lesser 
but not explicitly conferred powers so as to effectively exercise that first 
one (i.e. the competence to review the legality of the act of establishment 
of that very same jurisdiction). 
The Trial Decision argues that the authority to investigate and rule on challenges of 
jurisdiction does not include the same "authority for engaging in an investigation, 
not into jurisdiction, but into the legality of the action of the Security Council in 
establishing the International Tribunal.,0277 Again the Chamber concludes for a self-
contained jurisdiction, as attributed by a higher power, where the jurisdiction is 
subject to challenges, but not that higher power, which thus lies beyond the 
competence of the court. As such, the legal speech indulges in the circumlocutory 
mutual legitimization of jurisdiction and Resolution, where the first has no power to 
question the second's creation of the first. 
Strange as it may seem the technical argument is quite common, it is actually a 
pre-condition for the separation of powers. However, in such cases there are 
cultural contexts of self-reconnaissance, i.e. the preconditions to view a jurisdiction 
277 Trial Decision: 6. 
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as legitimate, as the Trial Chamber itself recognizes: " ... it is of equal importance 
that a body that judges the criminality of this behaviour should be viewed as 
legitimate" (Trial Decision: 4). 
Furthermore, at least for a democratic Rule of Law abiding State, that barrier that 
keeps the Judicial from the Executive can, most, and in fact is balanced by the 
Judicial competence to investigate the abuse of powers by the Executive (checks 
and balances), a detail the ICTY misses. The lack of tradition, as of cultural 
references, might help reviewing the Trial Decision as an almost impossible 
exercise of judgment, given the political acts themselves novel and unreferenced, it 
had to take as law, yet outside the normally already established context of a pre-
existent legal order. In a sense, the lack of context, legal political and cultural, 
makes the Court overcautious on the grounds to found its judgements. 
b) The Defence argument on the second Rule, 91 of the RPE,278 is 
addressed by the Trial Chamber in a very different manner. 
As earlier mentioned, the question in discussion would be (should the Tribunal 
recognize its competence to do so) the possibility of extension of competence 
based on a case where such extension already occurs: liability to prosecution for 
false testimony under solemn declaration 279 In fact the "full extent of the 
competence of the International Tribunal" to which the Trial Chamber refers 
(Decision: 6, §8 in fine),28o does not include facts occurred outside the Former 
Yugoslavia, nor such offences as false testimony (SICTY, Articles 1 to 5), 
accordingly, when the Tribunal created its own Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it 
should also be limited by that competence as described in the Statute. By setting 
up a norm creating liability for actions committed outside the former Yugoslavia, 
the Tribunal is extending its jurisdiction as set forth in the Statute. 
278 See Appendix II. 
279 Ibid., Article 91. 
280 On a reference to Article 1 of the SICTY (see Appendix V). 
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The apparent paradox is surpassed by the Trial Chamber by claiming the "inherent 
authority of a Chamber to control its own proceedings", i.e. raising the possible 
liability for actions within the proceedings, such as a testimony. This reasoning 
concludes that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to prosecute certain crimes includes 
the jurisdiction over all of that prosecution in accordance with Article 15 of the 
SICTY. Interestingly no mention, other than the "mandate" of Article 15 of the 
SICTY, is made to a higher power (i.e. a UNSC Resolution) confirming, ratifying or 
recognising the Tribunal's own set up of the RPE. In agreement with the 
recognition of competence, the Chamber fails to affirm, or at least clarify, the 
ultimate source of its "legislative" powers on the matter. The inside containment of 
the power is laid to interpretation, as the liability referred to above, part of the 
proceedings as it may be, is still not in the mandate to prosecute given by the 
UNSC. 
Given the previous copious resourcing to the unquestionable authority of the 
UNSC actions (i.e. Resolutions), and the equivalence implicitly recognized to the 
legal value of all elements in Res. 827 (among which the Statute), it was somewhat 
expected for that argument to be mentioned here. That would be the case should 
the Trial Decision, like previously, had found the competence of the ICTY to 
"extend" its competence in the RPE in the jurisdiction conferred for such particular 
task by the UNSC, i.e. a legitimacy link for such competence to "extend" the 
jurisdiction as by the connections of all elements between the norm (Rule 91 RPE) 
and the "legislator" (UNSC)281 
The reason invoked by the Trial Chamber (its inherent authority to control its 
proceedings) seems more aimed to deny the possibility of analogy, as proposed by 
in the Motion, and less keen on standing on the grounds which already appeared 
to be constructing an, although limited, discourse of legitimacy. 
281 I.e.: UNSC .. , Action under Chapter VII of the Un Charter UNSC -, UNSC Res. 827, --+ 
UNSC Res. 827 inclusion of the Statute --> Article 15 of the Statute -, RPE --+ Article 91 
RPE. UNSC Res. 827, > UNSC Res.827 inclusion of the Statute -, Article 15 of the Statute 
-.... Creation of the RPE by the ICTY - > Article 91 of the RPE. 
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The argument itself has no direct relevance for this research, but the willingness of 
the Trial Chamber to take a well known legal instrument of interpretation, such as 
the analogy, even if to contradict its occurrence, may well show its awareness of 
lack off such references in other arguments 282 
2.4. The Trial Chamber then addresses another argument,283 claimed to be 
presented by the Defence, which is connected with references to positions of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The same final conclusion is also reached through reference to ICJ proceedings,?84 
as claimed to have been made by the Defence, i.e. the Trial Decision dismisses 
the Defence arguments. 
However, such references are not found in the Motion nor supporting Brief (see 
supra Trial Motion) Despite the Defence Trial Motion's indirect references to the 
possibility of establishment of the ICTY by a UN Charter amendment, and in this 
context a possible analogy with the ICJ provisions (Chapter XIV of the UN 
Charter), extensive and specific references to ICJ proceedings are in fact made but 
in the Prosecutor's Trial Response, which the Defence actually counter argues, 
dismissing them by differentiating the nature of both judicial bodies and claiming 
the specificity of the criminal procedure in the ICTY, against the advisory 
jurisdiction on the settlement of disputes by the ICJ. 285 
282 i.e., should, as in this argument, the Chamber had the opportunity or the context 
references to do so, it might well have recourse to these references in its reasoning. By 
embarking in circumlocutory speeches on the unreviewable righteousness of UNSC 
Resolutions establishing the ICTY, yet taking this technical perspective here, it creates a 
dissonance in the discourse. 
283 Trial Decision: 6-7. 
284 Trial Decision: 6, and references therein to ICJ proceedings: "Expel1ses ... ", "Namibia .. " 
and "Lockerbie" cases. 
285 In this context, and by the clarity of the presentation, it is worthwhile to remember Mr. 
Wladimiroff preliminary intervention, by the Defence, in the public hearing of the Motion 
(Motion Hearing, open session, Affaire IT-94-1-PT, 193-194): 
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Nevertheless the Trial Chamber references to the cited ICJ cases,286 points 
towards the conclusion that the UNSC actions are judicially unreviewable. The Trial 
Chamber reasoning being that: on the first case ("Expenses") the ICJ stated that 
there "exists no procedure for determining the validity of acts of organs of the 
United Nations,,287 (UNSC included);288 in the second case ("Namibia,,)289 the ICJ 
renewed the same statement, clarifying that such review was not within the Court's 
powers;290 and in the third ("Lockerbie"),291 although through a quotation from a 
'''the argumentation of the prosecution in its response to our motion seems to be 
founded upon principles of international law without taking into account principles of 
criminal law. 
It can do no harm to emphasise that the Tadic case is a criminal trial being heard by an 
exclusive criminal court and not a dispute between states before a court under 
international law. 
Unlike international law, where the concepts and the customs are often defined quite 
vaguely and that. clearly, are approached more from a policy and, therefore, a political 
perspective than from a legal point of view, the criminal debate is sharply demarcated by 
demands off] legality and legitimacy The Defence missed this aspect in the 
Prosecution's approach. 
Furthermore, one should realise that a Tribunal [ICTY] cannot be compared to the 
International Court of Justice. We found a lot of references in the response of the 
Prosecution to rulmgs of the international Court, but we feel that since the Tribunal, 
unlike the International Court of Justice that can only give advisory opinions and 
decisions that do not directly affect an individual and that are not enforceable against 
individuals the Tribunal can impose a punishment that may be executed against the will 
of those concerned." (Trial hearings: 193-194). 
2B6 Namely, as cited by the Chamber (Trial Decision: 10): Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Advisory Opinion of 20 July) (the "Expenses Advisory 
Opinion"); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South-west Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971, I.C.J. 
16, 45 (Advisory Opinion of 21 June) (the "Namibia Advisory Opinion"); and Questions of 
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992, I.C.J. 114, 176 (Provisional Measures Order of 
14 April) (the "Lockerbie decision"). 
2B7 It is also mentioned the reference made by the ICJ therein, to the Travaux preparatoires 
of the Charter, when proposals for such reviewing powers were rejected. 
2BB Trial Decision: 6-7. 
2B9 Trial Decision: 7, see next footnote (Trial Hearings: 213-214). 
290 For the Defence, the discharging of the ICTY duties would depend on the 
appropriateness of the measures vis-a-vis the appropriateness of the UNSC actions 
(Resolutions), quoting the Defence: 
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dissenting opinion,292 the Trial Chamber calls on a statement that further explores 
the judicial unreviewable nature of the discretion of the UNSC, both in determining 
the existence of a threat to peace and in deciding which actions to take under 
Chapter VII. 
2.5. The very brief reason under § 13 of the Trial Decision is by no means less 
important, as the Decision not only concludes that those cited cases within the 
ICJ "clearly provide no basis" for the ICTY to review UNSC Resolutions, but 
further takes those same ICJ opinions to be "authorities to the contrary". 
This latter part of the conclusion assumes an importance given to the opinions of 
the ICJ by a Criminal Tribunal that can only be understood in one of two ways: (i) 
as adopting the common law feature of the precedent; or (ii) as recognizing these 
opinions to be, at least, opinio juris. 
Either way such reason should support the absence of considerations by the ICTY 
(reasons for decision) on the merits of a challenge of legitimacy based on the 
judicial review of UNSC Resolutions. Precisely the opposite of what the Trial 
Chamber does in responding to each argument of the Defence, even after 
acknowledging its lack of competence. 
The issue here might very well be the nature, scope or intention for (international) 
judicial bodies to elaborate on a subject beyond their powers. Should this lack of 
"In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, after the Court [ICJ] had judged the basis of the 
resolution, the precise contents of the measures and their suitability was left to the 
political organ. I believe that in a case which is not of a purely international legal nature, 
as in this criminal case, what is at stake are not 'usual measures', but a special institution 
charged with the administration of criminal justice to individuals. That is quite a different 
position. 
In that case the exact determination of the contents of the measures cannot be left 
exclusively to political organs. In the case of the Tribunal [ICTY], the question centers on 
the foundation of the measure that established it. Therefore, the legal review comes 
down to the question of whether the function exercised by the tribunal fits into the United 
Nations constitutional structure." (Trial hearings: 213-214) 
291 Ibid. 
292 Judge Weeramantry dissenting opinion, but not dissenting in the object of the quotation. 
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possible judicial effects hold its grounds,293 and we might discover as an 
explanation, and predictably, the intention to create a self-legitimizing discourse, or 
at best an opinio juris from the subjece94 on the legitimacy discourse arising from 
the establisher. Whatever the intention be, self created or recognition of intelligible 
legitimacy discourse, we start to lack possibilities of interpreting the reason for this 
reasoning on a subject outside the Tribunal's competence, other than the 
affirmation of the unprecedented legitimacy discourse itself. 
2.6. The Trial Chamber then explicitly concludes295 that the Defence's submission 
envisages that the ICTY should review the actions of the UNSC. 296 
To such an end the Trial Chamber calls on "commentators,,297 so as to justify its 
agreement with the suggestion that there are limits to the authority of the Security 
Council, in particular as a consequence of, 
"Article 24 (2), which provides that the Security Council: 
shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
The specific powers appointed to the Security Council for the discharge of 
these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XIII." 
(Trial Decision: 7-8) 
293 Thus not recognizing any form of expansion of the judicial powers to include the review of 
the legality of UNSC Resolutions, e.g. by ways of precedent (a contrario sensu). 
294 In the sense of primary source. 
295 Trial Decision: 7-8. 
296 Despite the deep scope of the challenge, the Defence does not pursue the full power to 
review UNSC actions but rather the verification of the legality of the establishment of the 
ICTY. In the trial hearings a fine distinction is even presented by the Defence, referring to 
the ICJ Lockerbie case, between the viewing and reviewing: "they [ICJ] have viewed the 
matter but did not review it because there was no reason to." (Trial hearings: 208) 
Still a defence is made that the validity of the establishment (legitimacy) is "an aspect of the 
jurisdiction matter itself' (Trial hearings: 211). 
297 Namely: D. W. Bowett, The Law of internationaiinstitutions 33 (1982), and Ian Brownlie, 
The Decisions of Political Organs of the United Nations and the Rule of Law, in Essays in 
Honour of Wang Tieya 95 (1992). 
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The interpretation the Trial Chamber engages in, as far as these limits to the 
UNSC are concerned, brings out as recognizable limits the prohibition of arbitrary 
actions or the instrumentalization of the Security Council own powers "for an 
ulterior purpose" Such limits to UNSC actions (here recognized by the same Trial 
Chamber which does not consider itself competent to review UNSC actions), are 
then agued to be a consequence of the nature of the Charter. 298 The delegation of 
powers included in the Charter acts as a limit, i.e. the UNSC has, at best, the full 
extent of the powers included in the delegation by member States to the UN, 
299 
represented by the Charter. 
In a parallel discourse with the first reason presented (on the UNSC power to 
establish the ICTY) here, as there, it is already clearly established the Trial 
Chamber position on its lack of competence; here, as there, the line of thought 
follows the teleological scope of the UNSC (maintenance of international peace 
and security) only now not so as to find the Charter's rules, upon which ethos 
converts into powers, but rather the means by which such powers come into being: 
the breath of God, 300 in the form of the delegation of powers. 
Again, the argument apparently admitting limitations to the actions of the UNSC, 
can be back read to the opposite meaning, i.e., if and when acting vested on the 
powers delegated to it by the Member States, the UNSC actions are binding erga 
omnes. Or, as earlier said on that first line of reasons of the Trial Decision, having 
been given the authority to intermediate between States and Peace, the Organ is 
vested in the powers needed to act on behalf of its congregation. If, then, that 
would avoid the involvement of the UNGA, in discharging the powers under 
298 Trial Decision: 8. 
299 On a more extreme view even the exercise of those delegated powers could be, as by a 
Treaty, only valid inasmuch as in the pursue of the purposes of the Treaty itself. A double 
limitation to the widening of UNSC powers: fist contained within the delegated powers, and 
then constrained into their use only for the purposes of the Treaty. 
300 The Trial Chamber, despite recognizing those few limits (later attempted to be proven 
respected) implicitly counter argues the argument by which "the Defence contends that the 
decisions of the Security Council are not 'sacrosanct'." (Trial Decision: 7). 
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Chapter VII, here the same reasoning avoids challenges to its exercise: for if the 
UNSC is pursuing its ethos (the self-referenced maintenance of international 
peace) it has those powers and is not violating those Iimits.301 
The circumlocution can be represented in a charter: 
States UNSC 
Delegation Authority 
Powers 
--> ! 
Peace and Submission Recognition 
security (threat) i <-
2.7. After thus recognizing these limits - for the UNSC to act arbitrarily or in 
misuse of power - the Trial Chamber renews its lack of competence to review 
the actions of the UNSC,302 - leaving the interpreter with the question of who 
could review the respect for, or violation of, those limits - but proceeds to a 
review of facts so as to justify the non violation of those limits. 
The central role of the argument, both by questioning the actions of the UNSC and 
the appropriateness and legitimacy of the measure taken (i.e. the establishment of 
the ICTY), deserve the careful scrutiny of the Trial Chamber speech as, reaching 
this far in the hypothetical debate of the powers of the UNSC, it can now hardly 
avoid the abstraction of the legal debate to the concrete case. A result, proven or 
denied, most probably able to answer the questions posed in this dissertation. 
301 States -+ Delegation of Powers for -+ maintenance of international peace and security -+ 
Recognition of need to act -+ (by) -+ UNSC -+ Exercise of powers -+ (when) -+ threat to 
international peace and security -+ (for) -+ maintenance of international peace and security. 
302 Trial Decision: 16. 
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The Trial Chamber's hesitation on facing the chalienge303 does not preclude it, 
nevertheless, to start elaborating in exactly that subject (the respect for the limits to 
UNSC actions), but only as own conclusions "proper" to be presented as reasons 
for the Decision, yet not binding given its lack of competence. 
In a well intended interpretation, identifying this reasoning with what was said 
earlier about the ICJ (see supra 2.5.) we might let this note on the purpose of the 
reasoning aside for now, concentrating in the subject of the arguments presented. 
The Trial Decision pursues the verification of the respect of the UNSC for these 
above mentioned limits: arbitrariness and misuse of power. 304 
The relevance of the Decision's speech in these Reasons for Decision, both for the 
boldness of the assessments made and the expressions used to that end, deserve 
a selected reading of the primary source, as a proof of the construction of a self-
legitimizing discourse (our highlight): 
"Although it is not for this Trial Chamber to judge the reasonableness of 
the acts of the Security Council, it is without doubt that, with respect to the 
former Yugoslavia, the Security Council did not act arbitrarily. To the 
303 After explicitly questioned by the presiding judge on the appropriateness and criteria for a 
judicial review of political questions (as the recognition of a threat to peace), the Defence 
further explains its argument during the Trial hearings: 
"it will be clear that the position of the Court [ICJ] is probably such that it is not competent 
to subject the decisions of UN-organs to a constitutional review automatically, 3S 
constitutional courts in certain member-states (such as Germany) can do. But if the 
question is raised explicitly, then the Court, as we see it, can answer legal questions 
regarding the powers of UN-organs, apparently with a view to the independent 
judgement of their legality. For reasons mentioned earlier, this cannot be less so in 
criminal law" (Trial hearings: 213). 
The objective of the Defence being, having open the possibility of a judicial organ to 
consider the legality of UNSC actions (even if on a non review manner, i.e. without 
pronouncing on the merits and material options contained in the political questions, but 
limited to the legality of the exercise of powers) to highlight the special role of the ICTY as a 
subsidiary organ entrusted with the concrete application of the measures: the individual 
criminal liability. 
304 Trial Decision: 8-10 
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contrary, the Security Council's establishment of the International Tribunal 
represents its informed judgement, after great deliberation, that the 
violations of international humanitarian law were occurring in the former 
Yugoslavia and that such violations created a threat to peace." 
(Trial Decision: 8) our bold. 
The assertive manner in which the Trial Chamber describes the reasons for the 
UNSC establishment of the ICTY (Resolutions 808 and 827),305 further supported 
by the reference, on a selected analysis way, of the "careful, incremental 
approach,,306 process followed by the UNSC to that end (from Resolution 764 until 
Resolution 827),307 can be interpreted as a review of the actions of the UNSC, in 
light of the earlier mentioned limits to the exercise of its powers. 
A note must be made to the Trial Decision mentioning, within that incremental 
approach of the UNSC, of the receiving of the Experts Report, by the inherent 
adoption by the Trial Chamber, as legally established facts the findings of the 
Experts Report, as per its conclusion "that grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law had been 
committed ( ... ) including willful killing, 'ethnic cleansing', mass killings, torture, 
rape, pillage and destruction of civilian property, destruction of cultural and 
religious property and arbitrary arrests" (Trial Decision; 9). 
305 See Appendix IV. 
306 Trial Decision: 8, although by quotation references to external authorities (O'Brien, 1993: 
639-642). 
307 The Trial Decision enumerates a four-step approach by the UNSC (Trial Decision: 8-9): 
a) First by stressing the individual responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, as per Res. 764; 
b) Second, when the UNSC "publicized" that condemnation, by asking "States and 
other bodies to submit 'substantial information'" so as to consider additional 
measures, in Res. 771; 
c) Third, by the establishment of "the Commission of Experts to investigate these 
violations of international humanitarian law", by Res. 780. 
d) Fourth, by the UNSC decision (?) "that an international tribunal should be 
established", "by resolution 808" (Trial Decision; 9, § 1, in fine) and the consequent 
establishment of the ICTY in Res. 827. 
146 
This mention, in the context of a "comment" to the "accused's contentions" in the 
legality of the Tribunal (Trial Decision: 4), clearly surpasses a mere explanation for 
a judicial decision, and enters the discursive domain of justification, i.e. facts 
considered proven in a judicial criminal proceeding. The detail of this reasoning, 
known to have no legally binding effect for the accused, seems deeply committed 
in the Uudicially lateral) proof of the UNSC respect for the limits to act under 
Chapter VII, that very course of action which resulted in the (challenged) 
establishment of the ICTY. Inside the unnecessary global comments of the non-
decision, the detail of the review of facts deemed capable to prove the legality of 
UNSC actions, "[a]lthough it is not for th[e] Trial Chamber to judge the 
reasonableness of the acts of the Security Council" (see quotation above), it does 
in fact review those actions. The aimed to be proven lawfulness of these actions 
mounting to the expected basis to consider the "appropriateness" of the Tribunal 
itself. 
Willingly or not, this speech (constituting an objective review of the UNSC 
Resolutions, by a judicial organ which recognizes to have no such competence) 
focuses on the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY. 
The Trial Chamber goes as far as clarifying how this reasoning, on the respect for 
the limits to the action of the UNSC, cannot be understood (our highlighted): 
"None of the hypothetical cases which commentators have suggested as 
examples of limits on the powers of the Security Council, whether imposed 
by the terms of the Charter or general principles of international law, in 
particular, jus cogens, have any relevance to the present case. Moreover, 
even if there be such limits, that is not to say that any judicial body, let 
alone this International Tribunal, can exercise powers of judicial review to 
determine whether, in relation to an exercise by the Security Council of 
powers under Chapter VII, those limits have been exceeded." 
(Trial Decision: 9) 
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A speech that amount to the negation of the power to do what the Trial Chamber 
just did, when considering facts that might support the conclusion that the UNSC 
did not violate the limits to its powers in establishing the ICTY. To note that the 
Trial Decision is consistent with its recognized powers, and does not affirmatively 
conclude that such limits to the actions of the UNSC were not violated, it (the Trial 
Chamber) does only state so much as to conclude that the issue is of no relevance 
to the case, and that the Tribunal has no powers to review such possible violation. 
What could, then, be the purpose of that previous reasoning of the facts leading to 
the exercise of Chapter VII powers as incorporated in Res. 827? 
Could it be to consubstantiate a political opinion on the establishment of the ICTY? 
Or just to create such a discourse that, by ways of public attractiveness, could 
surpass any lack of recognizable, sound and well established references? The 
answer is never explicitly presented (other than that initial "appropriateness" of the 
comments). Yet. not as a part nor as a direct consequence of the same reasoning, 
but as an explicitly admitted additional comment, the Trial Decision considers that 
"One may add that in the present case any submission to the contrary 
[that the limits to the powers of the UNSC have not been violated] 
becomes particularly unattractive when, in the notorious 
circumstances of the former Yugoslavia, ( ... ) the Security Council has 
done no more than take the step of 'ameliorating a threat to 
international peace and security by providing for the prosecution of 
individuals who violate well-established international Law ... [something] 
best addressed by a judicial remedy'" (Trial Decision: 9), our bold. 
Such a comment cannot. as intended by the Trial Chamber, be interpreted as an 
additional commentary, not in the context, not with this content. The comment "one 
may add" is actually the one by which the Trial Decision not only reviews the acts, 
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the Resolutions, of the UNSC,30B but furthermore, draws the conclusion (though 
only after the formal caution warning of non relevancy for the case and lack of 
powers to do so) that the acts of the Security Council are a proper measure to face 
a threat to international peace and security. 
Such findings are also supported by the subsequent reasoning of the Trial 
Decision, where, indirectly answering the possible arbitrariness of the measure,309 
i.e. the establishment of the ICTY, as the Trial Chamber differentiates 
a) the sources of substantive law on its jurisdiction ratione materiae 
(subject-matter jurisdiction), as pre-existent in customary law, from 
b) the means to prosecute under such law, i.e. the way to concretise the 
existent criminal liability, as the establishment of a court. 
To then consider that that mean (establishment of the Tribunal) is not an 
"eccentric" or arbitrary measure, but rather a simple enactment of that pre-existent 
criminal liability, thus appropriate. 
Yet again given the empirical approach of the research and the consubstantiation 
of the analysis in the primary sources, it is worthwhile with the excuse of the 
needed quotation of the last sentence, to quote the paragraph in question: 
"It is not irrelevant that what the Security Council has enacted under Chapter 
VII is the creation of a tribunal whose jurisdiction is expressly confined to the 
prosecution of breaches of international humanitarian law that are beyond any 
doubt part of customary law, not the establishment of some eccentric and 
novel code of conduct or some wholly irrational criterion, such as the 
possession of white hair, as was instanced in argument by the Defence. 
Arguments based upon reductio ad absurdum may be useful to destroy a 
308 As previously done by considering the facts able to prove the non illegal use of powers 
(see the initial part of this very argument). 
309 Previously identified by the Trial Decision as a possible limits to UNSC actions under 
Chapter VII. 
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fallacious proposition but will seldom provide a firm foundation for the criterion 
of a valid one." (Trial Decision; 10), our bold. 
As a partial conclusion from this long line of argumentation, and already answering 
some of the preliminary questions of this research ,310 one might say that from this 
set of reasons presented by the Trial Chamber in its Decision we can ascertain: 
a) that the ICTY Trial Chamber does in fact address the questions of the 
legitimacy of the Tribunal, 
b) that, while doing so the Trial Decision speech seems circumlocutory and 
limited to the invocation of the non-judicial acts of creation (UNSC 
Res.827); yet 
c) Recognizes the theoretical possibility of the existence of limits to the 
actions of the UNSC, namely arbitrariness and misuse of powers; 
d) Analyzes the proceedings of the UNSC leading to the establishment of the 
ICTY (Resolution 827); 
e) Concludes that no such limits were violated by the action taken by the 
UNSC in the case, thus materially reviewing UNSC actions; and 
f) Then consider that such review Uust made) cannot be made by any judicial 
body, such as itself; 
g) Although warning for the irrelevance and non-binding character of 
comments, the speech includes conclusions that amount to a review of: 
i. UNSC powers; 
ii. UNSC determination of what is, in casu, a "threat to international 
peace and security"; and 
iii. The appropriateness of the UNSC adopted measures facing the 
situation. 
310 Although addressed in the Conclusions, a note must already be made on the irrelevance 
of the legal hierarchy between the Decisions. Even if, as later said, the fii1al word in the case 
is of the Appeals Chamber, the novelty of it all (Tribunal, Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber, 
jurisdiction and challenges) can and must overcome the very same legally self-contained 
speech and, on the contrary, affirm the cultural perspective on the questioning of the entire 
discursive process of creating, ab initio, a self-legitimizing discourse. 
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2.S. UNSC Resolutions 808 and 827, who does what? 
Interestingly, on another note, the Trial Chamber does not miss the opportunity, on 
an earlier and small play of words,311 within the particular mention to the four-step 
incremental approach of the UNSC, to retain the equal value of the decisions 
included in Res. 827: 
"Finally, on 22 February 1993, by resolution SOS, the Security Council 
decided that an international tribunal should be established and directed the 
Secretary-General to submit specific proposals for the implementation of that 
decision. On 25 May 1993, in resolution S27, the Security Council adopted 
the draft Statute and thus established the International TribunaL" 
(Trial Decision; 9), our bold. 
Unlike its usual official speech on its establishment, the ICTY, is here vague 
enough about the relation of both Resolutions with the establishment of the 
Tribunal. In fact, our initial doubts on the particularly odd systematic reference to 
Res. 808 in the ICTY Statute, as published on its website (see supra, and 
Appendix V), seem now timidly founded by the Tribunal's discourse when 
addressing its own legitimacy. 
The hesitation of the Trial Decision supports the critique to the concept that the 
ICTY was established by the UNSC in Res. 827. In fact, the contents of the UNSC 
Res. 808 were: 
"The Security Council, ( ... ) 
1. Decides that an international tribunal shall be established ( ... ); 
2. Requests (. .. ) a report ( ... ) including specific proposals ( ... ) for the effective 
and expeditious implementation of the decision contained in paragraph 1 
above ( ... )" 
311 Trial Decision: 9, § 18, in fine. 
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(UNSC, Res. 808: 2)312 
And then, 92 days later, UNSC Resolution 827 reads: 
"The Security Council, ( ... ) 
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General; [S/25704] 
2. Decides hereby to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia ( ... );" 
(UNSC, Res. 827: 2)313 
As it is now clear, even the greater legitimizing references of the ICTY, the UNSC 
Resolutions, might be pointed for not using the clearest of speeches. The decision 
in Res,. 808 can be said to include the political act of will of establishment, as it is 
only the implementation of an already taken decision which is yet to be presented 
and approved later. However, as a political organ that it is, and facing the novelty 
of the measure, the UNSC fund it useful to (re)affirm that very same will in Res, 
827, where the expression "Decides" is yet again used on the already known 
option on the measure to be implemented. 
In such an interpretation, one might consider that the establishment (as 
manifestation of political will) of the ICTY is included in Res, 808, whereby Res. 
827 only approves the ways of implementing such measure, namely by adopting its 
Statute. The issue is rather relevant given the Trial Chamber reasoning in 
conceding equal value to both the act of establishment (legitimacy of the 
establishment), and to the Statute (as conferred norms on jurisdiction), by including 
the approval of both in the same UNSC act, i.e. only in Res.827. 
If from a strictly formal legal perspective both Resolutions, as forms of acts, do 
have the same value, from a material challenge perspective (a somewhat politico-
cultural critique, as included on the Trial Motion) the prerequisites, conditions and 
.112 See Appendix IV. 
313 Ibid. 
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consequences of both decisions may differ, should they be included in the same or 
separate UNSC Resolutions. The act of establishment, as earlier confirmed, can 
be challenged on the basis of the legality of the Tribunal, whilst the Statute (without 
questioning the existence of the Tribunal itself) can find challenges to specific 
points of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
The Trial Decision discourse until now did recognize equal legal value to both 
issues, considering in its reasoning the fact that both were part of the same UNSC 
Resolution. The present hesitation may reveal the awareness of the court that both 
issues can be separately challenged, despite its continued circumlocutory speech 
on the mutual legitimizing roles of the establishment and of the Statute within the 
same higher instance by reference to a single Resolution (827). 
2.9. The independence and impartiality of the Tribunal. 314 
After closing the discussion on the respect for the limits to the actions of the UNSC, 
and therefore to the establishment of the Tribunal, the Trial Chamber turns its 
attention to the claims of possible interference by the UNSC in the judicial, criminal 
proceedings of the ICTY, and therefore in the independence of the Tribunal. 
The non-essentiality of the argument, for the purposes of this dissertation, would, 
per se recommend setting it aside, however, considering the record interest for a 
ulterior motive (a mention to a form of legitimacy of exercise, rather the of 
constitution) we will summarise its contents. 
The Trial Decision argues the comparison with national courts, subject to the 
(constitutionally established) political will if the legislator. As such, the possibility of 
national courts being abolished, though through constitutionally established and 
empowered organs, is somewhat presented as, mutatis mutandis, a non criteria for 
the arguing of the possible interference of the UNSC by its power to abolish the 
ICTY. Noteworthy the Trial Chamber recognizes such power as for the UNSC to 
314 Trial Decision: 10 and 14-15. 
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decide "the abolition of the International Tribunal, in midstream as it were, for 
wholly political reasons,,315 
Consequently, one may conclude that the Trial Chamber does reaffirm its 
recognition of the act of its establishment as a political act, thus unreviewable. 
However, in this particular case such a conclusion would yet again dissent any 
self-legitimizing discourse from the contents of that act, at least not without 
paradox. 
If, then, there is no need, and in fact no justification, for the judicial review of the 
political act (i.e., the well-established and commonly shared politico-cultural 
references are self evident), why would the ICTY engage in such review? 
The above-mentioned ulterior motive is argued much later ir the Trial Decision (§ 
32),316 and relates no so much with the possibility of UNSC interference, but with 
the ab initio independence and impartiality of the ICTY. 
The challenge is that the UNSC, while a political organ, cannot create an 
independent and impartial criminal court. Once again the Trial Chamber calls on 
national sovereignty for the comparison, as "criminal courts worldwide are the 
creations of legislatures, eminently political bodies".317 On its own, such 
argumentative path could, if reversed, amount to the Trial Chamber's conclusion 
that the UNSC is a legislative organ. This question finds even more support given 
the example summoned by the Trial Decision, now regarding the UN organs (the 
ICJ Effects case):318 
315 Trial Decision: 10. 
316 Trial Decision: 14-15. 
317 Trial Decision: 14. 
318 As earlier mentioned by the Prosecutor's Response, "Effect of Awards" case, 1945, I.C.J. 
Advisory Opinion of 13 July. 
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"The Court (ICJ), ( ... ), specifically held that a political organ of the United 
Nations - in that case, the General Assembly - could and had created 'an 
independent and truly judicial body'." (Trial Decision: 14) 
The misfortunate example of the Trial Chamber further highlights the possible 
confrontation of UNSC and UNGA powers, a question by which the 
representativeness of sovereignties may question, if not the Executive, at least the 
legislative powers of the UNSC. The case is so that it is precisely one of the 
contentions of the Defence (the possible need for the involvement of the UNGA on 
the establishment of the ICTY), which is presented as an authority for the 
acceptance of the establishment of the Tribunal by a political organ, but just not 
quite the same one. 
Apparently the Trial Decision does not consider it important to present more 
arguments on the matter, at least as far as its establishment is concerned. On the 
contrary, a whole new perspective is offered on the assessment of the 
independence and impartiality of the ICTY, when the Trial Chamber connects such 
assessment more with the practice than with the act of establishment: 
"The question whether a court is independent and impartial depends not upon 
the body that creates it but upon its constitution, its judges and the way in 
which they function. The International Tribunal has, as its Statute and Rules 
attest, been constituted so as to ensure a fair trail to an accused and it is to be 
hoped that the way its Judges administer their jurisdiction will leave no room 
for complaints about lack of impartiality or want of independence." 
(Trial Decision: 14-15) 
Such reasoning opens the possibility for considerations of legitimacy of exercise, at 
the loss of the initial guarantee of legitimacy of title. If, on a national level context, 
there are cases where a (legally) illegitimate taking of power (coup, revolution) 
may, and in many cases does, lead to a legitimacy of exercise, those cases are 
appraised on the light of their fast tracking into constitutional normality and the 
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Rule of Law. Summoning, even inherently, such possibility in the international 
arena, especially in respect of a criminal jurisdiction, is the opposite of that path 
towards "constitutional normality" and Rule of Law. 
For the purpose of the current research, it amounts to consider that the legitimacy 
discourse of the ICTY opens the possibility of illegal establishment, with a posterior 
legalization of the (already imposed) jurisdiction. From that perspective, either the 
ICTY might still be illegitimate, or the legitimacy of the UNSC use of powers is only 
assessable by its exercise, i.e. they are initially unlimited (which would contradict 
further reasoning by the same Trial Decision on: the delegation of powers by 
States; and the concurrent limits to UNSC actions, even under Chapter VII, namely 
the respect for the Principles and Purposes of the Charter), and only "reviewable" 
by the effective success of the measure taken to achieve the determined goals. 
The discursive argument is, therefore, paradoxical, unless within a politico-cultural 
context where such a priori limits constitute a communal reference. A cultural 
context framing never to be referred by the Trial Decision. 
2.10. On the "establishment by law." 
Systematically immediately after this last "ulterior" reasoning on the independence 
of the Tribunal (and therefore her considered, within context)319 the Trial Decision 
addresses the Defence's contention that the ICTY was not established by law. On 
the invocation of the International Convention on the Protection of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), an approach similar to a previous one (see supra 
Reasons for Decision review: 2.2, pp. 129-133, on the human rights), 320 the 
Defence claims the unlawful prosecution of the accused. 
According to the subject of this research, but also followed by the Trial Chamber, it 
is not the question of the respect for the "right" of the accused out the concept of 
319 Although not following the enumeration of the Trial Decision. As both lines of reasoning 
on the independence are separated by 4 pages (p. 10, § 20 and p. 14-15, § 32). 
320 And the mentions in the footnotes therein to the Trial hearings (supra pp.129-133). 
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the "tribunal established by law" which is questioned, vis-a-vis that Convention. If, 
on the one hand, the question addresses the UNSC powers (both the respect for 
that Convention in the discharging if those powers, and the "legislative" nature of 
the establishment of the ICTY), it also questions the pre-existence of the Tribunal. 
The first question is referred, in the Trial Decision, to that particular reasoning 
already made on the powers of the UNSC. 321 But the second is sharply contended 
with the rejection of proposals, at the time the Convention was being drafted, so as 
to substitute the reference to a "tribunal established by law" (Article 14 of the 
ICCPR), by a reference to a "pre-established" tribunal. Beyond the contention's 
cutting reasoning, the Trial Decision does note, in favour of its own legitimacy, that 
all that is required is for a "tribunal to be legally constituted". 
At play, for the legitimacy discourse construction, is the relation between 
sUbstantial law, i.e. the International Criminal Law, and the judicial structure, i.e. 
jurisdiction of prosecution, of those already established liabilities. In separating the 
two the Trial Decision's discourse makes the ICTY's legitimacy independent of any 
previous Law, but indelibly dependant on the legitimacy of the UNSC act of 
establishment (for the review of which it does not recognise competence). 
2.11. Returning to the systematic framing of the Reasons for the Decision 
(yet directly connected with the here previous reason reviewed) a 
central argument in the legitimacy discourse is made, as the Trial 
Decision turns to the legality of the establishment of the ICTY by 
explicitly reviewing the fulfilment of the concepts mentioned in the 
proper procedure, i.e., the verification of the existence of the facts 
needed for the UNSC to be empowered to establish the ICTY (a legal 
formal review of UNSC Res.7). 
321 Here reviewed in 2.1., 2.6. and, partially in 2.7. 
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Given the interconnection of the issues reviewed under this line of reasoning, we 
must consider them under a single review322 The Trial Decision, on a string of 
considerations, starts by addressing the formal procedure then passing on to 
characterize the novelty, or not, of the measures and finally excluding the 
possibility of considering a review of the appropriateness of those measures. At no 
time, though, do this considerations fall out of the self-contained legal concepts, 
into a political or its socio-cultural context. 
Initially the Trial Decision reaffirms the circumlocution of the exercise of UNSC 
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter so as to ground the legal establishment of 
the court. The by now well known argument being that: 
a) The Security Council found of the violations of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) in the former Yugoslavia; 
b) The UNSC considered those violations to constitute a threat to 
peace; 
c) Consequently the UNSC acted under Article 39 of the Charter;323 
d) Thus acting under Chapter VII; 
e) The UNSC had, then, to chose to take a measure "to maintain or 
restore international peace and security" (Article 41 or 42, or both); 
f) That measure was the establishment of the ICTY. 
322 Trial Decision: 10-11 the three arguments made under three paragraphs (21-23) all 
point towards a Trial Chamber review of the procedure, interpretation and limits to the UNSC 
act of establishment of the ICTY. 
323 Article 39 opens Chapter VII of the Charter, empowering the UNSC to act either with 
military or non military measures, see Appendix I. 
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After such traditional legal speech, the Trial Chamber found it useful to stress that 
the objective of the measure taken was to "contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace". A dialogical link, between act and effect: the violated IHL 
(as threat), give rise to the ICTY, aimed at (restore peace by) prosecuting those 
violations. 
The now finally obvious gap in this particular discourse is whether that measure is 
"appropriate" for its objective, as if it is not, a limit to UNSC actions324 was 
disrespected, namely an arbitrary use or even the misuse of powers. 
The immediate question for the interpreter is on which grounds for those 
considerations, how, regardless of the political or judicial nature of the assessment, 
to consider the appropriateness of a measure towards its goal? Can a measure be 
considered appropriate regardless of the cultural context it is aimed at? Is the 
threat to peace of (un)revenged crimes equal regardless of place, religion and 
culture? 
The Trial Chamber immediately avoids these questions, by passing such 
responsibility to the UNSC. First when stressing that it was the Security Council 
that considered that "in the 'particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia' the 
establishment of the International Tribunal would contribute to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace,,325 Second, by considering that the action itself was not 
new, but only the means: "the course it took was novel only in the means adopted 
but not in the object sought to be attained". 326 
To consider the actions of the UNSC for the restoration and maintenance of peace, 
and even within these those involving IHL concerns, as a single course of action is, 
at the very least, a rhetorical argument. As we know it was not simply the decision 
to adopt measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace that had been 
324 As those previously considered limits to UNSC actions under Chapter VII. 
325 Trial Decision: 10, also quoting UNSC Res. 827 (see Appendix IV). 
326 Idem. 
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questioned, much more important (in particular given the context of the judicial 
proceedings at hand) was the novelty of the criminal judicial institution established 
as measure. On a judicial challenge to the legitimacy of the ICTY such reasoning is 
completely off-topic, with the exception of a finding of previous judicial measures 
with the same origin and purpose, i.e. measures of the UNSC under Chapter VII. 
Apparently disconnected from the rhetoric involved (when considering the ICTY a 
"not new" course of action of the UNSC) the "object to be attained", counter 
intuitively for the interpreter, is not the "restoration and maintenance of peace" but 
addressing IHL issues. The slight self-denial (as the legal speech so far would stop 
on the use of Chapter VII powers), points to the base of the invocation of powers, 
i.e. the politically determined substance of the "Threat": the violation of 
International Humanitarian Law. The detour from the previous containment has a 
purpose: the circumlocution on the novelty of the actions of the UNSC. Well 
beyond straight forward legal basis and discourse regarding the establishment of 
Tribunals, the Trial Chamber finds that: 
"The Security Council has on a number of occasions addressed humanitarian 
law issues in the context of threats to the peace, has called upon States to 
comply with obligations imposed by humanitarian law and has on occasion 
taken steps to ensure such compliance." (Trial Decision: 10) 
The Trial Decision then tries to reinforce the argument by naming examples, none 
of which, as easily presumed, the establishment of a Criminal Tribunal. Not really 
none, between the examples presented there is in fact one other International 
Criminal Tribunal, the one for Rwanda, an offspring, of sorts, from the ICTY 
itself.327 
327 The examples given are: 
"It has done so, for example, in relation to Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and 1966, 
South Africa in 1977, Lebanon on a number of occasions in the 1980's, Iran and 
Iraq in 1987, Iraq again in 1991, Haiti and Somalia in 1993 and, of course, Rwanda 
in 1994, In the last of these, the establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal by the 
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Although it was already known that no such example prior to the establishment of 
the ICTY could be given, the argumentative path followed here can only be 
understood as an attempt to equalize completely different measures based only in 
two facts: that those measures were taken by the UNSC for the restoration or 
maintenance of peace; and that they addressed international humanitarian law. 
Precisely the point of doubt reached above on the reasonableness of considering 
that the UNSC action was not new, but only the means. 
Preventing newly arising questions, on the nature of the threats and the 
appropriateness of the measures, the Trial Decision then returns to the safe haven 
of the non-judiciable nature of the concepts it was so ostensive in extensively use: 
the nature of the threat Uust previously identified as arising from an issue of IHL); 
and the appropriateness of the measure Uust undifferentiated from any other with 
addressing that sort of threat). 
The Decision here affirms the reasons as to why the contents of those concepts 
cannot by reviewed: 
"( ... ) a judgement as to whether there was such an emergency in the former 
Yugoslavia as would justify the setting up of the International Tribunal under 
Chapter VII ( ... ) is certainly not a justiciable issue but one involving 
considerations of high policy and of a political nature. As to whether the 
particular measure of establishing the International Tribunal is, in fact, likely to 
be conductive to the restoration of peace and security is, again, pre-eminently 
a matter for the Security Council and for it alone and no judicial body, 
certainly not this Trial chamber, can or should review that step." 
(Trial Decision: 11), our bold. 
security Council followed its findings that the conflict there involved violations of 
humanitarian law and was a threat to the peace." 
(Trial Decision: 10-11) 
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This full string of arguments, self referential as they are, show and thus seem to 
prove our initial questions. First as they do address the legitimacy of the Tribunal, 
both when identifying it with as enforcement measure of the UNSC, under Chapter 
VII powers addressing IHL, and then when attempting to compare it to other such 
measures. Second as they review (here not the actions but) the powers of the 
UNSC, when considering the enactment of those powers beyond judicial review, 
namely for their political nature. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber integrates in its 
discourse a tentative ruling: that "no judicial body ( ... ) can or should review" the 
appropriateness of UNSC measures. 
2.12. On a different string of arguments, the Trial Decision presents its 
reasoning on the validity of the UNSC Resolution. 328 
Summarizing the circumlocutory and self-referential legitimacy discourse, the Trial 
Chamber states that despite the fact that, ultimately, the legitimacy of the 
(establishment of) the ICTY depends upon the UNSC consideration on the 
existence of a threat to peace, such consideration is fact-based. 
A statement which made it materially possible to be scrutinized by the review of 
those facts, however, the Chamber dismisses such possibility by arguing that those 
very facts are of a political nature. The discourse becomes illogical, as either the 
UNSC determination of a threat is fact-based and thus verifiable, or it is based on 
political considerations and, as per the establishment of an imposable jurisdiction, 
translates into constitutional powers. This last option, apparently consistent with 
the reasoning on the States' delegation of powers to the UNSC, would actually 
imply the consequent limitations or submission: the UNSC could only act inasmuch 
as the States allow, or the States would render (and not just partially delegate) 
their sovereignty to the UNSC. 
328 Trial Decision: 11. These arguments are presented under the consideration, by the Trial 
Chamber of the concept of non-justiciability. 
162 
The argument enters an unsurpassable option without contradiction, a tension 
present even in the Decision quotations or authorities: 
"The validity of the decision of the Security Council to establish the 
International Tribunal rests on its finding that the events in the former 
Yugoslavia constituted a threat to the peace. This finding is necessarily fact-
based and raises political, non-judiciable issues. ( ... ) such decision 'entails a 
factual and political judgement and not a legal one'. (The Lockerbie decision 
at 176) ( ... ) 'a threat to international peace and security is not a fixed 
standard which can be easily and automatically applied'. (David L. Johnson, 
( ... )). The factual and political nature of an Article 39 determination ( ... ) makes 
it inherently inappropriate for any review by this Trial Chamber." 
(Trial Decision: 11), our bold. 
The breach in the apparently self-contained discourse is clearly the consideration 
of the concept of facts. If those facts regarding the determination of a threat to 
peace are political, that reference would be enough for the legal discourse, thus 
abstaining from any mention to the material context as assessed by the UNSC. But 
the Trial Chamber, by making references and even arguing throughout this 
reasons for decision some of those material facts, enters the domain of 
uncertainty, as these later are not possible to be considered without a politico-
cultural context. 
We can then confirm the tension of the discourse, when it swivels between fact and 
norm, i.e. between the self-referential legal speeches, proper of a community 
shared politico-cultural context, and the need for partial consideration of a 
worldview as per the absence of such pre-established and accepted references, as 
is the case of this novel jurisdiction. 
That much seems also to be inherent to the Trial Decision reasoning when, in 
contradiction with the examples given in the last string of arguments (so as to 
attempt to prove the lack of novelty of the UNSC action) contradicts the Defence's 
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claim of lack of consistency (by the UNS), with the argument that "the International 
Tribunal is the first of its kind to be created".329 Furthermore claiming, unlike then, 
that such novelty "cannot in itself be of any relevance in determining the legality of 
its (the UNSC's) action in this case." 
The until now only apparent contradiction becomes proven, at least regarding the 
establishment of the ICTY: as a novelty, thus needing a specific legitimacy 
discourse; or just as another measure of the same kind as (previous) others. The 
Trial Decision passes the hesitation into irreconcilable inconsistency. 
Intrinsic to the difficulty the Trial Chamber faces is the lack of shared politico-
cultural references, for if the full span of powers of the UNSC were already well 
known, or were there such culturally implicit limitations of power, such difficulty 
would be surpassed precisely by that shared understanding of references. The 
elsewhere self-evident truths are here unframed questions on the legitimacy of 
powers and their exercise. 
2.13. On the inclusion of a judicial body in the measures of Article 41 of the 
Charter. 33o 
Besides the legal debate331 on the nature of the listed measures in Article 41 
(either exhaustive or merely exemplificatory) the most relevant issue for the 
purpose of this research are the Trial Chamber considerations on why the 
establishment of the ICTY is not excluded from the provisions of this Article. 
The Trial Decision, as usual, reaffirms the "wide powers" of the UNSC under 
Chapter VII, but reversing the approach. The Trial Chamber embarks on 
reasoning, not on why the ICTY is included, but rather that it is not excluded from 
329 Trial Decision: 12. 
330 Trial Decision: 12-13. 
331 Idem, although the general opinio juris affirmatively concludes for its non-exhaustive 
nature, the general character of the measures listed (of an economic and political nature) 
can find contentions that measures of no other kind are contemplated in the Article. 
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Article 41. Forgetting (or not so much) the already established non-judiciable 
reviewability of political considerations, the wording of the Trial Decision is 
illustrative of the tension of the (un)shared politico-cultural references, completely 
abandoning a political stand-off, impartial, position leaping into preconceptions as 
established references: 
"( ... ) no good reason has been advanced why Article 41 should be read as 
excluding the step, very appropriate in the circumstances, of creation the 
International Tribunal to deal with the notorious situation existing in the 
former Yugoslavia. This is a situation clearly suited to adjudication by a 
tribunal ( ... ). This is not, as the Defence puts it, a question of the Security 
Council doing anything it likes, it is a seemingly entirely appropriate reaction 
to a situation in which international peace is clearly endangered." 
(Trial Decision: 12), our bold. 
More interestingly, this primary source of research textually confirms, by the 
presumed references on the basis of its conclusions, its review of concepts and 
considerations already stated as of a political nature, i.e. the material review of 
UNSC actions (Resolutions). 
Concepts and considerations directly connected with the actions of the UNSC, as 
the qualification of "the circumstances" and the threat by which "international peace 
is clearly endangered" are, as earlier stated in the same discourse "pre-eminently a 
matter for the Security Council and for it alone and no judicial body, certainly not 
this Trial chamber, can or should review that step".332 
Deepening the already proven contradiction in the last line of arguments 
presented, the Trial Decision renews it by contending (now regarding the 
appropriateness of the ICTY as a measure under Article 41 to restore peace) with 
332 Trial Decision: 11. 
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the novelty of the Tribunal so as to consider "premature at this initial stage,,333 any 
assessment of the effectiveness of the measure for its aim. 334 
Although inherently still questioning its competence to review this appropriateness 
of the measure vis-a-vis the threat, the sheer consideration of the initial stage of 
functioning as impeditive for the assessment, opens the material possibility that in 
the (then) future, now past, facts could, at least from that discursive path, make 
such a review possible. An argument which indicates (from a non-binding 
perspective, but aiming to build an opinio juris) that such a review of the 
appropriateness of measures adopted by the UNSC is materially possible. 
This conclusion is yet again confirmed when, now referring to the then present 
"premature stage", the 
"Trial Chamber agrees that due to the nature of the conflict, an adjudicatory 
body is a particularly appropriate measure to achieve lasting peace in the 
former Yugoslavia" (Trial Decision: 14), our bold. 
2.14. On the Tribunal as subsidiary organ of the UNSC. 
As for the Defence's contention that a judicial body could not be a subsidiary 
organ, as per Article 29 of the Charter (see Appendix I), the Trial Decision's 
reasoning is threefold: 
a) Regarding the claim that a Tribunal could not be an additional body, the Trial 
Chamber claims that "Article 29 is expressed in the broadest of terms and 
333 Trial Decision: 13. 
334 The Trial Decision does, however, mention references to support the UNSC 
consideration of the ICTY as a measure which would help in the restoration of peace: (i) the 
possible deterrent effect (by reference to the records of the discussions of the UNSC on 
both Res. 808 and 827,); and (ii) the possible assistance effect, by the example given to the 
whole region, and the defusing of tensions (by reference to some States' statements on the 
matter and a commentator - in casu, Meron (1993: 122, 134)). 
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nothing appears to limits its scope to non-judicial organs.,,335 An argument that 
overlooks the nature of the organ (as envisaged by the Defence) to restrain 
the consideration of the question to the formal legalistic interpretation of the 
norm. 
It is true that the norm may have an ample content, but it is the missing 
context that allows the interpreter, given his politico-cultural references, to 
consider, or not, inherent limits to that norm. For example, should a national 
Executive establish, as its own subsidiary organ, a "private" jurisdiction (thus 
outside the Judiciary, in a regime of separation of powers and Rule of Law) 
and such action would, or could, be considered as illegitimate, a misuse, if not 
an abuse, of powers. Mutatis mutandis, and given the Trial Decision 
proclaimed limits to UNSC actions, even under Chapter VII, there are 
constitutional contexts where such establishment might be considered 
inappropriate. 
In refusing this considerations, even if only arguendo, the Trial Decision 
makes it clear the intentional lack of culturally contextualized references, upon 
which to form opinions and considerations. 
b) Yet another independent reasoning is presented by the formal legal, but now 
more systematic, interpretation. The Trial Decision implicitly dismisses the 
question by referring that the ICTY "as the Statute of the International Tribunal 
declares In its opening paragraph,,336 was not created under Chapter VI,337 as 
per the summoned Article 29, but under Chapter VII of the Charter. The 
argument implies that Chapter VII, as special norms, are generally above 
eventual limitations of the Charter. However the mentioned exception in Article 
24 (2) (the respect for the Principles and Purposes of the Charter) already 
admitted by the Trial Chamber, would have equal value as Article 29 is in the 
same Chapter V. The legal speech apparently hesitates in the justification for 
335 Trial Decision: 15. 
336 Idem. 
337 Although Chapter VI is mentioned in the Trial Decision, it refers in fact to Chapter V. 
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not considering the inherent concepts, and limits, to the positivism of the 
adopted approach. 
c) Finally, by renewing the reference to the ICJ Effects case, the Trial Decision 
contends that 
"if the General Assembly has the authority to create a subsidiary 
judicial body, then surely the Security Council can create such a 
body in the exercise of its wide discretion to act under Chapter VIi." 
(Trial Decision: 16) 
Besides the point of the criminal jurisdiction (that truly a novelty) the renewal 
of the reference to that particular case, instead of founding the legitimacy of 
the ICTY, questions the lack of involvement of the UNGA. 
2.15. On the UNSC "indirect imposition of criminal liability upon individuals". 338 
The Trial Decision speech here is more internally coherent, although maybe 
because the creation of a jurisdiction is not in itself part of the reasoning. The case 
is made for the legitimacy of the UNSC to act upon individuals, leaving the judicial 
measure to a secondary debate. 
According to the central logic of the argument, the UNSC conclusion is that the 
threat to peace in consideration arises from violations of IHL (thus crimes) 
perpetrated by individuals, making it consequently needed for the UNSC actions to 
affect that threat, and those individuals. 
Despite this rather straightforward logical argument, the Trial Chamber decided to 
introduce two disruptive mentions to the reasoning: 
a) The appropriateness and necessity of such UNSC action upon individuals 
"through the International Tribunal". As such characterizing the concrete 
measure adopted (as mean to act upon individuals) i.e. the establishment of 
the ICTY. The added comment is, for our research, another proof of the 
338 Trial Decision: 16. 
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ICTY review of the appropriateness of the actions of the UNSC - and one 
which by its contents, and considering its recognition of lack of competence, 
translates an improper self-legitimizing discourse. 
b) The case of the sanctions imposed upon Libya, by UNSC Resolutions 731 
and 748, seeking the extradition of suspects of the Lockerbie bombing. In 
the argument the Trial Chamber's reference to the "mandatory commercial 
and diplomatic sanctions" although rightfully considered as being "in 
substance, acting upon individuals" are the exact opposite of the measure 
here questioned. 
As is known, the purpose of the UNSC actions, even if aimed to try those 
individuals, was not to create an international jurisdiction (or prosecution), 
but conversely to restate the due respect for national jurisdictions, namely 
the "right" of the United Kingdom jurisdiction to prosecute and trial the 
accused. The example could well be put forward by the Defence, in 
particular when considering the primacy issue, but also as a challenge to the 
appropriateness of the measure in question: the establishment of the ICTY. 
2.16. Jus de non evocando or the surrender of sovereignty? 
Facing the question on this legal principle, under which an accused should not be 
tried by "some special tribunal set up for that particular purpose,,339 (as in the ICTY) 
the Trial Decision, as far as the legitimacy is concerned,340 is here two-fold: 
a) The reasoning starts by implicitly contesting the universal character of the 
principle. It would therefore be applicable in some States, but not to the UN. 
Although a lesser and not explored argument of the Decision, the question is 
quite pertinent for this research, for as, if the Trial Chamber says, this 
339 Trial Decision: 16. 
340 In this paragraph the Trial Decision also mentions the applicability of the same reasoning 
towards its conclusions on primacy (not here considered for its lateral role in the legitimacy 
discourse). The Decision also raises the question, without concluding any answer, of the 
dubious standing (locus standi) of the accused to raise a question on sovereignty. 
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principle is (only) "a feature of a number of national constitutions", then the 
politico-cultural context of the norm is admitted to be central for its 
interpretation. 
Conversely, only globally accepted legal norms can be viewed as 
internationally legitimate. Given the previous argumentation towards the 
identification of the act of establishment of the ICTY with a legislative act, the 
creation of the Tribunal, i.e. UNSC Res. 827, would have to translate a 
similar acceptance. 
b) The main argument, though, is that the principle has no application to the 
case. A conclusion the Trial Decision reaches by returning to a self-
referential legal speech. The argument is set that, by the exception 
contained in Article 2 (7) 341 0f the Charter (in fine), actions under Chapter VII 
imply a "surrender of sovereignty" by member States. A surrender the Trial 
Chamber considers well established by the adoption of the Charter, namely 
including that mentioned exception. 
This is the missing link between the discursive mentions to the UNSC and 
this very organ's origin of power. Mentioned on a less direct challenge to 
both the ICTY and the UNSC powers, it remains, nonetheless, a part of the 
Trial Decision discourse clearly pointing to the supra-national, rather than 
inter-national, character of at least some powers of the UNSC. 
2.17. The reasons for the not involvement of the UN General Assembly. 
Ostensibly ignoring the point raised, on the possibility that the establishment of the 
ICTY by the UNGA might be convalidated by the representativeness of the organ, 
the Trial Decision limits its review of the question to the possibility of amendment of 
the Charter. The political contextual resemblance of the UNGA with a 
representative political organ, as of the UNSC with an Executive one, is overlooked 
both as a non-reference, and as a circumlocutory speech of self reference. 
341 See Appendix I. 
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The Trial Chamber starts by appearing to understand the issue only from a legal 
procedural perspective, namely by claiming that "the submission ( ... ) can only have 
any meaning if what is suggested is ( ... ) an amendment of the Charter". As it is 
clear from the beginning (Trial Motion), the very legitimacy of the exercise of 
powers by UN organs is confronted with their nature and character, as one of 
acceptance, by States, or one of imposition, by the UNSC. In between lies the 
representative nature of the UNGA, a context here forgotten in favour of a legalistic 
discourse. 
Furthermore, stepping up to the self legitimization, the Trial Decision considers 
other options to itself (now restricted to an amendment of the Charter) as 
"unnecessary, as it is impractical as a measure appropriate by way of a response 
to the current situation in the former Yugoslavia" .342 Reasons with a strong appeal 
to the reviewability of the "appropriateness" of UNSC measure, but also, when 
considering a given context ("the current situation in the former Yugoslavia"), the 
possible judicial review of the UNSC determination of a threat to peace and 
security, for if the "situation" is considered by the Tribunal, it implies its valuation, 
as here expressly stated. 
2.18. Restating case conclusions so as not to pronounce on legitimacy.343 
"The foregoing disposes of the various submissions of the Defence so far as 
they relate to the legality of the creation of the International tribunal, 
submissions to which the Trial Chamber felt it proper to refer since the Defence 
raised them but, many of which, as stated above, it does not regard as properly 
open for consideration by this Trial Chamber since they go, not so much to its 
342 Trial Decision: 17. 
343 Ibid. Note: the argument immediately before this conclusion of reasons on the legitimacy 
challenge, faces the claim on the disadvantage for the accused of not being tried (in the 
already initiated proceedings) in Germany. Briefly, it relates to the possibility, under German 
Law, to have yet another instance of recourse - the Human rights Committee. Considering, 
as the Trial Decision does, that such question does not relate to a challenge on the ICTY 
legitimacy, it is not here included. 
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jurisdiction, as to the unreviewable lawfulness of the actions of the Security 
Council." (Trial Decision: 17) 
As concluding remarks on the legitimacy challenge, the Trial Decision, yet again, 
takes refuge in the legalistic consideration of competence, regardless of the 
politico-cultural references, able to give context, and thus meaning to the norms. 
Section V - The Appeal Chamber Decision 
Since the Appeal's Decision - ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 02 October 1995, 
hereinafter Appeal Decision - reviews most of the argumentation present in the 
Trial Decision on the same matter, we will privilege the novelties or argumentation 
changes in the established position of the Tribunal, i.e. the final Decision, as put 
forward in the Appeal Decision,344 in what is more directly connected with the 
subject of our research: the legitimacy discourse. 
Assured that the framing of the legal questions posed is already reviewed in 
previous Chapters, that is, when extensively reviewing the initial materials (Trail 
Motion, Trial Response and USA brief), we can now focus more carefully on only 
those new arguments on legitimacy, on a close and careful analysis of the 
discourse in question. 
Even though a latere, it might be worth noting that the presiding judge was A. 
Cassesse, accompanied by four others: Li, Deschenes, Abi-Saab and Sidhwa. All 
of the latter felt the need to further publicise their view on the passing of such 
judgement, therefore appending separate opinions (Li, Abi-Saab and Sidhwa) and 
a declaration (Deschenes), A. Cassesse, on the contrary, kept his renowned opinio 
juris work. 
The Appeal Decision itself encompasses four separate decisions: 
a) Decision on the competence on legality, votes: 4 to 1, Li against; 
344 The singular is used for the purpose of clarifying this specific Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber. 
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b) Decision to dismiss the (legality) plea, votes: Unanimous; 
c) Decision to dismiss the challenge on the primacy of the ICTY, votes: 
Unanimous; 
d) Decision that the ICTY has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, votes: 4 to 
1, Sidhwa against. 
The Appeal Chamber was presented with the, already know at Trial level, Defence 
Motion challenging the legitimacy (formally the jurisdiction) of the Tribunal to 
prosecute the (Tadic) case. By keeping the exact same challenges the Appeal had 
to be based on a legal questioning of the Trial Decision, consequently the 
Defence's alleged "error of law on the part of the Trial Chamber,,345 as a resource 
to pass on to Appeal all the challenges presented at Trial: 
a) Illegal foundation of the Tribunal, as legitimacy of establishment; 
b) Wrongful primacy of the Tribunal over national courts; 
c) Lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
However, as the Appeal of interlocutory motions are only admissible if challenging 
the jurisdiction, it was contested as to whether that first challenge was properly on 
jurisdiction or (as it is) on legitimacy, thus opening the legal normative discourse to 
questioning the validity of the Appeal Motion. 346 That was the contents of the fourth 
decision in the Appeal Decision, yet in fact the first. 
345 Appeal Decision: 1. For clarity and consistency, references will privilege its mentioning in 
the Appeal Decision, whereby the Appeal Chamber does, at times, rephrases the reference 
made, such is, e.g. the case here as the Appeal Motion reads: "by error of judgment on the 
relevant questions of law" (Appeal Motion: 2),or case (IT-94-1-AR72) p. 5423. Still for the 
above-mentioned reason, we will follow the Appeal Decision's wording and reference. 
346 i.e., an interlocutory motion is not the trail, but a previous contention. So as not to admit 
the indefinite deferral, or procrastination, of the trial itself, many are the limitations, in most 
legal orders, to the admission of Appeals on interlocutory motions. However, the dismissal of 
one of these motions on the grounds of lack of competence, or regarding the tribunal's 
jurisdiction, is widely considered to be a needed exception - as its non hearing would allow 
for the trial to proceed, only for later to be found that there was no jurisdiction to begin the 
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In respect of the last two challenges, it is now evident that they are of secondary 
importance to this thesis, which is also the case with this new question on the 
admission of the Appeal. Such must, in fact, be our conclusion, as otherwise it 
would mean an unwilling new entanglement within the legalistic discourse, when it 
is clear that: the ICTY Appeal Chamber separates both questions; the new 
jurisdiction review is in fact a procedural issue, here only relevant, if stopping the 
main challenge, which it does not; and only if denied competence, would the 
question become relevant. 
1. Reasons for the Appeal Chamber Decision on the illegal establishment of 
the Tribunal 
Unlike the Trial Decision, where arguments are, at times, scattered throughout the 
reasoning process,347 the Appeal Decision follows a much more systematic 
structure, by addressing each line or argumentation on a self-contained set of 
alleged reasons. A structure also adopted in this current review, namely: 
1.1. Meaning of Jurisdiction. 
1.2. Admissibility of Plea based on the invalidity of the establishment of the 
International Tribunal. 
1.3. The issue of constitutionality. 
1.1. Meaning of Jurisdiction. 
This shorter reasoning contradicts the Trial Decision concept of jurisdiction by 
enlarging its scope but also, and much more relevant for this thesis, by reference 
to the politico-cultural context so as to interpret the concept. 
At stake is the Trial Chamber decision to disqualify, and not dismiss, the challenge, 
when considering that the legitimacy of the establishment of the ICTY was beyond 
Trial in the first place. As such, here only relevant if denying the Appeal Chamber of 
pronouncing on the legitimacy issue itself, which is not the case. 
347 See above, e.g. (9) and (11) of our previous Section. 
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a challenge on jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Appeal Decision argues that such 
interpretation misunderstands jurisdiction as competence instead of power. This 
argument, as here explored, sUbstantiates the first appeal of the ICTY discourse to 
external references and departs from the normativism adopted before. It is not so 
much the legal definition which interests us the most, but the contextual framing of 
the issue, reinforced by the affirmation of politico-cultural references: 
"jurisdiction is not merely an ambit or sphere (better described in this case 
as 'competence'); it is basically - as is visible from the Latin origin of the 
word itself, jurisdictio - a legal power, hence necessarily a legitimate 
power, 'to state the law' (dire Ie droit) within this ambit, in an 
authoritative and final manner. 
This is the meaning which it carries in all legal systems. Thus, 
historically, in common law ... ,,348 (Appeal Decision: 5), our bold. 
So as to make it clear the full extent of the needed references in the ICTY, for the 
interpretation of the concept, the Appeal Decision confronts the conditions and 
context of national and international Tribunals. According to the Decision, those 
first may ("perhaps,,)349 work with that other narrower concept of jurisdiction on: 
"an integrated judicial system operating an orderly division of labour 
among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or components of 
jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or vested in one of them but 
not the others" (Appeal Decision: 6), our bold. 
The International Tribunals' context is presented, conversely, both as one where 
"every tribunal is a self contained system", and as a consequence of the lacking of 
"a centralized structure" 350 in International Law. This more than explicit context 
driven interpretation, calls on the very superstructure of, or lack of, International 
348 To note, for future reference, the meaning of the expression "competence", as here used 
by the Appeal Decision. 
349 Appeal Decision: 6. 
350 Idem. 
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Law so as to point out the need effectively to bring the transcendent into the 
situated, the norm to its context of application. Inherent in this discourse is also the 
consideration for the international Judiciary to be aware of the lack, limitation or 
multi-polarity, of the other traditional powers (Executive and Legislative). 
These contextual references permitted the Appeal Decision, now referring 
exclusively to International Tribunals, to ascertain the hierarchical primacy of the 
judicial character (and the power therein) of these organs over any limitations from 
the principle of legality, i.e. these Tribunals are not confined to apply the law as it 
exists. They must be first and foremost, judicial in character before considering any 
such limits: 
"the constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can limit some of its 
jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent to which such limitation does 
not jeopardize its 'judicial character"'. (Appeal Decision: 6) 
Returning to the case under appeal, the Decision explains why such context 
implies the admissibility of a challenge to the ICTY legitimacy, as that (Trial 
Chamber's) narrow concept of jurisdiction (of the positivism of the jurisdiction-
creating norm, i.e., Res. 827 and the SICTY) needs a higher and legitimate judicial 
power to apply it. To this end the Appeal Decision considers the challenge to the 
legitimacy of the ICTY, as preliminary to any other jurisdictional challenges. 
1.2. Admissibility of Plea based on the invalidity of the establishment of the 
International Tribunal. 
Following the claim from the Prosecutor,351 the Appeal Decision subdivides this 
reasoning into questioning the existence of the ICTY jurisdiction, on the one hand, 
and questioning whether the case sub judice amounts to a political, non-judiciable 
issue, on the other. 
351 Appeal Decision (6), in reference to the Trial Response (10-14). 
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a) Does the International tribunal have jurisdiction?352 
As we already know (despite Judge Us dissenting opinion, see infra) the Appeal 
Decision considers that it does. The reasoning by which it reaches such 
conclusion, although apparently consistent with the previous line of 
argumentation,353 reaches far beyond, and in fact in the opposite direction, of the 
Trial Decision. Keeping that contextual interpretation, it so auspiciously was 
following, the distinction now made, between incidental and primary jurisdiction, 
counter-intuitively gives a primary role to the first. 
According to the Appeals Chamber the primary, original or substantive jurisdiction 
strictly adopted by the Trial Chamber is more limited, as this one, yes, depends on 
the provision of norms (the intrinsically current positivism from acts of 
establishment) while the second, inherent, or should we even say immanent, is 
already, as a characteristic (condition and power) of the very judicial character of 
the organ: Tribunal. As such, the Appeals Chamber claims this latter's pre-
existence and having not to be created, could by the contrary be limited: contrary 
to the primary jurisdiction, which is only what it is, as created; whereby the primary 
jurisdiction begins to exist, through a positive act, the incidental one is or might be 
limited, as a positivist constriction on a pre-existing power. 
Major among the powers included in the incidental jurisdiction is, as per the 
Appeals Chamber decision and the politico-cultural references made in support, 
the Tribunal's power to determine its own competence: 
"This power, known as the principle of 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz' in German or 
'Ia competence de la competence' in French, is part, and indeed a major part, 
of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal, 
352 Appeal Decision: 7. 
353 The argument made on the "special" nature of the judicial bodies created by UN organs 
is, for the purpose of this thesis, besides the point (Appeal Decision: 7). It is so though, only 
inasmuch as the underlining conceptual frame is exactly the same as the here reviewed: the 
primacy of the "Character" of the international judiciary, and its inherent powers. 
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consisting of its 'jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction'. It is a necessary 
component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need to be 
expressly provided for in the constitutive documents ... " 
(Appeal Decision: 8), our bold. 
This otherwise welcomed external references are now apparently shifting towards 
not only a self-legitimizing, but also a self-empowering discourse. A question the 
interpreter does not have time to formulate, as the Appeals Chamber proceeds on 
claiming that this principle is "not merely a power" is in fact the exercise of a duty, 
"the first obligation of the Court ( ... ) is to ascertain its own competence". 354 In a 
sense the opposition of a certain idealism (of perpetual peace? of world legal 
order?) contradicting the sceptic positivism, yet self-preserving normativism, of the 
previous Decision, now not inherently, under review. 
We do however note the contradiction to the meaning of the expression 
"competence" here and when earlier addressing the meaning of jurisdiction (see 
footnote to the first quotation in 1). Also to note the possible confrontation of 
meaning through translation, by the contextually selective approach of the Appeal 
Decision: as per the English "Jurisdiction" becoming the meaning of the translation 
of the French "competence" or the German "Kompetenz". 
We do not argue the correct interpretation of a legally shared meaning by different 
translations; rather, the previous politico-cultural references of the Appeal Decision 
are proven to go beyond the legalistic self-contained discourse, even that which 
(international in nature) is sectional, or sectarian, in character. Or is it? The current 
reasoning, logical as it flows, is narrowing the context of where to borrow 
references from, and if the worldview is wider, the legal context does appear to be 
hermeneutically more limited. 
The return to the Law is then proven (although somewhat more from Natural Law 
and thus less positive, with the empowerment, of sorts, of the judges directly by jus 
354 Appeal Decision (8), on quoting Judge Cordova (1956, I.C.J. Reps., 77, 163). 
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cogens, without the intermediation of (hetero )representations), as the Appeal 
Decision, bowing to the possibility of limitation of such powers, states that it can 
only happen positively. Further contending that such a formal act, "an express 
provision",355 may have two sources: the arbitration agreement, thus outside the 
legal hierarchy established or yet to be established; or in the "constitutive 
instruments". The contention, limiting the limiting possibilities, is yet again 
conditional as, for the Appeals Chamber, those constitutive acts of establishment, 
would in turn be limited to limit this competence, i.e. inherent jurisdiction, by 
respecting the judicial character, and independence, of the Tribunals. In the ICTY, 
and for the clarification of any non-legalistic contextual interpretations, it affirms: 
"as no such limitative text appears in the Statute of the International Tribunal, 
the International Tribunal can and indeed has to exercise its 'competence de la 
competence' and examine the jurisdictional plea of the Defence, in order to 
ascertain its jurisdiction to hear the case on the merits." (Appeal Decision: 9) 
The Decision closes this particular argument on jurisdiction with an incidental 
approach to a later argument (on the nature and reviewability of UNSC acts) 
contending that the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction does not make the ICTY 
into a constitutional body, nor is it for this Tribunal to review UNSC actions, but it is, 
under the discharging of these inherent powers, for the same ICTY, to "examine 
the legality of its establishment by the Security Council", 356 although "solely for the 
purpose of ascertaining its own 'primary' jurisdiction". One thing and its opposite 
and, yet again, in relation. In relation, as the Decision (not entirely capable of 
surpassing the paradox) has found not a frontier, a limit,357 where two natures 
meet, but an overlapping where the same act is duty and prohibition. 
355 Appeals Decision: 9. 
356 Appeal Decision: 9. 
357 As did Judge Li, see infra separate opinion. 
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The tension is only partially defused, still unresolved, by weighing the discretion of 
the UNSC against the "competence" of the ICTY, the wider the first, the narrower 
the second. A warning of sorts? 
b) Is the question at issue political and as such non-justiciable? 
On a very short reasoning, of half a page, the Appeals Chamber dismisses the 
non-judiciable nature of the issue for being a "political question". Although turning, 
as the Trial Chamber before, to the safe-haven of self-referenced legal speech, 
namely by both quoting, in adoption, and arguing, in support, with ICJ cases,358 the 
Appeal Decision still envisages, unsuccessfully, external references: in this 
particular argument, via the mentioning of the historical acceptance, and more 
contemporary obsolescence. Not convincingly, for the key issue of the judicial 
reviewability of political acts, it is however noteworthy the subjective speech 
adopted (and inverted commas in disputable concepts like "sovereignty" or 
"national honour") by means of which the Decision apparently wants to remain 
open to historical, political, and also judicial references: 
''The doctrines of 'political questions' and 'non-justiciable disputes' are 
remnants of the reservations of 'sovereignty', 'national honour', etc. in very old 
arbitration treaties. They have receded from the horizon of contemporary 
international law, except for the occasional invocation of the 'political question' 
argument before the International Court of Justice in advisory proceedings, 
very rarely, in contentious proceedings as well." (Appeal Decision, 11) 
The self-evident point of subjective use of references, e.g. the unshared world view 
of concepts of "sovereignty" of "national honour" are highlighted here by the 
confrontation with a detachment from the "old" and "rare", eccentric? Not quite. It is 
taken (at face value) as eminent (contemporary) truth, able to found the three-line 
conclusion dismissing that the ICTY could be "barred from examination of the 
358 Appeal Decision: 10-11, and the references therein to the ICJ "Expenses" case and 
subsequent Advisory opinion. 
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Defence plea by the so-called 'political' or 'non-justiciable' nature of the issue it 
raises",359 nothing more that the legality, and legitimacy, of the prerequisites for the 
establishment of the ICTY itself. 
1.3. The issue of constitutionality. 
The Appeal Decision aggregates under this heading all the argumentation 
regarding the limits of the powers of the UNSC, namely when acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter. At odds, as the reader know by now, are the concepts of "threat 
to peace and security" so as to justify the use of powers under Chapter VII, but 
also the appropriateness, is such characteristic is needed given the wide discretion 
of the UNSC, of the measures chosen, in particular the ICTY possible contribution 
for the restoration or maintenance of peace. 
Despite the Appeal Decision structure, followed so far, the various arguments in 
this same "issue" justify a separate enumeration for this particular review. 
a) The power of the UNSC to invoke Chapter VII 
Despite the possible path of external references in this broad, rather subjective, 
issue of considering what is a threat to international peace and security (and one is 
aware of the careful systematic characterization of the "situations justifying resort 
to the powers provided for in Chapter VII", 360 of lesser value for this research) the 
Appeals Chamber keeps most of the Trial Chamber line of argumentation. 
A self-referential normativism, as per the references to the Articles of the Charter, 
is broken only twice. 
Once to input the political framework of the UN, regarding the issue of the non-
unlimited powers of the UNSC, to retrieve the already known three arguments: the 
"very wide" discretion of actions under Article 39; the due respect for the Purposes 
359 Appeal Decision: 11 
360 Appeal Decision: 14, and the references therein to "threat to peace", "breach of peace" 
and "act of aggression" 
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and Principles of the Charter; and, although from a somewhat more global, UN 
institutionally centred perspective, "the limits of the jurisdiction of the 
Organization",361 a novel way of referring to the delegation/surrender of sovereignty 
by member States. 
And then, yet without ever deciding for a characterization (and thus formally 
avoiding a material review), to include facts from the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. 362 The reference, though, is to the existence of "a" conflict, surpassing, 
by alternative reaching the same result, the opportunity to review the UNSC 
determination of a threat to peace. The result is achieved by return to logical, yet 
legalistic and self-centred, argumentation, for as there was a conflict, it was either: 
international, and able to justify the UNSC determination of a "breach of peace", 
thus invoking Chapter VII; or internal and could be characterized as a "threat to 
peace" with the same result. 
b) The range of measures envisaged under Chapter VII 
The issue is not reviewed by the Appeal Decision in any new argumentation. Other 
than the invocation of the Charter's norms, proper to legitimize the use of powers, 
the Appeals Chamber enters the circumlocution where the linking concept between 
norms has no external context, but the "wide margin of discretion" in the measures 
adopted. 363 
In this particular case, and given the discursive path of the Appeal Decision so far, 
the reader might well expect, at the very least, the listing of other possible 
measures the epigraph suggest. The lack thereof constitutes a great flaw in the 
Decision discourse, not only for that normativism, but for the loss of internal 
contextual logic. 
c) The establishment of the ICTY as a measure under Chapter VII. 
361 Appeal Decision: 13. 
362 Appeal Decision: 14. 
363 Appeal Decision: 15. 
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Yet again the Appeal Decision closes its discourse around the pre-announced and 
self-referential concepts, without any politico-cultural reference. One would think, 
having such impetus for that initial consideration of the "character" of the Judiciary 
as by the references therein, at least now, regarding its own establishment, and the 
necessary basis of a legitimacy discourse, that the Appeals Chamber would 
extensively cross-reference norms-concepts-facts-contexts. 
On the contrary the speech centres on the repeatedly referenced legal argument 
that the UNSC "has a very wide margin of discretion under Article 39 to choose the 
appropriate course of action and to evaluate the suitability of the measures 
chosen".364 
d) What article, of Chapter VII, serves as basis for the ICTY? 
After extensively arguing the unfittingness of the ICTY in Articles 40 (as the ICTY is 
not meant as provisional measure) and 42 (for it obviously is of a non-military 
nature), the Appeal Decision faces the contention of the non-inclusion of the ICTY 
in Article 41 both for "non-intended" and for the economic and political nature of the 
examples given in the Article. Additionally the question of whether these (Article 
41) measures are necessarily to be imposed by Members States, and not the UN 
itself, was raised. 
Dismissing the first of these claims with the same argument as the Trial Chamber 
(the exemplifying nature of the listing of measures, thus rendering it impossible to 
ascertain any "intention" of specific measures), the Appeal Decision loses an 
opportunity to list, at least, new examples of non-ordinary measures the UNSC 
had, or theoretically could take under this norm. Such an exercise, worthy of a 
"self-contained legal system", could live up to build upon the difficult task of 
representing commonly shared references or elevate the debate on the matter. 
364 Appeal Decision: 16. 
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In an attempted escape from the self contained legal speech, the effort made in the 
"literal analysis,,365 is limited to the sectioning of the prescriptions of the Article, i.e. 
the singularization of the contents of the norms; in no way adding to the much 
needed pursue of external contexts, while debating specific arguments, so as to 
gradually build up a context frame capable of supporting an equally singularized 
discourse of legitimacy. 
e) Can the UNSC establish a subsidiary judicial organ? 
Rather than the issue, the Appeal Decision faces its questioning. Claiming the 
untenableness of the claim for a "fundamental misunderstanding of the 
constitutional set-up of the Charter".366 For the sole purpose of proving the lack of 
external, contextualized, cultural or political references (as the UNSC functioning 
structure is addressed from a legal, procedural, perspective), we can point out that 
in this reasoning the Appeals Chamber's only novelty is to consider that the UNSC 
in the discharging of its own functions (towards the maintenance of peace) does 
not have to have the powers of the subsidiary organs it creates. These are 
understood by the Appeals Chamber to be instrumental for the exercise of a 
"principal function of maintenance of peace and security,,367 
The examples given, though referentially reassuring, keep the internally contained 
speech: the setting up, by the UNGA of military forces, thus proving beyond doubt 
the possibility of an organ (UNGA) without a specific power (military) to create 
instrumental, subsidiary, organs with such (military) powers. 
f) Was the establishment of the Tribunal an appropriate measure? 
Our already known claim against the "appropriateness" of the measure (i.e. the 
ICTY as measure to promote peace) is addressed in the Appeal Decision by 
adoption of the Trial Decision's main argument but denying its conclusions. 
365 Appeal Decision: 18. 
366 Idem. 
367 Appeal Decision: 19. 
184 
On the one hand the Appeals Chamber confirms that "Article 39 leaves the choice 
of means and their evaluation to the Security Council",368 further (re)stating that the 
UNSC "enjoys wide discretionary powers in this regard". 
Interestingly, the reasoning goes on to contend that: 
"it would be a total misconception of what are the criteria of legality and validity 
in law to test the legality of such measures ex post facto by their success or 
failure to achieve their ends" (Appeal Decision, 19) 
Although laying the argument for its evaluation facing the peace and security 
situation in the former Yugoslavia, still this reasoning denies, even if for an ulterior 
motive and purpose, the Trial Chamber claim on the legitimacy of exercise when 
reviewing the Defence's argument on the independence of the ICTY. 
Nonetheless the Appeal Decision conclusion here, in the argument of the 
appropriateness of the measure, seems much more directed towards the next one: 
"for the aforementioned reasons, the Appeals Chamber considers that the 
International Tribunal has been lawfully established as a measure under 
Chapter VII of the Charter." (Appeal Decision), our bold. 
1.4. Was the establishment of the ICTY contrary to the Principle "established 
by law"? 
As just quoted, the Appeals Chamber had already answered the question 
beforehand, however, keeping its will to address the challenge and its claims, the 
Appeals Chamber does review this particular one by stating, and reasoning on, the 
possible meaning of the expression "established by law". 369 
368 Idem. 
369 Appeal Decision: 20-24, to further note that the main argument presented by the Defence 
was based on the provisions of the ICCPR (see above, Sections VI and IX). 
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After quoting not only the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but 
also the European Convention on Human Rights and the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the Appeal Decision claims not to be satisfied, i.e. not convinced, 
that these instruments apply to the ICTY, the underlining argument being twofold: 
The conventions, as signed by States, would not apply per se to an 
international organization such as the UN; and 
The goal of the conventions, being identified on a national context with 
preventing an Executive discretion in the administration of Justice, does 
not apply to the UN, given the lack of definition of the traditional (national) 
separation of powers. 
Interestingly, the two arguments when, as here, read together can easily be 
misinterpreted as opening the possibility for the UN to be above the law (of 
conventions) and not abiding by the principle of separation of powers. If the first 
conclusion is set aside by another reasoning of the Appeals Chamber, this last one 
is not, as is clearly stated: 
"it is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of powers which 
is largely followed in most municipal systems does not apply to the 
international setting, nor, more specifically, to the setting of an international 
organization such as the United Nations. Among the principal organs of the 
United Nations the divisions between judicial, executive and legislative 
functions are not clear cut ( ... ) There is, however, no legislature, in the world 
community. That is to say, there exists no corporate organ formally empowered 
to enact laws directly binding on international legal subjects." 
(Appeal Decision: 21), our bold. 
The autonomous and self-contained system earlier envisaged by the Appeals 
Chamber to describe International Tribunals is here again called upon to exonerate 
the UN (with all of its organs) from compliance with the highest standards of the 
Rule of Law. Although the final conclusion does not maintain this possibility de 
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facto, it does so for another set of reasons, thus keeping this argument. For the 
purpose of this thesis, one has to note that: 
The Appeals Chamber does review the powers of UN organs; 
Characterizing them, if only negatively; and 
Supports the interpretation that the "world community", i.e. the UN, is not 
limited by international conventions. 
Returning to the main argument of the Appeal Decision, it proposes three possible 
meanings to content of the expression Tribunal "established by law": 
a) Established by a legislature 
Although mentioning the European Convention on Human Rights, as favouring this 
interpretation,370 the Appeals Chamber dismisses the application of this meaning, 
as proposed by the Defence, as a "mere executive order". The reason (reviewed 
above) is that such meaning implies a guarantee against Executive discretion in a 
system of separation of powers, a feature the UN structure lacks. 
b) Established by a body with power to take binding decisions 
To this possible other meaning, the Appeals Chamber compares such a non-
parliamentary organ with the UNSC "when, acting under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, it makes decisions binding by virtue of Article 25".371 
Contending the argument that the UN, lacking the separation of powers and 
therefore a proper Legislature, could not have established the ICTY, at least 
without amending the Charter, the Appeal Decision concludes that, on the contrary, 
the UNSC is in fact empowered to do so. The argument being that such power is 
legitimate when the UNSC is acting pursuant to an authority found within its 
constitution, i.e. Chapter VII of the Charter, "in the light of its determination that 
370 Appeal Decision: 21. 
371 Appeal Decision: 22. 
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there exists a threat to the peace". Such reasoning, parting from a possible 
application of general principles, concedes with the self-referential procedural 
explanation which allows the UNSC to determine the conditions (threat to peace) to 
be vested in special powers (Chapter VII). 
The underlined circumlocutory legitimacy is then tentatively justified with the 
argument of the support of the UNGA, as "representative organ", to the 
establishment of the ICTY. An argument directly in contradiction with the prior 
dismissal of the application of national concepts of structures power (i.e. the 
existence of a Legislature). In this sense the Appeal Decision misses the external 
politico-cultural references to explain the meaning of the argument. 
c) Established in accordance with the rule of law 
Not conSidering the formal legitimacy of creation, but rather the contents (leaving it 
to be known if implying an ex post assessment of legitimacy of exercise), the 
Appeal Decision takes up the above-mentioned norms from conventions, and 
endorses an interpretation that the principle of a Tribunal "established by law" 
means, in International Law, a principle rather than a positive norm. As such, it is 
not that any conventional norm applies to the ICTY on the matter, but, so as to 
respect this principle: 
"it must be established in accordance with the proper international 
standards; it must provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice, .::tnd 
even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized 
human rights instruments." (Appeal Decision: 22-23), our bold. 
The reference to "proper international standards" and "internationally recognized" 
was a promising prelude for the possibility of grounding the transcendence of the 
"norm" by reference to specific context(s). However, not really backtracking, but 
rather reinforcing its periodical return to the safe-haven of the legalistic 
circumlocution (i.e. the singularity unity of itself), the Appeals Chamber, as the Trial 
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Chamber, recognizes itself in the requirements of the principle (fairness, justice, 
and even-handedness) and limits the external recognition to the norm (as 
"internationally recognized" are the "human rights instruments" and not the "human 
rights" themselves). 372 
To such end, at which we too are arriving, the Appeal Decision calls only, in self-
sufficiency, upon the norms of its Statute, and of the RPE (as established by the 
judges themselves), to conclude - as we do by agreeing with the Tribunal's vision 
of International Tribunals as "self-contained systems" (it regarding the authorities to 
respect, us regarding the references of a discourse of legitimacy): 
"In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber finds that the International Tribunal 
has been established in accordance with the appropriate procedures under 
the United Nations Charter and provides ali the necessary safeguards of a 
fair trial. It is thus 'established by law'." (Appeal Decision: 24) 
2. Separate opinion(s) 
The Appeal Decision includes three separate opinions appended (Judges Li, Abi-
Saab and Sidhwa) and a declaration (Judge Deschenes).373 Again, considering its 
relevance for the object of the research, the argumentation on the questions of 
legitimacy in the official discourse of the Tribunal, we cannot but take into 
consideration that facing those four challenges, the Appeal Decision was, on the 
issue of legitimacy, unanimous. Thus rendering beyond secondary for this thesis 
the arguments included in those separate opinions, even when addressing that 
very question of legitimacy. 
372 Appeal Decision 23-24. Noteworthy are the mentions to the Human Rights Committee 
(as per the ICCPR), which, on another context (primacy), was envisaged by the Defence as 
a guarantee of appeal, if in trail in Germany, and denied by the ICTY. 
373 Judge Deschenes declaration focuses in the usage of both official languages of the 
Tribunal (English and French), and the disadvantages inherent to its non-observance. As it 
does not include any comment on the object of the Appeal Decision (but rather in the "risk" 
for French speaking jurists "while awaiting an official text to which they are entitled") it will 
not be included in the current research. 
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Despite this conclusion, one cannot ignore that the first question (only presented 
before the Appeal Chamber) on the jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber to hear the 
Appeal, may in one of the cases hold its grounds for a reinterpretation of the vote 
on the second challenge (on the legitimacy of Tribunal). Such was the case of 
Judge Li, as by voting against the decision "that the International Tribunal is 
empowered to pronounce upon the plea challenging the legality of the 
establishment"374 of the ICTY, made it necessary for his vote (in favour, as all the 
others) to be reinterpreted on dismissing the plea on the legitimacy of the ICTY. 
2.1. Judge Haopei Li separate opinion.375 
Judge Li presented his disagreement with the Decision on three legal questions: 
a) Examination of the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal; 
b) Subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Article 3 of the SICTY; 
c) Characterization of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 
On the legality of the establishment of the ICTY, Judge Li argues that the 
"Kompetenz-kompetenz" does not allow the Tribunal to consider any legal 
challenge to the UNSC Res. which establishes it. The key point being that the 
"jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction" stops just before the legislative 
power, i.e., the ICTY can review and draw up the boundaries of its jurisdiction as 
derived from such instruments that lay beyond its review. 
In such case, the ICTY could only scrutinize and decide on the jurisdiction it may 
pass judgement on, according to a given instrument. So, even though the ICTY 
would have competence to say what was in the Res. and Statute, it could never 
question, nor for that matter even consider, the legality of such instrument. 
374 Appeal Decision: 75. 
375 Li opinion: 2. The reasoning on the legitimacy is limited to the two first paragraphs of the 
cited page. Although the Li opinion goes on in reasoning on the subject-matter jurisdiction 
and on characterization of the conflict, such argumentation, will not be here reviewed as is 
beyond the point of our research. 
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In certain legal traditions this argument can be referred to those cases where the 
legality of the norm has a special jurisdiction, there a court can determine which 
laws to apply, or even which legal body is included within its jurisdiction, but any 
challenge to those norms is reviewed as an appeal, ab initio, therefore outside that 
court's jurisdiction. A legality challenge would obstacle to the appreciation of the 
case before the court until a decision is reached in another instance. Other 
traditions give the (first instance) court the possibility Uurisdiction) to review such 
challenges, even when the decisions are subject to appeal. 
A very interesting note by Judge Li refers to the establishment of the ICTY "by 
resolution BOB", a statement which could contradict other views of the Tribunal, 
when affirming its establishment under Res. B27. 
In a parallel line of argumentation, Judge Li dismisses the possibility of the ICTY to 
review the "political question" of whether the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was 
indeed a threat to international peace and security (thus reinforcing his first 
argument by taking its full theoretical consequences): if the Tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction over the UNSC Resolutions, then such a review would be improper. 
However, Judge Li carries on considering the implications of such jurisdiction 
limitation (on UNSC Resolutions) and considers, from a strictly legal, or rather 
jurisdictional, point of view that the ICTY lack of competence to review the 
Resolution which established it, was by itself cause for dismissing the appeal. The 
solution would be a negative review of competence, similar to the Trial Decision. 
In conclusion, the argument is that without competence over the legality of the 
Resolution, the Tribunal could not engage in the review of the legality of its own 
establishment. 
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CHAPTER IV - CONCLUSIONS 
What then by way of conclusion? To draw succinct lessons from what is, in the 
end, an invitation to look critically, and in a cultural and ever political context, at a 
notoriously, indeed, deliberately, over-complicated set of legalistic disputations, 
would be inadvisable. 
However, as the structure and organization of this thesis have shown, the Dusko 
Tadic case has been used as, and can fairly claimed to be, symptomatic and 
emblematic. Symptomatic of certain problematic legal processes; emblematic of 
the sadly un-admitted, even if tacitly recognized, morass wherein and whereby 
legal discourses become inexorably enmeshed with the cultural pressures of 
vested political interests. 
What can be said, at least, in summary, of the various aspects of the Tadic case 
as, of necessity, presented in this thesis? 
In the first Section of Chapter I the reader is invited to ponder on how to approach 
such an elusive subject as the discourse of self-legitimacy. Not the legitimacy itself, 
nor its theoretical debates, not even its perceived, and shared, consistency within a 
community, but its representation by, and on, a particular international judicial 
context. 
In Section II of the same Chapter, the issues raised concerned the multitUde of 
objects from where to limit the subject within the international criminal judiciary, 
their singularity - via, unlike others in the international stage, its direct 
consequences upon individuals - and the relation, and relevance, between them. 
In the last Section of Chapter I, what was problematized were the chosen criteria of 
relevance, testing, already in practice, the ground for delimiting the focus of our 
analysis. A task pursued both with the objectiveness of the observation of facts 
(the chronological perspective) and the careful scrutiny of the more challenging 
examples. 
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In the beginning of the second Chapter we have examined the stage (ICTY), its 
frame structure and self representation, where the case to be reviewed occurred. 
An assignment proven to present as many doubts as answers, yet capable of 
opening the research to the external context of that particular institution: from the 
international political environment under its creation to the perceived relevance 
given by ICTY to a particular public representation. 
In the second Section of the same Chapter, the key concern was to establish a 
solid ground to the context previously described. Already in a legal context, it was 
not only the nature of the norms setting the boundaries of our case study which 
was made explicit, but also the why and when such a legal framework was 
established. 
In the first Section of Chapter III, in the dense legal context of the case-study, at 
stake was the reviewing of the Dusko Tadic Defence's interlocutory Motion on 
jurisdiction. The legitimacy challenge, as effectively posed before the ICTY, and in 
responding to which the tribunal would have to look itself in the mirror. 
In Section II of the same Chapter, the validity of the challenge was subjected to 
rigorous analysis, both by considering, but furthermore by reviewing, the 
Prosecutor's answer to the Motion of the Defence, its discourse and implications. 
In Section III of Chapter III, echoing concerns raised on several previous 
occasions, an external input, the USA Brief, as amicus curiae, was also reviewed, 
not just so as to consider all filed material of the case, as we did, but also 
broadening the spectrum of possible references upon which the discourse of 
legitimacy could have had been built. 
In Section IV of the same Chapter, and by now in a manner familiar to the reader, 
serious concerns arose regarding the capability of the ICTY to construct the, 
claimed, discourse of self-legitimization. Here, at the review of the first Decision, at 
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the Trial Chambers, a pattern started to emerge, a certain willingness for outreach 
yet an incapability of incorporating such external references. 
Finally, in Section V, the whole question, in retrospect, of the validity, standing and 
eventual justifiability of the discourses legally deployed is raised as an issue that 
could never be other than culturally saturated. Nonetheless, and thus, a failure of 
coherence can now be acknowledged, and conceded, to be the inevitable 
(organizing) principle of a patchwork quilt of interfering discourses. 
The willingness of the Appeals Chamber to engage in external references, as 
contextual interpretation, rather than opening the legalistic discourse, has proven it 
still incapable, at least in the absence of a "centralized structure", of constructing a 
commonly shared, an internally coherent legitimacy discourse. 
In a way, the Trial Chamber says that it lacks not only the competence, but also the 
capacity (locus standi) to review UNSC Resolutions, such being the consequence 
of the strictly self-contained and self-referential discourses adopted in the Trial 
Decision. Or does it? The occasional temptation firmly to ground its conclusions in 
an open field of references, as was, for example, the reasoning around the 
applicability of the legal technical instrument of "analogy", as presented by the 
Defence (regarding Article 91 of the RPE), seems to lay bare the lack of other such 
well-established grounds for legitimacy when addressing the more central 
arguments of the challenge. 
The Appeal Chamber, on the contrary, implicitly recognizes the "right" (as locus 
standi - i.e. capacity), but. .. just missing the competence. In order to pass 
judgement it seems to be limited to the procedural confirmation of UNSC powers; 
or of the verification of the de facto conditions, as pre-requisites, for such powers? 
It thereby avoids any judicial (binding) decision on the matter, however, as proven 
in the review of the Appeal Decision, the "appropriateness" to consider arguments 
(be they binding or otherwise) passes from Trial to Appeal Chambers, as an 
urgency of self-legitimization. 
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Already aware of the need to seek solid grounds, the uncommon "world 
jurisdiction" aspired to by the Tribunal, does refer to external, that is, extra-legal, 
concepts, yet, it is still incapable, in itself, of building upon these. It further misses 
the "world view" of cross-cultural references and consequences, thus proceeding 
on its own a lumine matus. 
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APPENDIX 1- THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Relevant or mentioned rules376 
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends. 
Article 2 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, 
shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members. 
376 Our highlight, passim. 
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2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits 
resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed 
by them in accordance with the present Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it 
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving 
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive 
or enforcement action. 
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the 
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
( ... ) 
CHAPTER IV: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
( ... ) 
Article 10 - Functions and powers. 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope 
of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs 
provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
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make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Councilor to both on any such questions or matters. 
Article 11 
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the 
principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may 
make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to 
the Security Councilor to both. 
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any 
Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state 
which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, 
paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make 
recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states 
concerned or to the Security Councilor to both. Any such question on which 
action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General 
Assembly either before or after discussion. 
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to 
situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. 
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the 
general scope of Article 10. 
Article 12 
1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation 
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly 
shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation 
unless the Security Council so requests. 
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify 
the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the 
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maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with 
by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or 
the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, 
immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters. 
( ... ) 
CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
( ... ) 
Article 24 - Functions and Powers 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out 
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers 
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down 
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports 
to the General Assembly for its consideration. 
Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
(. .. ) 
Article 29 
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary 
for the performance of its functions. 
( ... ) 
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Article 31 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council 
may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the 
Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member 
are specially affected. 
Article 32 
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council 
or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute 
under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without 
vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down 
such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a 
Member of the United Nations. 
( ... ) 
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION 
Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, 
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for 
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional 
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be 
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The 
Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional 
measures. 
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Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 43 
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the 
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of 
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the 
facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on 
the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the 
Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups 
of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
( ... ) 
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Article 48 
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council 
may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of 
which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance In 
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
( ... ) 
CHAPTER XIV: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Article 92 
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based 
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an 
integral part of the present Charter. 
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APPENDIX 11- ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
Relevant Rules, 1995 version vs. Current version. 
A. Relevant Rules of the RPE 
version at the time of the Motion on 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal (ICTY) 
- from the filing of the Motion (23 
June 1995) to the Appeal Chamber 
Decision (2 October 1995):377 
B. Relevant Rules of the current 
version378 of the RPE: 
---- - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - : : = - - : - - - - - c ~ - - - - - -
Rule 73 Rule 72 
Preliminary Motions by Accused Preliminary Motions379 
(A) Preliminary motions by the (A) Preliminary motions, being 
accused shall include: motions which: 
(i) objections based on lack of (i) challenge jurisdiction; 
jurisdiction; 
(ii) objections based on defects in (ii) allege defects in the form of the i 
the form of the indictment; indictment; 
(iii) applications for the exclusion of (iii) seek the severance of counts 
evidence obtained from the accused joined in one indictment under Rule 49 
or having belonged to him; or seek separate trials under Rule 82 
(8); or 
(iv) applications for severance of 
crimes joined in one indictment under 
Rule 49, or for separate trials under 
Sub-rule 82 (8); 
(v) Objections based on the denial of 
request for assignment of counsel. 
(iv) raise objections based on the 
refusal of a request for assignment of 
counsel made under Rule 45 (C) 
--.--- -----------'--------------__ --.-l 
377 RPE as at the date of the Trial Decision (original version adopted on 11 February 1994, 
amended 5 May 1994, further amended 4 October 1994, revised 30 January 1995, 
amended 3 May 1995 and further amended 15 June 1995), the same version was in place 
at the date of the Appeal Chamber Decision, from 2 October 1995, as the following 
amendment to the RPE is dated from 6 October 1995. 
378 NOTE: Rule 73 is currently Rule 72 (revised on 20 October and 12 November 1997). 
379 Adopted 11 Feb 1994, revised 30 Jan 1995, amended 25 June 1996, 5 July 1996, 25 
July 1997, revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 10 July 1998, 4 Dec 1998, 17 Nov 1999, 1 Dec 
2000,13 Dec 2000,23 Apr 2002,21 July 2005, and 12 July 2007. 
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(8) Any of the motions by the shall be in writing and be brought not 
accused referred to in Sub-rule (A) later than thirty days after disclosure by 
shall be brought within sixty days after the Prosecutor to the defence of all 
his initial appearance, and in any case material and statements referred to in 
before the hearing on the merits. Rule 66 (A)(i) and shall be disposed of 
not later than sixty days after they were 
filed and before the commencement of 
the opening statements provided for in 
Rule 84. Subject to any order made by 
a Judge or the Trial Chamber, where 
permanent counsel has not yet been 
assigned to or retained by the accused, 
or where the accused has not yet 
elected in writing to conduct his or her 
defence in accordance with Rule 45 
(C) Failure to apply within the time- (F), the thirty-day time-limit under this 
limit prescribed shall constitute a Rule shall not run, notwithstanding the 
waiver of the right. Upon a showing of disclosure to the defence of the 
good cause, the Trial Chamber may material and statements referred to in 
grant relief from the waiver. Rule 66 (A)(i), until permanent counsel 
has been assigned to the accused. 
(Amended 12 July 2007) 
(8) Decisions on preliminary 
motions are without interlocutory 
appeal save 
(i) in the case of motions 
challenging jurisdiction; 
(Amended 25 June 1996 and 5 July 1996, 
amended 23 Apr 2002) 
(ii) in other cases where 
certification has been granted by the 
Trial Chamber, which may grant such 
certification if the decision involves an 
issue that would significantly affect the 
fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings or the outcome of the 
trial, and for which, in the opinion of 
the Trial Chamber, an immediate 
resolution by the Appeals Chamber 
may materially advance the 
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proceed i ngs. 
(Amended 25 June and 5 July 1996, 25 July 
1997,revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 23 
Apr 2002) 
(Revised 30 Jan 1995, revised 12 Nov 1997) 
(C) Appeals under paragraph (B)(i) 
shall be filed within fifteen days and 
requests for certification under 
paragraph (B)(ii) shall be filed within 
seven days of filing of the impugned 
decision. Where such decision is 
rendered orally, this time-limit shall run 
from the date of the oral decision, 
unless: 
(i) the party challenging the 
decision was not present or 
represented when the decision was I 
I 
pronounced, in which case the time- I 
I 
limit shall run from the date on which 
the challenging party is notified of the 
oral decision; or 
(ii) the Trial Chamber has 
indicated that a written decision will 
follow, in which case, the time-limit 
shall run from filing of the written 
decision. 
If certification is given, a party shall 
appeal to the Appeals Chamber within 
seven days of the filing of the decision 
to certify. 
(Revised 12 Nov 1997, amended 10 July 
1998, 17 Nov 1999, 1 and 13 Oec 2000, 
and 23 Apr 2002) 
(0) For the purpose of paragraphs 
(A)(i) and (B)(i), a motion challenging 
jurisdiction refers exclusively to a 
motion which challenges an indictment 
on the ground that it does not relate to: 
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(i) any of the persons indicated in 
Articles 1, 6, 7 and 9 of the Statute; 
(ii) the territories indicated in 
Articles 1, 8 and 9 of the Statute; 
(iii) the period indicated in Articles 
1, 8 and 9 of the Statute; 
(iv) any of the violations indicated 
in Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the 
Statute. 
(Amended 1 and 13 Dec 2000) 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - + ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - -
Rule 91 Rule 91 
False Testimony under Solemn 
Declaration 
(A) A Chamber, on its own initiative 
or at the request of a party, may warn a 
witness of the duty to tell the truth and 
the consequences that may result from 
a failure to do so. 
False Testimony under Solemn 
Declaration 
(A) A Chamber, proprio motu or at 
the request of a party, may warn a 
witness of the duty to tell the truth and 
the consequences that may result from 
a failure to do so. 
(8) If a Chamber has strong (8) 
(Amended 25 July 1997) 
If a Chamber has strong 
grounds for believing that a witness has 
knowingly and wilfully given false 
grounds for believing that a witness has 
knowingly and wilfully given false 
testimony, it may direct the Prosecutor testimony, it may: 
to investigate the matter with a view to (i) direct the Prosecutor to 
the preparation and submission of an investigate the matter with a view to the 
indictment for false testimony. preparation and submission of an 
indictment for false testimony; or 
(Amended 13 Dec 2001) 
(ii) where the Prosecutor, in the 
view of the Chamber, has a conflict of 
interest with respect to the relevant 
conduct, direct the Registrar to appoint 
an amicus curiae to investigate the 
matter and report back to the Chamber 
as to whether there are sufficient 
grounds for instigating proceedings for 
false testimony. 
(Amended 13 Dec 2001) 
(C) If the Chamber considers that 
there are sufficient grounds to proceed 
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against a person for giVing false 
testimony, the Chamber may: 
(i) in circumstances described in 
paragraph (8)(i), direct the Prosecutor 
to prosecute the matter; or 
(ii) in circumstances described in 
paragraph (8)(ii), issue an order in lieu 
of an indictment and direct amicus 
curiae to prosecute the matter. 
(Amended 13 Dec 2001) 
(C) The rules of procedure and (0) The rules of procedure and 
evidence in Parts Four to Eight shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings 
under this Rule. 
evidence in Parts Four to Eight shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings 
under this Rule. 
(E) Any person indicted for or 
charged with false testimony shall, if 
that person satisfies the criteria for 
determination of indigence established 
by the Registrar, be assigned counsel 
in accordance with Rule 45. 
(Amended 13 Dec 2001) 
(0) No Judge who sat as a (F) No Judge who sat as a 
member of the Trial Chamber before member of the Trial Chamber before 
which the witness appeared shall sit for which the witness appeared shall sit for 
the trial of the witness for false the trial of the witness for false 
testimony. testimony. 
(E) The maximum penalty for false (G) The maximum penalty for false 
testimony under solemn declaration 
shall be a fine of US$1 0, 000 or a term 
of imprisonment of twelve months, or 
both. The payment of any fine imposed 
shall be made to the Registrar to be 
held in the account referred to in Sub-
rule 77(E). 
testimony under solemn declaration 
shall be a fine of 100,000 Euros or a 
term of imprisonment of seven years, or 
both. The payment of any fine imposed 
shall be paid to the Registrar to be held 
in the account referred to in Rule 77 
(H). 
(Amended 18 Jan 1996, 25 July 1997, 12 
Nov 1997, 4 Dec 1998, 1 and 13 Dec 2000, 
and 13 Dec 2001) 
(H) Paragraphs (8) to (G) apply 
mutatis mutandis to a person who 
knowingly and willingly makes a false 
statement in a written statement taken 
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in accordance with Rule 92 bis or Rule 
92 quater which the person knows or 
has reason to know may be used as 
evidence in proceedings before the 
Tribunal. 
(Amended 17 Nov 1999, 1 and 13 Dec 
2000, 13 Dec 2001, and 13 Sept 2006) 
(I) Any decision rendered by a 
Trial Chamber under this Rule shall be 
subject to appeal. Notice of appeal 
shall be filed within fifteen days of filing 
of the impugned decision. Where such 
decision is rendered orally, the notice 
shall be filed within fifteen days of the 
oral decision, unless 
(i) the party challenging the 
decision was not present or 
represented when the decision was 
pronounced, in which case the time- i 
limit shall run from the date on which I 
the challenging party is notified of the 
oral decision; or 
(ii) the Trial Chamber has 
indicated that a written decision will 
follow, in which case the time-limit shall 
run from filing of the written decision. 
(Amended 1 and 13 Dec 2000) 
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APPENDIX III - "Summary of arguments" in the Persecution Response to the 
Defence Motion on the legitimacy of the ICTY, as filed before the Trial Chamber380 
"SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
II. The establishment of the ICTY is a legitimate exercise of Security 
Council powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
A. The establishment of the ICTY is within the powers of the Security 
Council 
1. Judicial review over Security Council powers 
2. Review of determinations by the Security Council relating to the 
existence of a threat to international peace and security, and the 
measures to be adopted 
3. The powers of the Security Council are broad and permissive, 
giving rise to a presumption of legality with respect to measures 
adopted under Chapter VII 
4. Being an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, no treaty is 
required for the establishment of the ICTY 
5. The establishment of the ICTY is not in conflict with the prospective 
establishment of a permanent international penal tribunal 
6. The powers of the General Assembly and Security Council are not 
mutually exclusive 
7. Unlike the Security Council, the powers of the General Assembly 
do not extend to the adoption of binding enforcement measures 
B. The establishment of the ICTY is a valid measure under Chapter VII 
of the Charter 
1. The serious violations of humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 constitute a threat to 
international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII 
380 Highlighted in the original. 
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2. Impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law is 
an impediment to the restoration of peace and security in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia 
3. He protection of humanitarian and human rights law is a legitimate 
area of Security Council action 
4. The Security Council has authority over individuals with respect to 
serious violations of humanitarian law 
5. Nothing in the Charter precludes the establishment of a subsidiary 
judicial organ by the Security Council 
6. The establishment of a subsidiary judicial organ by the Security 
Council does not affect its independence or impartiality 
C. The IClY has primary jurisdiction to try this case and all cases 
alleging violations within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
IClY Statute 
1. The accused has no standing to raise the issue of primacy over 
domestic courts 
2. The Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Federal Republic of Germany have accepted the primary 
jurisdiction of the ICTY 
3. As an entity without international recognition, the so-called 'Bosnian 
Serb Republic' cannot invoke the sovereign rights of States 
4. The serious violations of humanitarian law within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the IClY are matters of universal jurisdiction which 
may be vested in an international jurisdiction 
5. Jus de non evocando does not defeat the right of a State to confer 
jurisdiction on the ICTY 
6. The serious violations of humanitarian law within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the ICTY give rise to obligations erga omnes which 
justify collective measures by the international community 
overriding State sovereignty 
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7. Chapter VII action by the Security Council overrides the sovereign 
rights of States 
8. The exercise of primary jurisdiction by the ICTY does not infringe 
the rights of the accused, and is warranted by the universal 
interests threatened by the crimes committed by the accused, and 
by the right of the international community to repress such crimes in 
an international jurisdiction 
III. Applicability of the subject-matter jurisdiction 
A. The ICTY has the power to prosecute the accused under Article 2 
of the Statute on the grounds that all relevant times the 
requirements for the applicability of the Grave Breaches 
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were satisfied 
1. The organs of the United Nations, the Security Council in particular, 
regard the conflict in the Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
international armed conflict 
2. An international armed conflict existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
at all relevant times during which the accused is alleged to have 
committed Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
3. Once the Geneva Conventions of 1949 become applicable, there is 
a presumption that they continue to be applicable in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary 
4. The applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 does not 
terminate with the cessation of hostilities 
5. The parties to the conflict in BiH have agreed to apply the Grave 
Breaches provisions by means of special agreements pursuant to 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
6. The parties to the conflict in BiH are bound by the Grave Breaches 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by virtue of unilateral 
declarations 
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7. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has 
implicitly agreed that the conflict in BiH is international in character 
B. The IClY has the power to prosecute the accused under Article 3 
of the Statute for committing Violations of the Laws or Customs of 
War in an armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character 
1. The term 'laws or customs of war' in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
applies to both international and internal armed conflicts 
2. Since the enumerated acts under Article 3 are illustrative and not 
exhaustive, the ICTY has jurisdiction to apply the minimum 
standards contained in Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, by virtue of its status as a norm of international 
customary law as well as the treaty obligations of the former 
Yugoslavia and its relevant successor States, and insofar as they 
constitute serious violations of humanitarian law and of the laws or 
customs of war under Articles 1 and 3 of the Statute respectively 
3. The minimum standards contained in Article 3 common to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions are applicable to both international and 
internal armed conflicts and, therefore, it is unnecessary for the 
ICTY to inquire into the characterization of the armed conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia 
4. Application of the minimum standards contained in Article 3 
common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not violate the 
principle nul/urn crimen sine lege insofar as it is a norm of 
international customary law and a binding treaty obligation of the 
former Yugoslavia and its relevant successor States 
C. The IClY has the power to prosecute the accused under Article 5 
of the IClY Statute insofar as crimes against humanity do not 
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require a nexus with an armed conflict, whether international or 
internal in character 
1. The requirement of a nexus with armed conflict under Article 6 (c) 
of the Nuremberg Charter is an artificial link, peculiar to the 
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and is not indicative of the 
underlying principles of international law 
2. The Law No. 10 ofthe Control Council for Germany did not require 
a nexus with armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character 
3. Under contemporary international law, it is well-established that 
crimes against humanity do not require a nexus with an armed 
conflict, whether international or internal in character 
4. Elementary considerations of humanity cannot be violated in 
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character 
5. The definition of crimes against humanity in Article 5 of the ICTY 
Statute is in full conformity with the principle nul/um crimen sine 
lege" 
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APPENDIX IV - UNSC Resolutions 808 and 827 
UNITED NATIONS 
Security Council 
S/RES/808 (1993) 
RESOLUTION 808 (1993) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3175th rleeting, 
on 22 February 1993 
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The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions, 
Recalling paragraph 10 of its resolution 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, in which it 
reaffirmed that all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under 
international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave 
breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such 
breaches, 
Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, in which, inter alia, it 
demanded that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all 
military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all 
breaches of international humanitarian law, 
Recalling further its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, in which it requested 
the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial 
Commission of Experts to examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant 
to resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992), together with such further information as 
the Commission of Experts may obtain, with a view to providing the Secretary-
General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia, 
Having considered the interim report of the Commission of Experts established by 
resolution 780 (1992) (S/25274), in which the Commission observed that a 
decision to establish an ad-hoc international tribunal in relation to events in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia would be consistent with the direction of its work, 
Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread 
violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, including reports of mass killings and the continuance of the 
practice of "ethnic cleansing", 
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Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to 
justice the persons who are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the 
establishment of an international tribunal would enable this aim to be achieved and 
would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, 
Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for the 
establishment of such a tribunal (S/25221), 
Noting also with grave concern the "report of the European Community 
investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia" 
(S/25240, Annex 1), 
Noting further the report of the committee of jurists submitted by France (S/25266), 
the report of the commission of jurists submitted by Italy (S/25300), and the report 
transmitted by the Permanent Representatives of Sweden on behalf of the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) (S/25307), 
1. Decides that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for consideration by the Council at 
the earliest possible date, and if possible no later than 60 days after the adoption of 
the present resolution, a report on all the aspects of this matter, including specific 
proposals and where appropriate options for the effective and exped itious 
implementation of the decision contained in paragraph 1 above, taking into account 
suggestions put forward in this regard by Member States; 
3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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UNITED NATIONS 
Security Council 
S/RES/827 (1993) 
RESOLUTION 827 (1993) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, 
on 25 May 1993 
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The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions, 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/25704 and Add.1) 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 808 (1993), 
Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread and 
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia, and especially in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
including reports of mass killings, massive, organized and systematic detention 
and rape of women, and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic cleansing", 
including for the acquisition and the holding of territory, 
Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to 
justice the persons who are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the 
establishment as an ad-hoc measure by the Council of an international tribunal and 
the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace, 
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of 
persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international 
humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and 
effectively redressed, 
Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 
Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for the 
establishment of such a tribunal (S/25221), 
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Reaffirming in this regard its decision in resolution 808 (1993) that an international 
tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, 
Considering that, pending the appointment of the Prosecutor of the International 
Tribunal, the Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) 
should continue on an urgent basis the collection of information relating to 
evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of 
international humanitarian law as proposed in its interim report (S/25274), 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General; 
2. Decides hereby to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 
and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace 
and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Tribunal annexed to the 
above-mentioned report; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the judges of the International 
Tribunal, upon their election, any suggestions received from States for the rules of 
procedure and evidence called for in Article 15 of the Statute of the International 
Tribunal; 
4. Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its 
organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the 
International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures 
necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present 
resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with 
requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the 
Statute; 
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5. Urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to 
contribute funds, equipment and services to the International Tribunal, including 
the offer of expert personnel; 
6. Decides that the determination of the seat of the International Tribunal is subject 
to the conclusion of appropriate arrangements between the United Nations and the 
Netherlands acceptable to the Council, and that the International Tribunal may sit 
elsewhere when it considers it necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions; 
7. Decides also that the work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out 
without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, 
compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international 
humanitarian law; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to implement urgently the present resolution 
and in particular to make practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the 
International Tribunal at the earliest time and to report periodically to the Council; 
9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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APPENDIX V - Relevant quotations and articles, as published in the ICTY website, 
of the version of the: 
"UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
( ... ) 
(Not an official document. This compilation is based on original United Nations 
resolutions. ) 
( ... ) 
UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
RESOLUTION 808 (1993) 
RESOLUTION 827 (1993) 
RESOLUTION 1166 (1998) 
Annex 
RESOLUTION 1329 (2000) 
( ... ) 
ICTY RELATED RESOLUTIONS 
Resolutions with no amendments to the Statute, but relevant to the ICTY. 
RESOLUTION 1503 (2003) 
( ... ) 
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UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
(ADOPTED 25 MAY 1993 BY RESOLUTION 827) 
(AS AMENDED 13 MAY 1998 BY RESOLUTION 1166) 
(AS AMENDED 30 NOVEMBER 2000 BY RESOLUTION 1329) 
(AS AMENDED 17 MAY 2002 BY RESOLUTION 1411) 
(AS AMENDED 14 AUGUST 2002 BY RESOLUTION 1431) 
(AS AMENDED 19 MAY 2003 BY RESOLUTION 1481) 
(AS AMENDED 20 APRIL 2005 BY RESOLUTION 1597) 
(AS AMENDED 28 FEBRUARY 2006 BY RESOLUTION 1660) 
(AS AMENDED 29 SEPTEMBER 2008 BY RESOLUTION 1837) 
(AS AMENDED 7 JULY 2009 BY RESOLUTION 1877) 
Having been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter 
referred to as "the International Tribunal") shall function in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
222 
Article 1 
Competence of the International Tribunal 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Statute. 
Article 2 
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or 
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the 
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
(a) wilful killing; 
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile 
power; 
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular 
trial; 
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; 
(h) taking civilians as hostages. 
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Article 3 
Violations of the laws or customs of war 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the 
laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: 
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering; 
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity; 
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings; 
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and 
works of art and science; 
(e) plunder of public or private property. 
( ... ) 
Article 5 
Crimes against humanity 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or 
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: 
(a) murder; 
(b) extermination; 
(c) enslavement; 
(d) deportation; 
(e) imprisonment; 
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(f) tortu re; 
(g) rape; 
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) other inhumane acts. 
Article 6 
Personal jurisdiction 
The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to 
the provisions of the present Statute. 
Article 7 
Individual criminal responsibility 
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 
to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime. 
( ... ) 
Article 8 
Territorial and temporal jurisdiction 
The territorial jurisdiction of the International Tribunal shall extend to the territory of 
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, 
airspace and territorial waters. The temporal jurisdiction of the International 
Tribunal shall extend to a period beginning on 1 January 1991. 
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Article 9 
Concurrent jurisdiction 
1. The International Tribunal and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction 
to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. 
2. The International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. At any stage 
of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request national courts to 
defer to the competence of the International Tribunal in accordance with the 
present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Tribunal. 
Article 10 
Non-bis-in-idem 
1. No person shall be tried before a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute, for which he 
or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal. 
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the 
International Tribunal only if: 
(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or 
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were 
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the 
case was not diligently prosecuted. 
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime under 
the present Statute, the International Tribunal shall take into account the extent to 
which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same 
act has already been served. 
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( ... ) 
Article 13 bis 
Election of permanent judges 
1. Fourteen of the permanent judges of the International Tribunal shall be elected 
by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council, in the 
following manner: 
(a) The Secretary-General shall invite nominations for judges of the International 
Tribunal from States Members of the United Nations and non-member States 
maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters; 
( ... ) 
(c) The Secretary-General shall forward the nominations received to the Security 
Council. From the nominations received the Security Council shall establish a list of 
not less than twenty-eight and not more than forty-two candidates, taking due 
account of the adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world; 
(d) The President of the Security Council shall transmit the list of candidates to the 
President of the General Assembly. From that list the General Assembly shall elect 
fourteen permanent judges of the International Tribunal. ( ... ) 
2. In the event of a vacancy in the Chambers amongst the permanent judges 
elected or appointed in accordance with this article, after consultation with the 
Presidents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, the Secretary-
General shall appoint a person meeting the qualifications of article 13 of the 
Statute, for the remainder of the term of office concerned. 
( ... ) 
Article 13 ter 
Election and appointment of ad litem judges 
1. The ad litem judges of the International Tribunal shall be elected by the General 
Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council, in the following manner: 
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( ... ) 
Article 15 
Rules of procedure and evidence 
The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and 
appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and 
other appropriate matters. 
Article 16 
The Prosecutor 
1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. 
2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International 
Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or 
from any other source. 
3. The Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed of a Prosecutor and such other 
qualified staff as may be required. 
4. The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Security Council on nomination by the 
Secretary-General. He or she shall be of high moral character and possess the 
highest level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and 
prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor shall serve for a four-year term and 
be eligible for reappointment. The terms and conditions of service of the 
Prosecutor shall be those of an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
5. The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Secretary-
General on the recommendation of the Prosecutor. 
( ... ) 
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Article 20 
Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings 
1. The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that 
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and 
evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the 
protection of victims and witnesses. 
2. A person against whom an indictment has been confirmed shall, pursuant to an 
order or an arrest warrant of the International Tribunal, be taken into custody, 
immediately informed of the charges against him and transferred to the 
International Tribunal. 
3. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the 
accused are respected, confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and 
instruct the accused to enter a plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for 
trial. 
4. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the 
proceedings in accordance with its rules of procedure and evidence. 
Article 21 
Rights of the accused 
1. All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal. 
2. In the determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a 
fair and public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute. 
3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present 
Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full 
equality: 
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(a) to be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of 
the nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(c) to be tried without undue delay; 
(d) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal 
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case 
where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such 
case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; 
(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him; 
(f) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in the International Tribunal; 
(g) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
( ... ) 
Article 25 
Appellate proceedings 
1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial 
Chambers or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds: 
(a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or 
(b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the 
Trial Chambers. 
( ... ) 
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Article 29 
Co-operation and judicial assistance 
1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an 
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: 
( ... ) 
(d) the arrest or detention of persons; 
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal. 
( ... ) 
Article 32 
Expenses of the International Tribunal 
The expenses of the International Tribunal shall be borne by the regular budget of 
the United Nations in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
( ... ) 
Article 34 
Annual report 
The President of the International Tribunal shall submit an annual report of the 
International Tribunal to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. 
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